节点文献
不完全信息下的封闭投标机制研究
A STUDY ON SEALED-BID MECHANISM WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
【摘要】 本文在相互依存的两点分布假设下研究了一种常用的协商机制--封闭投标机制,把它构造成一个不完全信息的非合作对策模型。在此基础上,给出了Bayesian-Nash平衡点的完全刻划,按其实现的效率把平衡点集分类,深入地研究了它们的存在性、效率及相互关系。最后,研究了先验信念分布的变化对平衡点集的影响,证明Bayesian-Nash平衡点集对整个先验分布类具有上半连续性,仅对于一个较小的先验分布类具有下半连续性。
【Abstract】 In this paper,we study sealed-bid mechanism with two-type value structure,which is modelled as a kind of nonccoperative games with incomplete in-formation. Based on the model,the sets of Bayesian equilibrium are characterized,their existence, efficiency and relation are analysed,and the effect of change of trad-er′s beliefs to the sets of Bayesian equilibrium is discussed.
【关键词】 协商理论;
封闭式投标;
不完全信息;
Bayesian-Nash平衡点;
效率;
灵敏性;
【Key words】 bargaining theory; sealed-bid; incomplete information; Bayesian-Nash equilibrium; efficiency; sensitivity;
【Key words】 bargaining theory; sealed-bid; incomplete information; Bayesian-Nash equilibrium; efficiency; sensitivity;
【基金】 国家自然科学基金,博士点基金
- 【文献出处】 系统工程学报 ,JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING , 编辑部邮箱 ,1995年04期
- 【分类号】F224
- 【被引频次】2
- 【下载频次】53