【作者】 于红；

【导师】 杨林；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 公共经济学， 2022， 博士

【摘要】 随着我国经济社会快速发展,水环境问题不再局限于单一行政区内部,跨行政区域水污染冲突屡次发生,跨域水污染问题尤为突出,对地方政府环境治理属地模式提出挑战。倡导跨地域、部门等进行政府协同治理成为破解水污染难题的客观选择。中央和地方从政策文件和实践探索多方面推进跨域水污染治理,但在协同治污实践中仍遭遇诸多现实困境。如何通过地方政府协同有效治理跨域水污染,实现人水和谐,是我国环境政策的重要内容。作为一项由地方创新实践上升为国家意志的治水方略,河长制为探讨跨域水污染政府协同治理问题提供了研究场景。鉴于此,本文以跨域水污染问题为研究对象,探究跨域水污染政府协同治理行动逻辑,基于河长制的独特情境,考察协同治理效果及其内在影响机理,探寻政策优化和制度创新保障,以期为提升政府治理能力、推进政府协同治污行动、缓解水污染难题等提供决策依据。政府协同治理是应对跨域水污染问题的理论创新,涉及经济学、管理学等内容。根据公共物品理论、集体行动理论、博弈论和协同治理理论,基于“物品属性-治理主体-治理依据-治理效果”的逻辑思路,将SFIC分析模型、协同治理综合框架、“结构-过程”模型等与我国水资源治理实况相结合,从准公共物品属性-政策实施-效果评价方面,构建适合我国实情的跨域水污染政府协同治理理论框架,揭示协同治理动因、治理主体、治理依据和治理效果,描述跨域水污染协同治理的—般化运作模式。在协同治理现实动因方面,从边界污染存在性视角分析跨域水污染政府协同治理的外在拉力。结合我国七大流域水质监测站数据,综合运用系统广义矩(SYS-GMM)、倾向得分匹配(PSM)等估计方法,剖析边界污染的存在性,挖掘地方政府策略性减排性行为的影响效应及作用路径。研究发现:(1)我国七大流域中存在显著的省域边界污染现象,河流水质省界监测的污染水平明显高于非边界监测。(2)作用路径显示,省级政府存在策略性减排行为,有意识地差别化省域边界城市与省域内部的环境规制强度;当城市越靠近省域边界,其环境规制强度相应越低,吸引更多数量的工业企业进入,进而加剧流域边界污染现象。(3)随着地方政府环境考核压力的增强,地方官员具有更强的策略性减排动机,因此边界污染效应更为显著。即使考虑省级经济发展水平因素,边界污染效应结论依然得到支持。在协同治理实践动因方面,从属地模式局限性视角分析跨域水污染政府协同治理的内在推力。(1)跨域水污染政府属地治理行为演化博弈表明,地方治污动机与水污染治理净收益密切相关,上级政府约束条件介入虽在一定程度上提升地方由不治理转向治理的空间,但一方治理一方不治理仍是目前地方政府最优选择。(2)不同治理模式下跨域水污染政府行为微分博弈表明,相较于属地独立治污,协同治污情形下两个地区的污染排放更低、治污投入更高、河流污染容量更低、总体福利水平更高。相对于非协同治理,行动者对协同治理水污染的环境结果亦或经济结果激励预期更高,意味着其参加协同治理的可能性愈大。在协同治理政策实施方面,从河长制视角剖析跨域水污染政府协同治理主体、组织架构、治理过程的实践应用。研究发现:(1)我国跨域水污染政府协同治理的政策演进可分为应急治污下的早期萌芽、地方实践的积极探索、法治建设下的快速发展三个阶段。(2)作为跨域水污染政府协同治理典型代表,河长制运行主要依托河长权责的制度化配置、河长制办公室及河长制工作领导小组的组织化设计,以及河长会议制度等一系列配套制度的系统性支撑;治理过程通过自上而下科层制推进确定协同治理目标、进而经过纵横交错会议制细化分解协同治理任务,并由河长办进行综合性协调协同治理行动。(3)个案剖析表明,四川省沱江流域河长制的实践与“权责-机构-制度”、“目标-任务-行动”的基本逻辑相符,但在水污染协同治理的协调机制以及资源保障机制如信息资源、资金供给、技术创新等方面有待进一步优化。在协同治理效果评价方面,以七大流域河长制推行作为准自然实验,基于2008-2018年水质监测数据,运用三重差分法(DDD)检验河长制对河流边界污染治理的总体作用、动态效应、影响机理、异质性影响和经济效应等。研究发现:(1)与省域非边界地区相比,河长制实施显著降低省域边界地区河流COD、NH3N浓度,表明政府协同治理能够有效实现跨域水污染从“以邻为壑”到“守望相助”转变。(2)动态效应显示,河长制对边界污染的治理效果没有表现出较好的可持续性,表明地方政府治污压力或绩效达标压力下短期治理行为。(3)影响机理表明,河长制实施能够有效改变地方政府的策略性减排行为,提升边界地区环境规制强度,缩小其与内部地区环境规制强度差距,缓解边界污染现象。(4)河长制对边界污染的改善效果存在区域差异:在经济发展水平领先省域、河长制推行“省先市后”地区治理效果显著,在经济发展水平滞后省域、河长制推行“市先省后”地区未达到预期治理效果。(5)经济效应显示,河长制实施能够显著促进地区整体包括边界地区经济发展,实现从“绿水青山”到“金山银山”的转化。最后,提出跨域水污染政府协同治理的政策优化与制度保障的政策建议,具体包括:从构建利益均衡机制、完善协同治理职能体系、组建统一协同治理机构等方面强化跨域水污染政府协同治理;从健全考核评价与监督问责机制、建立协同治理精准帮扶机制、完善协同治理协调机制等方面提升跨域水污染政府协同治理效果;从构建协同治理信息化管理系统、完善信息公开制度等方面完善水污染政府协同治理制度保障。更多还原

【Abstract】 Along with the continuous development of our economy and society,water environment problems are no longer confined within a single administrative area.The transboundary water pollution conflicts have occurred repeatedly,and this problem is particularly prominent,challenging local government environmental governance territorial model.It is an objective choice to solve the problem of water pollution that the government should collaborative governance across regions and departments.The central and local governments have been trying to improve the treatment of transboundary water pollution from the aspects of policy documents and practices.However,there are still many difficulties in the collaborative governance.It is an important content of our country’s environmental policy that how to control the transboundary water pollution effectively and realize the harmony of human and water.As a water-control strategy rising from local innovation practice to national will,the River Chief System(RCS)provides a research scene for discussing government collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution.In view of this,this thesis attempts to explore the action logic,examines the effect and internal influence mechanism,and explores policy optimization and institutional innovation guarantee of government collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution,based on the unique situation of the RCS.It is expected to provide a basis for decision making to enhance the capacity of government governance,strengthen the actions of government collaborative pollution control,and alleviate water pollution