【摘要】 本文从博弈的角度对注册会计师的“诚信”进行了经济学分析 ,认为“诚信”实质上就是博弈参与方为了长远利益而“牺牲”眼前利益的一种非正式约束 ,其能否自动实施取决于以下因素 :产权的清晰程度、行业租金的大小、审计师如果舞弊被发现的概率以及所受处罚的大小和审计师来自于管理层的“审计租”的大小。通过对现实的考察 ,笔者发现我国目前还不具备产生“诚信”的制度基础。最后 ,笔者对“诚信”的构筑提出相应政策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 From the point of view of the game theory,the authors make an economic analysis on CPA’s Trust and point out that Trust,in essence,is an informal institutiona l arrangement in which the players scarify the interest in the short run for the interest in the long run.Whether it can be self-fulfilled depends on the facto rs as follows:the clarity degree of property rights,the industrial rent,the p ossibility of auditors being discovered when making a fraud and the penalty impo sed on the fraudulent auditor,the audit rent from management.Through the surve y of the circumstance in China,the authors discover that at present there is a lack of institutional basis to"produce Trust".Finally,the authors make some s uggestions to construct the Trust in China.更多还原