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最优股权结构设计的博弈分析

Analysis of Optimal Equity Structure Design from Games Theory

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【作者】 敬志勇孙培源吴志雄欧阳令南

【Author】 JING Zhi-yong SUN Pei-yuan WU Zhi-xiong OUYANG Ling-nan (Business and Management School,Shanghai Jiaotong University,Shanghai 200052,China)

【机构】 上海交通大学管理学院上海交通大学管理学院 上海市200052上海市200052上海市200052

【摘要】 股权相对集中是现代股份制度的典型特征。从发起人控股股东角度看 ,如何实现股权价值最大化是其进行投资及融资的主要目标。为了能够以较低成本进行外源性股权融资 ,发起人控股股东必须接受外部大股东的适度监督。从外部监督股东看 ,为了减少发起人控股股东转移公司价值 ,必须对其予以监督 ,因而必须持有最低限度的股权比例才有助于实现自身价值最大化。所以 ,发起人控股股东进行股权融资时 ,必须设计最优股权结构 ,最终实现股权融资的激励相容。

【Abstract】 Relatively concentrated equity structure is a quint essential character of modern stock system. From the view of controlling original shareholders, to maximize equity value is their main goal that they take on investment and finance. In order to get enough capital at lower cost, controlling original shareholders have to accept external investor’s limited monitoring. From the view of external monitoring shareholders, they have to monitor controlling original shareholders′ actions that turn corporation′s assets into their private fortune. Therefore, they must hold minimal shares to achieve their equity value maximization. So controlling original shareholders should design optimal ownership structure to achieve incentive compatibility between them.

  • 【文献出处】 中国工业经济 ,China Industrial Economy , 编辑部邮箱 ,2003年09期
  • 【分类号】F276.6
  • 【被引频次】38
  • 【下载频次】1036
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