problems.Theoretically,the issue of government collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution involves economics,management and other disciplines.Referring to the theory of public goods,collective action theory,game theory and collaborative governance theory,the SFIC analysis model,the comprehensive framework of collaborative governance,and the"structure-process" model are combined with water resources management reality in China.Based on the logical thinking of "goods attribute-governance subject-governance basisgovernance effect",the theoretical framework of government collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution is constructed.The main contents include three modules:quasipublic goods attribute,policy implementation and effect evaluation,which reveal the fundamental motivation,governance subject,governance basis and governance effect of collaborative governance,and describe the general operation mode of government collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution.In terms of the realistic motivation of collaborative governance,the external pull of government collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution is analyzed from the perspective of the existence of border pollution.Combined with water quality data in seven major river basins in China,the existence of boundary pollution is analyzed by using the estimation methods of SYS-GMM and PSM,and the influence effect and path of strategic emission reduction behavior of local governments are explored.The results show that:(1)There are obvious provincial boundary pollution phenomena in the seven major basins in China,and the pollution level of river water quality monitoring by provincial boundary is significantly higher than that by non-boundary monitoring.(2)The path of action shows that provincial governments have strategic emission reduction behavior,and consciously differentiate the intensity of environmental regulation between provincial border cities and provincial interiors.When the city is closer to the provincial boundary,the intensity of its environmental regulation is correspondingly lower,attracting more industrial enterprises to enter,thereby aggravating the pollution of the watershed boundary.(3)With the increasing pressure on local government environmental assessment,local officials are more motivated to make strategic emission reductions,thus making the border pollution effect more obvious.This conclusion is still supported even when provincial economic development level is taken into account.In terms of the motivation of collaborative governance practices,the intrinsic thrust of government collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution is analyzed from the perspective of the objective limitations of the territorial governance.The results show that:(1)The evolutionary game of territorial governance behavior of transboundary water pollution government shows that the motivation of local pollution control is closely related to the net income of water pollution control.Although the intervention of superior government constraints improves the space of local governance from non-governance to governance to a certain extent,the non-governance of one party is still the optimal choice for local governments.(2)Compared with local independent pollution control,collaborative pollution control has lower pollution emissions,higher pollution control input,lower river pollution capacity and higher overall welfare level in the two regions.Compared with non-cooperative governance,actors have higher incentive expectations for environmental or economic results of collaborative governance of water pollution,which means that they are more likely to participate in collaborative governance.In terms of collaborative governance policy implementation,the subject,organizational structure,and governance process of government collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution is analyzed from the perspective of RCS.The results show that:(1)The policy evolution of government collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution in China can be divided into three stages:early germination under emergency pollution control,active exploration of local practice,and rapid development under rule of law construction.