【摘要】 电力公司实施可中断负荷管理时,电力公司与发电商的不同行动次序会产生不同的效果。基于Stackelberg和Cournot模型,分别分析了电力公司先行动、后行动、与发电商同时行动的市场均衡。分析结果表明,电力公司先行动能中断的负荷最多,亦即先动优势,而电力公司后行动的市场价格最低。然后从促进发电侧电力市场竞争程度的角度出发,分析了电力公司采取各种行动所适用的环境,为电力公司在电力市场环境下实施可中断负荷管理提供了一种解决方案。更多还原

【Abstract】 Different sequences of utility and generators action will lead to different outcomes when interruptible load management is carried out by a utility. Based on Stackelberg and Cournot models, this paper analyzes the market equilibrium of a utility acting first, acting second and acting simultaneously with power companies, respectively. The results show that the load curtailed will be heaviest if the utility acts first, i.e. the advantage of acting first, while the market price will be lowest if it acts second. To promote the competition in the power market, the conditions suitable for the different moves of a utility are analyzed, and a scheme for it to implement interruptible load management in the electricity market is provided.更多还原