【摘要】 讨论了非合作竞赛反馈策略下厂商抽取地下水的策略行为．分析了地下水这一公共物品引起的几种外部性，即存量外部性、抽取成本外部性和风险外部性．通过公共物品策略和中央控制策略下地下水开发使用者成本和外部性的对比分析，指出公共物品策略下地下水开发太快，不能使社会资源达到最优配置．更多还原

【Abstract】 The rate of groundwater extraction under the common property regime is the outcome of a non corporative game played with feedback strategies.The analysis clarifies several externalities associatied with the common property extraction of groundwater and identifies an risk externality that arises when firms are risk averse.It is concluded that the pumping rate of groundwater exceeds the optimal rate through analysis of the costs and externalities of groundwater exploitation under the common property regime and the central control agency.更多还原