(2)As a typical representative,the operation of the RCS mainly relies on the institutional configuration of river chief rights and responsibilities,the organizational design of river chief system office and river chief system work leadership group,and the systematic support of a series of supporting systems such as river chief meeting system.The governance process of the RCS is promoted through the top-down bureaucracy to determine the goal of collaborative governance,and then to refine and decompose collaborative governance tasks through crisscross conference system,and to conduct comprehensive and coordinated collaborative governance actions by the river chief.(3)Case study analysis shows that the RCS in Tuojiang Basin of Sichuan Province is consistent with the logic of "power and responsibility-institution-institution" and "goal-taskaction".However,the coordination mechanism of water pollution management and the resource guarantee mechanism such as information resources,financial supply,technological innovation,etc.need to be further optimized.In terms of collaborative governance effect evaluation,based on the water quality monitoring data from 2008 to 20 1 8,this thesis takes RCS in the seven major river basins as a quasi-natural experiment,and uses DDD to test the overall effect,dynamic effect,influence mechanism,heterogeneity effect and economic effect of RCS on river boundary pollution control.The results show that:(1)RCS has significantly reduced the contents of COD and NH3N in river at provincial border areas compared with that inside the province,indicating that government collaborative governance can effectively realize the transformation of transboundary water pollution from "beggar thy neighbor" to "help each other".(2)Governance effect of RCS on boundary pollution does not show good sustainability,indicating a shortsighted strategic choice between pollution control and economic performance assessment by local governments.(3)RCS can effectively change the strategic emission reduction behavior of local governments,enhance the intensity of environmental regulation in border areas,narrow the gap between internal areas,and alleviate boundary pollution.(4)There are regional differences in the effect of RCS on river boundary pollution control.Compared with the provinces with the leading economic development level and areas with "province first and city then" in implementation of RCS,river chief system in the lagging provinces and "city first and province then" areas has not achieved the expected governance effect.(5)RCS can significantly promote the economic development of the whole region,including the border areas,and realize the transformation from "clear water and green mountains" to "mountains of gold and silver".Finally,this thesis puts forward policy proposal for policy optimization and institutional guarantee of government collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution,including:We should construct the interest balance mechanism,improve the functional system of collaborative governance,and establish a unified and collaborative governance institution to strengthen the collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution;improve evaluation mechanism and supervision accountability mechanism,establish precision assistance mechanism,and improve coordination mechanism to improve the effect of governmen collaborative governance of transboundary water pollutiont;construct information management system and improve information disclosure system to improve institutional innovation guarantee of government collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution.更多还原