【作者】 张丹；

【导师】 李秉祥；

【作者基本信息】 西安理工大学 ， 工商管理， 2025， 博士

【摘要】 我国经济在经历了高速发展期后逐渐趋于平稳,现阶段进入以高质量发展为导向的稳经济战略目标。经济粗放型增长时期,资本无序扩张催生部分企业负债率畸高问题,企业高杠杆问题已成为威胁经济韧性、放大金融市场系统性隐患的关键诱因。然而,受制于现实条件的复杂性,高负债企业推进实质降杠杆进程举步维艰,因而可能会转向粉饰杠杆而非直接降杠杆。这一行为掩盖了企业的真实财务状况,会加剧股东与管理层之间的信息不对称和利益冲突,引起大股东过度投资或过度负债最终侵害中小股东资产安全。企业杠杆操纵还可能导致宏观经济数据失真,影响政府和监管机构的宏观经济决策和资源配置效率、危害经济的整体健康和可持续运行,阻碍经济高质量发展。长期以来,股权结构过度集中、控股股东独揽话语权所引发的公司治理体系失衡,导致中小投资者权益频繁遭受侵害,同时我国企业信息透明度不足的问题日益突出,这一系列乱象严重制约了资本市场的高效运转。中小股东依靠自身力量通过参加股东大会对议案投票、在网络互动平台质询等方式行权,积极地对公司的经营管理施加影响,是进一步完善公司治理机制的重要举措。然而杠杆操纵手段多样且具有隐蔽性和复杂性,因此容易实施且难以被发现。通过发挥积极主义,中小股东能对内部利益主体行为实施监督,强化治理进而提升企业资产负债表信息质量。那么,中小股东积极主义能否对企业杠杆操纵行为产生治理作用,使上市公司“不敢操纵”或“不能操纵”?如果答案是肯定的,这其中的作用机理和路径又是什么?不同中小股东积极主义形式对杠杆操纵是否具有不同影响?哪些因素会调节中小股东积极主义对于杠杆操纵的关系?深入研究并解答上述问题,不仅有助于更加准确地厘清中小股东积极主义与企业杠杆操纵之间的关系,而且对于推动中小股东权益保护、推动我国经济高质量发展具有一定的理论价值和现实意义。本论文基于委托代理理论、信息不对称理论、选择性关注理论和群体动力理论,从中小股东参加网络股东大会投票和在网络互动平台质询两个层面出发,构建中小股东积极主义对企业杠杆操纵影响的逻辑框架,深入探究中小股东积极主义对企业杠杆操纵的影响、边界条件以及传导路径。运用A股主板上市公司年度数据进行实证研究,并且从政府层面、企业层面和高管层面三个角度提出中小股东积极主义治理杠杆操纵的相关对策建议。本论文的主要工作和创新性成果体现在以下四个方面:第一,本论文构建了“中小股东积极主义通过治理效应和关注效应两条路径影响企业杠杆操纵”的分析框架,深入探讨了中小股东积极主义如何影响企业杠杆操纵程度。通过利用2007—2023年中国深市A股主板上市公司的网络股东大会决议数据,从中小股东参加网络股东大会投票积极性视角出发,采用多元回归分析法研究中小股东积极主义对企业杠杆操纵程度的影响。利用2010—2023年中国沪深市A股主板上市公司的网络互动平台问答数据,从中小股东网络互动平台质询积极性视角,采用多元回归分析法研究中小股东积极主义对企业杠杆操纵程度的影响。研究发现:(1)中小股东积极主义能对企业总体的杠杆操纵程度产生治理作用。在网络股东大会投票积极主义形式下,中小股东网络股东大会投票积极性越高,上市公司总体的杠杆操纵程度越低;在网络互动平台质询积极主义形式下,中小股东在网络互动平台质询积极性越高,越能降低上市公司总体的杠杆操纵程度。(2)中小股东网络股东大会投票积极性主要对表外负债和明股实债形式的杠杆操纵产生治理效应,抑制表外负债和明股实债程度;中小股东在网络互动平台质询积极性主要对会计手段下的杠杆操纵发挥关注效应,降低会计手段下的杠杆操纵程度。本研究不仅为通过改善公司治理能够提升上市公司信息披露质量的观点提供了进一步的证据支持,也在一定程度上丰富了杠杆操纵影响因素的相关研究成果。第二,从两权分离度、中小股东一致行动人和“去杠杆”政策压力的视角,剖析并检验中小股东网络股东大会投票积极性对明股实债和表外负债程度的异质性作用,同时从上市公司回复信息质量、上市公司信息披露质量以及分析师关注度的视角,剖析并检验了中小股东在网络互动平台质询积极性影响会计手段杠杆操纵程度的异质性作用。研究发现:(1)两权分离度越高的上市公司,中小股东网络股东大会投票积极性对杠杆操纵的负向影响作用更强;中小股东具有一致行动人的上市公司,中小股东网络股东大会投票积极性对杠杆操纵的抑制作用更强;“去杠杆”政策压力越大的上市公司,中小股东网络股东大会投票积极性对杠杆操纵的治理作用更强。(2)上市公司回复投资者的信息质量越高,中小股东网络平台质询积极性对会计手段杠杆操纵的抑制作用越强。上市公司信息披露质量越高,越能增强中小股东网络互动平台质询积极性对会计手段杠杆操纵的治理作用。分析师关注度越高,中小股东网络平台质询积极性对会计手段杠杆操纵的抑制作用越强。研究结论不仅为企业治理杠杆操纵的情景设定提供了依据,还为中小股东权益保护以及提升上市公司信息披露质量提供了参考。第三,本论文创新性地提出从提高中小股东对杠杆操纵相关议案的异议投票率和对杠杆类问题的关注度两条路径探究中小股东积极主义影响不同类型杠杆操纵程度的作用机理。不同于以往研究对中小股东积极主义作用机制的探讨,本论文通过Python爬取股东大会决议和互动平台问答的相关文本,获得能够直观影响企业杠杆操纵程度的机制数据。实证检验发现:(1)中小股东积极参与网络股东大会投票能够提高杠杆操纵相关议案的异议投票率,从而抑制表外负债和明股实债程度。(2)中小股东在网络互动平台积极质询会提高投资者对杠杆类问题的关注度从而降低会计手段的杠杆操纵程度。本文所得出的研究结论,不仅回答了中小股东积极主义是否影响上市公司的资产负债表信息质量,更系统阐释了在网络股东大会投票以及网络互动平台质询等视角下,中小股东积极主义影响不同类型下的杠杆操纵所具有的不同效应与影响路径,有助于系统解析中小股东积极主义对企业杠杆操纵行为的作用机制异质性,以及内在作用逻辑的差异化特征,进而为优化公司治理架构提供更具有操作性的政策建议。第四,本论文较为系统地探究了中小股东积极主义对企业杠杆操纵的影响,从理论层面丰富了有关中小股东积极主义经济后果以及企业杠杆操纵影响因素的研究范围,既是对芝加哥学派“股东积极主义”观点的延伸,也是对中小股东“有效治理观”的有效验证;从实践角度不仅为积极推进政府部门落实去杠杆政策提供了决策参考,还为从内外部治理结构上提升上市公司的资产负债表信息质量提供了新思路与实践路径,同时也为企业高管加强与投资者的关系管理及提升信息披露质量提供了有力依据。更多还原

【Abstract】 After experiencing a period of high-speed development,China’s economy has gradually stabilized,and at the current stage,the strategic goal of stabilizing the economy with a focus on high-quality development is emphasized.During the period of extensive economic growth,the disorderly expansion of capital has led to the problem of extremely high debt ratios for some enterprises.The issue of high corporate leverage has become a key factor threatening economic resilience and amplifying the systemic risks in the financial market.However,due to the complexity of real-world conditions,it is extremely difficult for highly indebted enterprises to advance the process of deleveraging.As a result,enterprises may turn to window-dressing their leverage rather than directly reducing it.This behavior conceals the true financial situation of the enterprise,intensifies the information asymmetry and conflicts of interest between shareholders and the management,and may lead to major shareholders engaging in excessive investment or excessive debt,ultimately harming the interests of minority shareholders.Leverage manipulation