节点文献
电力市场中电厂报价的重复博弈分析
Analysis of the repeated games for pricing electricity in electric power market
【摘要】 利用博弈论对电厂的报价行为进行了分析 .首先通过古诺模型分析了电厂单阶段博弈情况下的报价策略 ,然后分别研究了电厂在有限次和无限次重复博弈的过程中可能采取的战略 ,指出在后一种情况下电厂存在合作的可能性 ,并且进一步比较了不同战略下合作的可能性大小
【Abstract】 A game theoretical approach was presented for pricing electricity. The market was modeled as a Cournot model to analyze one stage game of participants in decision making. As in the day ahead market, generation plants must submit supply offers. This process can be modeled into repeated games where the equilibrium is very different from that in the single stage game. An example shows that generation plants have incentives to ally in some instance and the possibility of allying varies from one strategy to the other.
【关键词】 电力市场;
投标策略;
博弈论;
重复博弈;
【Key words】 electric power market; bidding strategy; game theory; repeated games;
【Key words】 electric power market; bidding strategy; game theory; repeated games;
【基金】 国家自然科学基金资助项目 ( 60 0 740 3 3 )
- 【文献出处】 华中科技大学学报(自然科学版) ,Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology , 编辑部邮箱 ,2003年02期
- 【分类号】F224.32
- 【被引频次】29
- 【下载频次】364