【摘要】 本文运用现代经济学中的不完全合约以及预算软约束两个分析框架对开放式基金的治理机制进行分析 ,认为基于特殊的信息披露机制以及特有的赎回机制 ,开放式基金本身独特的合约安排可以自动引致一个有效地解决道德风险与逆向选择等委托代理问题的治理机制。对开放式基金而言 ,其治理机制的有效性是内生的。正因此 ,开放式基金具备了蓬勃发展的良好条件更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper analyzes the governance mechanism of opened end fund by the use of two modern economical analysis methods incomplete contract and soft budget constraint, and holds that on the basis of opened end funds own special information announcement mechanism and redeem mechanism, opened end funds own contracts arrangement can automatically result in an effective governance mechanism to solve the principal agent problems such as moral hazard and adverse selection. As far as opened end fund is concerned, its endogenous governance mechanism is effectiveness. Just because of that, opened end fund possesses a good condition of flourishing development.更多还原