【摘要】 本文对 1998年和 1999年在上海和深圳证券交易所的近千家上市公司经理人补偿、相关会计数据、公司市值进行统计分析与相关性分析 ,验证了有关经理人补偿的一些与国外一致的观点 :经理人补偿与公司规模 (包括会计与市场两方面 )成正相关关系 ,公司规模越大则经理人补偿越多。由于国有法人股的存在 ,公司治理制度与环境具备一些特殊性 ,我们也得到了一些我们尚未从文献中见到的结论 :经理人补偿与其年龄正相关 ,年龄越大收入越高 ;经理人补偿与国有股比例负相关 ,国有法人股比例越高的公司中经理人补偿越低 ;经理人持股没有明显的激励作用 ,即经理人持股数量与公司经营业绩没有相关关系。更多还原

【Abstract】 By making the statistical and correlation analysis on manager’s compensation, the relevant accounting data and the corporate market value of nearly one thousand listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in 1998-1999, this paper verifies some viewpoints on manager’s compensation, that are the same as foreign ones. One of them is that between the manager’s compensation and the corporate scale (including the two assets of accounting and market) lies direct correlation, i.e. the larger scale, the more compensation. Because of the existing of the state-owned corporate stock, the corporate governance system and environment are provided with some particularities and again we have Drawn some conclusions not yet found in any documents. These conclusions are as follows. Between manager’s compensation and his or her age lies direct correlation, i.e. the older age, the higher income. Between manager’s compensation and state-held stock proportion lies negative correlation, i.e. the higher the state-owned stock proportion, the lower manager’s compensation. The manager’s share-holding is not conspicuously stimulating, that is to say, there is no correlation between the amount of manager’s share-holding and corporate performances.更多还原