【摘要】 在信息不对称和目前不完全竞争的风险投资市场中,投资者与风险投资家之间存在一种契约关系,这种契约关系在风险投资市场中不可避免地产生了委托-代理问题,从而产生了"逆向选择"和"道德风险"难题。这将使整个风险投资市场的运行效率下降,风险放大。因此,如何设计一套激励与约束机制来协调两者的关系对于风险投资的成败至关重要。更多还原

【Abstract】 On the market with incomplete competition and information asymmetry, there is a contractual relationship between the investor and the venture capitalist which will unavoidably bring the principal-agent problem: adverse selection and moral hazard. It will decrease the operating efficiency of the whole venture investment market and add to its risk. Therefore, designing an effective prompting and restricting mechanism to harmonize the relationship is vital to the success of the venture investment.Key wards:venture capitalist; contractual relationship; prompting and restricting更多还原