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中国农村基层治理与公共物品提供

Local Governance and Public Goods Provision in Rural China

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【作者】 张晓波樊胜根张林秀黄季焜

【Author】 XIAOBO ZHANG and SHENGGEN FAN(International Food Policy Research Institute)LINXIU ZHANG and JIKUN HUANG(Chinese Academy of Sciences)

【机构】 国际食物政策研究所(IFPRI)中国科学院农业政策研究中心

【摘要】 在发展中国家,寻求最有效的社区治理方式已经成为农村发展的关键。因此,就各种治理方式进行实证评价已经刻不容缓。20世纪90年代初以来,中国农村有成千上万个村子进行了村民选举,这无疑为研究民主对农村基层公共物品提供的影响提供了良机。基于最近一次农村调查,本文就两种基层治理方式进行了比较,研究结果表明村民选举有助于增加村的收入,且主要靠企业上缴的税收。但是,私有化增加了向企业征税的难度。单靠选举不一定能增加村财务支出中公共投资的比例。只有真正实现决策权分担以后,公共支出中用于公共投资的比例才会增加。

【Abstract】 In developing countries, identifying the most effective community-level gover-nance mode is a key issue in rural development; therefore, empirical evaluation of these differentmodes is desperately needed. Since the early 1990s, tens of thousands of villages in rural Chinahave held local-government elections, providing a good opportunity to investigate the effect of de-mocratization on the level of public goods provision. Using a recent village survey conducted over asignificant period of time, this article compares two different governance modes. It finds that elec-tions help increase the size of revenue of local community primarily by generating more taxes fromenterprises. However, privatization has made taxation or levies on rural enterprises more difficult.Elections alone do not necessarily improve the allocation of public expenditures. Only when deci-sion-making power is shared, is the share of public investment higher.

【关键词】 治理民主公共物品提供
【基金】 中国国家自然基金委(项目批准号:79970065);澳大利亚国际农业研究中心资助;国际食物政策研究所资助
  • 【文献出处】 经济学(季刊) ,China Economic Quarterly , 编辑部邮箱 ,2003年03期
  • 【分类号】D422.0
  • 【被引频次】98
  • 【下载频次】2810
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