【作者】 曾敏；

【导师】 李常青；

【作者基本信息】 厦门大学 ， 财务学， 2021， 博士

【摘要】 随着混合所有制改革的深入推进,在“国企改革”取得阶段性成效之后,“国资改革”成为近两年新的政策关注点。具体到公司层面,国资改革意味着会有越来越多的国有资本进入到民营企业中,那么,国有资本持股民营企业之后,两种资本能否进行优势互补,提高资本的配置和运行效率?这对中国经济学、金融学研究提出了迫切的实现需求。为此,本文以公司财务行为为切入点,采用沪深两市A股上市公司2004-2019年的数据,实证检验国有资本持股民营企业对其债务融资、商业信用、现金持有和投资结构的影响及作用机制,得到如下主要结论:首先,国有资本参股民营企业能够显著降低公司的债务融资成本,扩大公司的债务融资规模。在对作用机制的检验中,发现国有资本持股民营企业对债务融资的优化效果不仅仅只源于带上“红帽子”的意识形态作用,更是降低信息不对称等多管齐下的综合效用呈现。进一步的研究显示,较之国资参股,国资控股对于公司长期债务规模的扩张作用更加显著;较之5%以上的国资参股,5%以下的国资象征性持股起不到降低债务融资成本、扩大债务融资规模的效果。另外,国资参股对于债务规模的扩大作用在国有企业持股(较之政府直接持股)和投资类国企持股(较之实业类国企持股)时,效果更加显著。其次,国有资本参股民营企业减少了公司的应付项目,支持了商业信用的“替代性融资”假说。对于处于竞争性行业和市场地位较高的民营企业而言,国有资本参股分别提升和降低了应收项目,支持了商业信用的“竞争力”假说和“买方市场”假说。进一步的研究显示,较之国资参股,国资控股对于应收账款的降低作用更加显著;国资控股在降低应收账款的同时,并未相应提升应付账款,体现了国有资本的企业社会责任。另外,国资参股对于商业信用的影响在国有企业持股(较之政府直接持股)时,效果更加显著。再次,国有资本参股民营企业显著提升了公司的现金持有,其作用机制为,多个大股东的股权制衡缓解了控股股东与小股东以及股东与经理人之间的代理问题,抑制了公司过度投资和经理人在职消费造成的现金无效耗散。此外,处于竞争劣势的公司为提升市场竞争力也增加了现金持有。进一步的研究显示,国资参股对于现金持有的提升作用在国有企业持股(较之政府直接持股)和投资类国企持股(较之实业类国企持股)时,效果更加显著。最后,本文发现增持的现金并没有作为股利发放给股东,而是留在公司继续投入到研发等更有利于长远发展的项目中。最后,国有资本参股民营企业对于金融投资的影响呈倒U形关系,此外,国有资本持股民营企业显著增加了公司的实业投资以及研发投入。作用机制为,国有股东的股权制衡作用显著抑制了民营控股股东利用金融投资“掏空”企业的行为,同时,国有股东参股从能力和意愿两个方面促进了企业的研发投入。进一步的研究显示,国有资本对于研发投入的提升作用在国有企业持股(较之政府直接持股)、中央国企持股(较之地方国企持股)和异地国企持股(较之本地国企持股)时,效果更加显著。此外,国有资本控股民营企业,显著降低了金融投资,提升了实业投资,但对研发投入的影响并不显著。本文的贡献和创新之处有如下几点:(1)既有混合所有制改革的研究几乎都集中于国有企业引入民营资本,较少关注混改的另一条主线,即国有资本持股民营企业。本文相对系统地讨论了国有资本持股民营企业对公司财务行为的影响,很大程度上丰富和拓展了这一领域的研究。(2)国有资本持股民营企业提供了一个极好机会来研究政府在公司经营中的作用。本文探究了国资持股对公司财务决策的影响,深入揭示了其中的作用机制,深化了相关领域的文献。(3)既有关于中国国有企业的系列研究,几乎都着眼于国企的代理问题、政府干预所导致的经营低效等消极方面。本文展现了国有资本的积极一面,有助于人们更客观、更立体地了解国有资本。(4)本文考虑了一致行动人关系,将国有股东视作独立个体进行更严谨的检验。此外,还对国有股东进行了手工分类,对国有股权的作用进行了更细致的检验。(5)本文为当下如火如荼的国资改革提供了重要的理论和实证依据,也提供了相应的政策启示。更多还原

