【摘要】 研究了 2× 1模型假设下的均衡 ,结果表明 ,在 2× 1模型假设下 ,如果企业家选取混合均衡战略 ,那么当创业资本家的先动收益均为负值时 ,模型博弈存在稳定均衡解 ;但当至少一个创业资本家的先动收益为正值时 ,模型博弈不存在稳定均衡解 .如果存在稳定均衡解 ,那么创业资本家的注意力不仅是自身在契约订立博弈阶段的转归值的递增函数 ,也是其他创业资本家在契约订立博弈阶段的转归值的递增函数 ;不仅是自身评估成本的递减函数 ,也是其他创业资本家评估成本的递减函数 ;同时也是创业理念实现紧迫程度的递减函数 .更多还原

【Abstract】 The dynamic game which one entrepreneur sought related resources from two venture capitalists constructed a Markov game. When this Markov game satisfied the stationary assumption, if the entrepreneur adopted the mixed equilibrium strategy, then when the first mover payoff of all venture capitalists were negative, the game has stationary equilibrium; when it was positive, the game has no stationary equilibrium. When there was a stationary equilibrium, the attention of venture capitalists was increasing on his imputation and that of others, decreasing on his evaluation cost and that of others and decreasing on realization urgency of the venture idea.更多还原