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信用担保制度提高信贷市场绩效的理论与方案

The Theory and Solutions to Improve Credit Market Performance under Credit Guarantee Institutions

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【作者】 苏旺胜施祖麟

【Author】 SU Wangsheng, SHI Zulin(School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua Univesity, Beijing 100084, China)

【机构】 清华大学公共管理学院清华大学公共管理学院 北京 100084北京 100084

【摘要】 经济学家研究指出,信息不对称性引起的逆向选择和道德危害使得信贷市场呈现出不完全性。当信贷市场中的资金需求方是中小企业时,信贷市场的不完全性表现得更为突出。文章从理论上证明,在满足一定的条件下,信用担保制度可以有效地缓解信息不对称性,并就信用担保制度更好地提高信贷市场的绩效而给出解决方案。

【Abstract】 Economists maintain that Credit Markets are imperfect due to the existence of adverse selection and moral hazard caused by asymmetric information, and credit market failures will become more serious while potential borrowers are SMEs (Small and Medium Sized Enterprises). This paper formalizes the idea that a wellstructured CGIs (Credit Guarantee Institutions) can alleviate effectively the asymmetric information under some conditions and proves it in theory. Moreover, there are some solutions to improve credit market performance under CGIs provided in the end of this paper.

  • 【文献出处】 清华大学学报(哲学社会科学版) ,Journal of Tsinghua University(Philosophy and Social Sciences) , 编辑部邮箱 ,2003年S1期
  • 【分类号】F830.5
  • 【被引频次】69
  • 【下载频次】417
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