may also lead to distorted macroeconomic data,affecting the macroeconomic decision-making of the government and regulatory authorities,the efficiency of resource allocation,endangering the overall health and sustainable operation of the economy,and hindering high-quality economic development.For a long time,the excessive concentration of the equity structure and the dominant position of controlling shareholders have led to an imbalance in the corporate governance system,resulting in frequent infringements of the rights and interests of small and medium investors.At the same time,the problem of insufficient transparency of information of Chinese enterprises has become increasingly prominent.This series of chaotic phenomena has severely restricted the efficient operation of the capital market.It is an important measure to further improve the corporate governance mechanism for small and medium shareholders to exercise their rights by participating in the general meeting of shareholders to vote on motions,asking questions on the online interactive platform,and actively influencing the operation and management of the company relying on their own strength.However,leverage manipulation is diverse,covert,and complex,so it is easy to implement and difficult to detect.By exerting shareholder activism,small and medium shareholders can supervise the behavior of internal interest entities,strengthen governance,and thus improve the information quality of the enterprise’s balance sheet.Then,can small and medium shareholder activism have a governance effect on corporate leverage manipulation,making listed companies "dare not manipulate" or"unable to manipulate"?If the answer is yes,what are the mechanisms and paths of this effect?Do different forms of small and medium shareholder activism have different impacts on leverage manipulation?What factors will moderate the relationship between small and medium shareholder activism and leverage manipulation?In-depth research and correct answers to the above questions will not only help to more accurately clarify the relationship between small and medium shareholder activism and corporate leverage manipulation but also have certain theoretical and practical significance for promoting the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders and the high-quality development of China’s economy.Based on the principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory,and selective attention theory,this thesis constructs a logical framework for the impact of small and medium shareholder activism on corporate leverage manipulation from two aspects:small and medium shareholders’ participation in online general meeting of shareholders voting and questioning on the online interactive platform,and deeply explores the impact,boundary conditions,and transmission paths of small and medium shareholder activism on corporate leverage manipulation.Empirical research is conducted using the annual data of A-share main board listed companies,and relevant countermeasures and suggestions for small and medium shareholder activism to govern leverage manipulation are proposed from three perspectives:the government level,the enterprise level,and the senior management level.The main work and innovative achievements of this thesis are reflected in the following three aspects:First,this thesis constructs an analytical framework of "small and medium shareholder activism affects corporate leverage manipulation through two paths:the governance effect and the attention effect" and deeply explores how small and medium shareholder activism affects the degree of corporate leverage manipulation.By using the resolution data of online general meetings of shareholders of A-share main board listed companies in Shenzhen from 2007 to 2023,from the perspective of the enthusiasm of small and medium shareholders to participate