【Abstract】 After the phase of the "state-owned enterprise reform",the "state-owned assets reform" has become a new policy focus in the past two years.At the firm level,state-owned assets reform means that more and more state-owned capital will enter private enterprises.This brings question that after the state-owned capital holds shares in private enterprises,can the two kinds of capital complement each other and improve the efficiency of capital allocation and operation?This puts forward an urgent demand for the study of Chinese economics and finance.For this reason,this dissertation takes the financial behavior of listed companies as the starting point,using the data of A-share companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2004 to 2019.This dissertation empirically examines the influence and mechanism of private enterprises owned by state-owned capital on their debt financing,commercial credit,cash holding and investment structure,and draws the following main conclusions:First of all,private enterprises owned by state-owned capital can significantly reduce the cost of debt financing and expand the scale of debt financing.In the test of the mechanism,it is found that the optimization effect of private enterprises owned by state-owned capital on debt financing comes not only from the ideological function of wearing a "red hat",but also from the comprehensive utility such as reducing information asymmetry.Further research shows that compared with state-owned participation,state-owned holding plays a more significant role in the expansion of the company’s long-term debt scale;compared with more than 5%of state-owned participation,symbolic shareholding of less than 5%of state-owned participation cannot reduce the cost of debt financing and expand debt financing.In addition,the effect is more significant when state-owned enterprises are owned by state-owned enterprises(compared with direct government shareholding).Secondly,the private enterprises owned by state-owned capital reduce the payables of the company,which supports the theory of "alternative financing" of commercial credit.For private enterprises in competitive industries and high market position,state-owned capital shareholding promotes and reduces receivables respectively,which supports the "competitiveness" hypothesis and "buyer’s market theory" of commercial credit.Further research shows that,compared with state-owned participation,state-owned holding plays a more significant role in reducing accounts receivable;while state-owned capital ownership reduces accounts receivable,it does not increase accounts payable accordingly,which reflects the social responsibility of state-owned capital.In addition,the role of state-owned shares in providing commercial credit is more significant when state-owned enterprises are owned by state-owned enterprises(compared with direct government ownership).Thirdly,the private enterprises owned by state-owned capital significantly improve the cash holdings of the company.The mechanism is that the equity balances of several major shareholders alleviate the agency problem of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders,thus restrain the ineffective consumption caused by the over-investment of the company.In addition,companies at a competitive disadvantage may also increase their cash holdings in order to enhance market competitiveness.Further research shows that the promotion effect is more significant when enterprises are owned by state-owned enterprises(compared with direct government shareholding)and investment state-owned enterprises(compared with industrial state-owned enterprises).Finally,this dissertation finds that the increased cash is not distributed to shareholders as dividends,but remains in the company’s investment in R&D and other projects that are more conducive to the company’s long-term development.Finally,the impact of state-owned capital shareholding in private enterprises on financial investment is inverted U-shaped.In addition,private enterprises owned by state-owned capital increase industrial investment and R&D investment.The mechanism is that the equity balances significantly restrain the behavior of private major shareholders to make use of financial investment to "tunneling" enterprises.At the same time,the participation of state-owned shareholders promotes the R&D investment of enterprises from two aspects of ability and willingness.Further research shows that the effect is more significant in promoting R&D investment when state-owned enterprises hold shares(compared with direct government ownership),central state-owned enterpri ses hold shares(compared with provincial state-owned enterprises),and local state-owned enterprises hold shares(compared with non-local state-owned enterprises).In terms of economic consequences,this dissertation verifies that private enterprises owned by state-owned capital alleviate the underinvestment of the company,at the same time reduce the over-investment of the company,and improve the investment efficiency of the company.The contributions and innovations of this dissertation are as follows:(1)Almost all the existing researches on mixed ownership reform focus on the introduction of private capital into state-owned enterprises,and pay little attention to the other main line of mixed reform,that is,private enterprises held by state-owned capital.This dissertation systematically discusses the impact of private enterprises owned by state-owned capital on corporate financial behavior,which enriches the research in this field.(2)Private enterprises owned by state-owned capital provide an excellent opportunity to study the role of government in corporate governance.This dissertation explores the impact of government shareholding on corporate financial decision-making,deeply reveals the mechanism,and enriches the literature in related fields.(3)Almost all of the studies on Chinese state-owned enterprises focus on the agency problem of state-owned enterprises and the low efficiency caused by government intervention.This dissertation shows the positive side of state-owned capital,which is helpful to have a more objective and multi-dimensional understanding of state-owned capital.(4)In this dissertation,different state-owned shareholders are regarded as independent individualsfor a more rigorous test.In addition,it also makes a manual classification of state-owned shareholders and makes a more detailed test of the role of state-owned equity.(5)This dissertation not only provides an important theoretical and empirical evidence for the current state-owned assets reform,but also provides the corresponding policy suggestion.更多还原