【作者】 陈萍；

【导师】 李波；

【作者基本信息】 天津大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2018， 博士

【摘要】 随着电子商务的高速发展,直销渠道的独特优势也越来越突出,因此,越来越多的制造商选择引入直销渠道,形成传统渠道和网络渠道并存的双渠道营销模式。本文利用运营管理、博弈论、行为学和营销学等相关理论和方法,探讨了制造商开设网络渠道入侵零售市场背景下的最优决策问题,并分析了供应链成员风险偏好行为、信息不对称、需求突变等因素对双渠道供应链决策者最优决策的影响。本文的研究成果包括以下几个方面:首先,考虑双渠道供应链系统中制造商和零售商具有不同的风险偏好行为,即风险规避、风险中性和风险追逐,采用Mean-CVa R方法来度量成员的风险态度。采用供应商Stackelberg博弈模型建模,探讨了能使双方成员效用及供应链总效用达到最大的最优批发价、订货量、直销渠道的库存量以及最优风险组合。进一步,分析了成员的不同风险偏好行为、供应商的销售成本及成员的自利、压榨、利他行为对供应链最优决策、风险组合和成员效用的影响。其次,考虑了供应商入侵背景下存在信息不对称的合同机制设计问题,假设零售商具有风险规避行为,采用CVa R方法度量其风险规避程度。通过建立委托代理模型,得出了不同情景下的最优合同。在假设零售商的风险规避信息不对称时,考虑了三种情景:完全信息(CI)、没有信息揭露(ND,即合并合同)和信息揭露(ID,即分离合同)。研究发现零售商总是偏好合并合同,而制造商总是偏好分离合同,且信息不对称总会导致供应链的低效率。在假设制造商的成本信息不对称时,根据制造商是否开通直销渠道及是否隐藏成本信息,将问题分成四种情景。探讨了零售商的风险规避行为、渠道权力以及制造商的生产成本对最优合同和利润的影响。最后,考虑集中和分散决策下发生需求突变前后具有风险规避型决策者的双渠道供应链的最优定价策略和生产计划调整策略。研究发现初始生产计划在需求突变幅度不大时具有鲁棒性,只有当需求突变的幅度比较大时,决策者才需要调整初始生产计划。如果决策者在需求突变发生后风险规避程度增加,则了解需求突变信息的价值的大小与需求突变前后决策者的风险规避程度密切相关。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the rapid development of e-commerce,the unique advantages of direct marketing channels have become more and more prominent.Therefore,more and more manufacturers chose to introduce direct sales channels to form a dual-channel marketing model where traditional channels and network channels coexist.This paper uses operations management,game theory,behavior science and marketing theory to explore the optimal decision-making problems in the context of supplier encroachment,and analyzes the impact of players’ risk preferences behavior,information asymmetry and demand disruption on the optimal decisions in the supply chain.The main findings are stated as follows:Firstly,we consider that the manufacturer and the retailer in a dual-channel supply chain system have different risk preferences,namely risk aversion,risk neutral and risktaking,and use the Mean-CVa R method to measure the players’ risk attitudes.Using the Stackelberg game model led by the supplier,the optimal wholesale price,order quantity,direct inventory and optimal risk combinations are discussed through maximizing each player’s utility and the total utility of the supply chain.Further,we analyzes the influence of players’ different risk preferences,the supplier’s selling cost,and palyers’ selfish,aggressive and altruistic behaviors on the optimal decisions,risk combinations and players’ utilities in the supply chain.Next,we consider information asymmetry in contract design mechanism under the background of supplier encroachment,assuming that the retailer has risk aversion behavior,and use the CVa R method to measure the degree of risk aversion.By establishing the principal-agent model,the optimal contracts under different scenarios are obtained.When we assume that the retailer’s risk aversion is private information,three scenarios are considered: full information(CI),no information disclosure(ND,i.e.,pooling contract),and information disclosure(ID,ie,separating contract).We find that the retailer always prefers pooling contract,while the manufacturer always prefers separating contract,and information asymmetry always leads to inefficiency in supply chain.When we assume that the manufacturer’s cost information is asymmetric,the problem is divided into four scenarios based on whether the manufacturer choses to open the direct channel and whether or not the cost information is hidden.We discuss how the retailer’s risk aversion behavior,channel power,and manufacturer’s production cost impact the optimal contract and players’ profit.Finally,we consider the optimal pricing strategy and production planning adjustment strategy of a dual-channel supply chain before and after a demand disruption occurs with a risk-averse decision maker under the centralized and decentralized models.We find that the initial production plan is robust when the demand disruption is not large.Only when the demand disruption is large enough does the decision maker need to adjust the initial production plan.If the decision maker’s degree of risk aversion increases after a demand disruption occurs,the value of knowing the demand disruption is closely related to the decision maker’s degree of risk aversion before and after the demand disruption occurs.更多还原