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风险企业与投资公司的博弈分析

Analyzing Both Venture Business and Investment Company from the Perspectives of Game Theory

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【作者】 张广李英侠王新宇

【Author】 ZHANG Guang, LI Ying-xia, WANG Xin-yu(College of Economics and Management, Beijing Aviation and Aerospace University, Beijing 100083, China)

【机构】 北京航空航天大学经济管理学院北京航空航天大学经济管理学院 北京100083北京100083北京100083

【摘要】 风险企业和投资公司在完全信息条件下存在静态博弈均衡和动态博弈均衡 ,二者既有相同点 ,又有差异。在其他条件不变的情况下 ,商业计划书的水平应与风险企业资金缺口的大小成正比。动态博弈的先动优势均衡点的变化是由风险企业的先动优势决定的。

【Abstract】 Both static gaming balance and dynamic one reside in venture business and investment company that are under the state of completely open information; the two types of balances have something in common as well as in difference. Provided that other conditions are invariant, the level of commercial planning paper shows a direct proportion with fund insufficiency of venture business. The changes of pre-advantageous balancing-point of dynamic gaming are decided by pre-advantage of venture business.

【关键词】 风险企业投资公司博弈均衡
【Key words】 venture businessinvestment companygamingbalance
  • 【分类号】F832.48
  • 【被引频次】6
  • 【下载频次】132
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