in online general meeting of shareholders voting,a multiple regression analysis method is used to study the impact of small and medium shareholder activism on the degree of corporate leverage manipulation.Using the question-and-answer data of the online interactive platform of A-share main board listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2023,from the perspective of the enthusiasm of small and medium shareholders to question on the online interactive platform,a multiple regression analysis method is used to study the impact of small and medium shareholder activism on the degree of corporate leverage manipulation.The research findings are as follows:(1)Small and medium shareholder activism can have a governance effect on the overall degree of corporate leverage manipulation.In the form of online general meeting of shareholders voting activism,the higher the enthusiasm of small and medium shareholders to vote in the online general meeting of shareholders,the lower the overall degree of leverage manipulation of listed companies;in the form of online interactive platform questioning activism,the higher the enthusiasm of small and medium shareholders to question on the online interactive platform,the more it can reduce the overall degree of leverage manipulation of listed companies.(2)The enthusiasm of small and medium shareholders to vote in the online general meeting of shareholders mainly has a governance effect on leverage manipulation in the form of off-balance-sheet liabilities and equity in substance but debt in form,suppressing the degree of off-balance-sheet liabilities and equity in substance but debt in form;the enthusiasm of small and medium shareholders to question on the online interactive platform mainly plays an attention effect on leverage manipulation by accounting means,reducing the degree of leverage manipulation by accounting means.This study not only provides further evidence support for the view that improving corporate governance can enhance the information disclosure quality of listed companies but also enriches the relevant research results on the influencing factors of leverage manipulation to a certain extent.Second,from the perspectives of the separation degree of ownership and control,concerted actions of small and medium shareholders,and the policy pressure of "deleveraging",this thesis analyzes and tests the heterogeneous effects of the enthusiasm of small and medium shareholders to vote in the online general meeting of shareholders on the degree of equity in substance but debt in form and off-balance-sheet liabilities.At the same time,from the perspectives of the quality of the information replied by listed companies,the information disclosure quality of listed companies,and the attention of analysts,it analyzes and tests the heterogeneous effects of the enthusiasm of small and medium shareholders to question on the online interactive platform on the degree of leverage manipulation by accounting means.The research findings are as follows:(1)In listed companies with a higher separation degree of ownership and control,the negative impact of the enthusiasm of small and medium shareholders to vote in the online general meeting of shareholders on leverage manipulation is stronger;in listed companies where small and medium shareholders have concerted actions,the inhibitory effect of the enthusiasm of small and medium shareholders to vote in the online general meeting of shareholders on leverage manipulation is stronger;in listed companies under greater policy pressure of "deleveraging",the governance effect of the enthusiasm of small and medium shareholders to vote in the online general meeting of shareholders on leverage manipulation is stronger.