【摘要】 针对传统博弈理论在解释参与人合作的局限性及蜈蚣博弈悖论所体现的博弈理论方面的缺陷,构建了暗恋博弈模型并以此分析了合作博弈的理性基础,分析了从不完全信息到共同知识演进的过程,讨论了参与人的风险规避、风险大小、折现系数、合作支付大小、博弈阶段数等变量对于不完全信息条件下合作博弈初始条件的影响以及基于贝叶斯推断的博弈学习机制,运用模型分析的结论解释了先锋模范人物的带头作用及中国传统观念"枪打出头鸟"等社会现象。更多还原

【Abstract】 Aiming at the limit of traditional game on its accounting for partners’ cooperation and the defects of game theory such as centipede game paradox,the mode of loving game in secret is fabricated to analyze the rational base of cooperation game,the evolution course from incomplete information to common knowledge is analyzed. The influence of some factors such as the partners’ dodging risk, risk, discounting coefficient, cooperation payoff, stage number on the primitive condition of cooperation game under incomplete information and mechanics of game learning based on Baysian deduction are discussed. The conclusion of mode analyses is used to interpret the take-the-lead role of exemplars and such traditional Chinese social phenomenon as "the bird which appear in public is the first bird to be beaten".更多还原