【作者】 卢超；

【导师】 黄卫来；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2021， 博士

【摘要】 绿色可持续发展已成为社会各界关注的焦点。受到企业的研发资金、技术能力等诸多因素约束,政府有必要制定合理的补贴政策,激励相关企业提高绿色生产研发水平。本文结合绿色供应链管理的发展现状,考虑了政府补贴策略的排他性与共生性,将基于产品绿色度、生产成本、研发投入的三种补贴策略加入博弈模型,从企业绩效、社会福利、财政补贴支出等角度,研究绿色供应链中不同的政府补贴策略对绿色供应链决策的影响,旨在为我国绿色产业可持续发展及补贴政策制定实施提供参考建议。主要的研究工作如下:(1)探究了不同政府补贴策略对企业静态决策的影响。考虑了绿色偏好水平和研发投入水平,构建了以产品绿色度、企业利润、投入产出综合指标等作为政府补贴策略评价标准的绿色供应链静态模型,依次得到补贴效果最优的策略是研发投入补贴策略、生产成本补贴策略、绿色度补贴策略。(2)探究了不同政府补贴策略对企业动态决策的影响。结合连续时间模型、离散时间模型,分别给出了企业动态决策分析及系统复杂性分析。考虑了产品的绿色度衰减效应,发现不同补贴策略所对应的绿色决策稳态指标排序不随时间变化,演化轨迹中的动态指标排序随时间变化,且时变排序确定了完全时段下的补贴策略最佳选择路径;考虑了企业的决策偏差,发现若任意企业的决策偏差较大,供应链系统会表现出混沌现象,增大政府补贴支出是控制混沌、恢复系统稳定的动因。(3)探讨了补贴策略共生对企业绿色决策的影响。针对政府打包实施多种补贴策略的政策现实,建立了以社会福利、补贴支出同时最优的多目标博弈模型。运用非支配排序遗传算法求出帕累托解集,讨论了政策复杂水平、补贴支出上限等因素对补贴策略组合选择的影响。研究发现,政府的财政能力决定了政策组合的数目以及结构比重,财政宽裕时实施补贴策略共生有利于提高社会福利并降低产品价格,财政紧张时实施单个补贴策略有利于控制补贴支出,但会导致产品价格提高。(4)探讨了同侪激励下的补贴策略对绿色决策的影响。考虑存在地方财政紧缺的现实,建立同侪激励下企业研发和政府补贴的演化博弈模型,结合静态激励和动态激励两种补贴机制分析局部均衡点的稳定性,探讨了同侪激励基金、补贴系数、研发投入水平等因素对群体演化路径的影响,从合作机制层面验证了同侪激励的可行性:较低的政府补贴支出仍能激励制造商绿色研发,较高的政府补贴支出可能导致补贴困局,动态调节的同侪激励机制可以治理政企双方不稳定合作关系。更多还原

【Abstract】 Green sustainable development has become the focus of attention from all walks of life.However,constrained by many factors such as R&D funds and technical capacity,it is necessary for the government to formulate a reasonable subsidy policy for the stimulation of the enterprises in improving their level of green production research and development.Combining the development of green supply chain management,considering the exclusiveness and symbiosis of government subsidy strategies,this dissertation adds three subsidy strategies in terms of green degree,production cost and R&D investment into game model,and studies the influence of different government subsidy strategies on enterprise green decision-making in green supply chain from the perspectives of enterprise performance,social welfare and subsidized expenditure.This dissertation is intended to provide some suggestions for the sustainable development of China’s green industry and the reasonable formulation and implementation of subsidy policies.The main research work is as follows:(1)It explores the influence of government subsidy strategies on short-term decisionmaking of enterprises.Considering the level of green preference and R&D investment,a static model of green supply chain is constructed,which takes product green degree,enterprise profit and input-output indicators as evaluation criteria of government subsidy strategy.The strategies with best subsidy effect are R&D investment subsidy strategy,production cost subsidy strategy and green subsidy strategy,respectively.(2)It explores the influence of government subsidy strategies on long-term decisionmaking of enterprises.Combined with continuous-time model and discrete-time model,the influence research and complexity analysis of long-term decision-making of enterprises in dynamic supply chain are given respectively.Considering the attenuation effect of green degree of products,it shows that the steady-state index rankings of green decision corresponding to different subsidy strategies are time-invariant,while the dynamic index ranking in the evolution trajectory changes with time.The time-varying ranking determines the best selection path of subsidy strategies in the complete period.Considering the decision-making bias of enterprises,it shows that if the decision deviation of any enterprise is large,chaos will appear in the supply chain system.Increasing government subsidy expenditure is the motivation to control chaos and restore system stability.(3)The impact of symbiotic subsidy strategy on firms’ green decisions is explored.A multi-objective game model with simultaneous optimization of social welfare and subsidy expenditure is developed for the policy reality that the government packages and implements multiple subsidy strategies.NSGA-Ⅱ is used to derive the Pareto solution set,and then discusses the impact of factors such as the difficulty of policy implementation and the upper limit of subsidy spending on the choice of subsidy strategy portfolios.It is found that the government’s fiscal capacity determines the number of policy portfolios as well as their structural weight.When the government is financially well-off,the implementation of a portfolio of subsidies is conducive to improving social welfare and reducing product prices.In times of fiscal constraint,the implementation of individual subsidy strategy is conducive to controlling subsidy expenditures,but leads to higher product prices.(4)The impact of subsidy strategy considering peer incentives on green decision making is explored.Considering the reality of local financial constraints,the evolutionary game model of enterprise R&D and government subsidies under peer incentives is established.Combining the two subsidy mechanisms of static and dynamic incentives,the stability of local equilibrium is analyzed,and the effects of peer incentive funds,subsidy coefficients,and R&D investment levels on the evolutionary path of the group are explored to verify the feasibility of peer incentives at the cooperative mechanism level: lower government subsidy expenditures can still motivate manufacturers to green R&D;while higher government subsidy spending may lead to subsidy trap.The dynamically adjusted peer incentive mechanism can manage the unstable cooperative relationship between government and enterprises.更多还原