(2)The higher the quality of the information replied by listed companies to investors,the stronger the inhibitory effect of the enthusiasm of small and medium shareholders to question on the online platform on leverage manipulation by accounting means.The higher the information disclosure quality of listed companies,the more it can enhance the governance effect of the enthusiasm of small and medium shareholders to question on the online interactive platform on leverage manipulation by accounting means.The higher the attention of analysts,the stronger the inhibitory effect of the enthusiasm of small and medium shareholders to question on the online platform on leverage manipulation by accounting means.The research conclusions not only provide a basis for the scenario setting of corporate governance of leverage manipulation but also provide a reference for the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders and the improvement of the information disclosure quality of listed companies.Third,this thesis innovatively proposes to explore the mechanism of how small and medium shareholder activism affects the degree of different types of leverage manipulation through two paths:increasing the dissenting voting rate of small and medium shareholders on leverage manipulation-related motions and increasing their attention to leverage-related issues.Different from previous studies on the mechanism of small and medium shareholder activism,this thesis obtains mechanism data that can directly affect the degree of corporate leverage manipulation by using Python to crawl relevant texts of general meeting of shareholders resolutions and question-and-answer on the interactive platform.Empirical research finds that:(1)The active participation of small and medium shareholders in online general meeting of shareholders voting can increase the dissenting voting rate of leverage manipulation-related motions,thus suppressing the degree of off-balance-sheet liabilities and equity in substance but debt in form.(2)The active questioning of small and medium shareholders on the online interactive platform will increase investors’ attention to leverage-related issues,thus reducing the degree of leverage manipulation by accounting means.The research conclusions of this thesis not only answer whether small and medium shareholder activism affects the information quality of the balance sheet of listed companies but also systematically explain the different effects and influence paths of small and medium shareholder activism on leverage manipulation of different types from the perspectives of online general meeting of shareholders voting and online interactive platform questioning.It helps to systematically analyze the heterogeneity of the mechanism of small and medium shareholder activism on corporate leverage manipulation behavior and the differential characteristics of the internal action logic,and further provides more operational policy suggestions for optimizing the corporate governance structure.Fourth,this thesis systematically explores the impact of small and medium shareholder activism on corporate leverage manipulation.Theoretically,it enriches the research scope of the economic consequences of small and medium shareholder activism and the influencing factors of corporate leverage manipulation.It is not only an extension of the "shareholder activism"view of the Chicago School but also an effective verification of the" effective governance view"of small and medium shareholders.In practice,it not only provides decision-making references for the active promotion of government departments to implement the deleveraging policy but also provides new ideas and practical paths for improving the information quality of the balance sheet of listed companies from the internal and external governance structures.At the same time,it also provides a strong basis for senior corporate management to strengthen relationship management with investors and improve information disclosure quality.更多还原