【摘要】 本文在一个引入消费攀比的McCallum-Goodfriend框架中,讨论了通货膨胀的福利成本。在政府开支由收入税、一次总付税和铸币税融资的假定下,消费攀比程度与通货膨胀福利成本之间的相关性受收入税率的影响。另外,本文所得到的福利成本要稍高于Lucas模型中的成本。本文还发现,当经济中不存在消费攀比时,最优收入税率和最优名义利率都等于零;反之,则最优名义利率等于零,最优收入税率不等于零。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper studies the welfare cost of inflation in a McCallum-Goodfriend framework when "catching up with Joneses" is inherent in the consumer’s consumption behavior. Under the assumption that the government spending is financed by income tax, a lump-sum tax and seigniorage, we find that for mild inflation, the relationship between the inflation cost and the intensity of consumers’ catching up Joneses depends on the income tax rate. We find that the inflation cost is slightly higher than the cost found in Lucas’s paper. In addition, if there is no consumption externality in the economy, the optimal income tax and interest rate are both zero.更多还原