节点文献
管理层情绪与公司信息披露:来自自然实验的证据
Managerial Sentiment and Corporate Information Disclosure:Evidence from a Natural Experiment
【作者】 陈霞;
【导师】 许慎;
【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 , 工商管理, 2020, 博士
【摘要】 市场经济的本质是一种理性经济,因为理性行为引领着经济发展的最终方向,但同时,非理性因素对市场行为的影响又不可避免,因此探讨市场经济中影响决策个体的非理性因素十分必要,这将有助于降低市场扭曲和缓解市场摩擦,对于建立和完善社会主义市场经济体制具有重要的现实意义。资本市场作为市场经济运行的轴心和中介,其本质是一个信息市场,信息披露是上市公司与其利益相关者建立契约关系的参考依据,也是资本市场的生命线。如何识别信息披露中的非理性成分,对于资本市场乃至整个市场经济的运行和可持续发展具有重要的现实意义。基于此,本文从上市公司管理层的非理性行为出发,以“高层梯队理论”和“有限理性理论”作为理论背景,探讨了管理层情绪对公司信息披露的潜在影响,研究内容有助于理解上市公司的信息披露行为,揭示非理性因素在市场经济中的重要作用。“新古典经济学理论”和“委托代理理论”都是以“理性经济人”为前提假设,认为上市公司的管理层具有完备的知识体系和预测能力,能在权衡利弊之后对公司的会计信息进行理性的预期和调整,然后将信息发布到市场上。然而,“理性经济人假设”忽略了管理层的心理因素和认知偏差导致的决策偏误,经不起实践的推敲。鉴于以往的文献较少地在公司信息披露行为中考虑到非理性因素产生的特质性差异,本文展开了此次研究,试图探讨管理层情绪如何影响上市公司的信息披露行为,进而影响盈余信息的决策有用性。结合心理学的研究理论和近期的相关研究发现,本文将特殊的自然实验,即恐怖袭击事件,作为识别管理层情绪的外生冲击,将总部位于袭击发生地附近的公司作为实验组,从公司的强制性信息披露和自愿性信息披露两方面出发,研究了管理层情绪对公司的会计稳健性、公司的非通用会计准则信息披露的潜在影响。主要的研究结论如下:第一,本文发现消极事件的外生冲击使管理层的情绪在短期内变得更加悲观,导致公司的强制性信息披露在未来两个季度内更加稳健。结合特定的体现会计稳健性的交易事项,本文的研究发现,管理层悲观情绪导致公司对资产减值、商誉减值以及重组费用的计提比例显著上升。此外,结合心理学的相关研究,本文从外生事件的特征、公司的地理位置特征以及管理层的人物特征等三个方面展开了异质性检验。研究结果表明,首先,性质更恶劣的外生冲击造成了更悲观的管理层情绪,进而导致了更稳健的会计信息披露。其次,当公司总部位于犯罪率较低的城市时,消极的偶发性事件造成了更严重的情绪冲击,导致了更稳健的会计信息披露。最后,以CEO的任职时长作为管理层经验的代理变量,本文的研究结果表明,外生情绪冲击更容易影响经验不足的管理层,进而影响公司的会计稳健性。第二,本文在自愿性信息披露的研究中得到了类似的结论,非通用会计准则盈余报告是管理层自发披露的盈余信息,用于反映公司核心的和可持续的经营价值。研究结果表明管理层悲观情绪造成了更消极的盈余预期,降低了公司披露非通用会计准则盈余信息的可能性。同时,研究结果表明披露了该类盈余信息的上市公司报告了更低的每股盈余数值。此外,结合心理学的相关研究,本文分别从外生事件的特征、公司的地理位置特征以及管理层的人物特征三个方面展开了异质性检验。研究结果表明,性质更恶劣的外生冲击造成了更悲观的管理层情绪,这导致更少的自愿性信息披露以及更消极的每股盈余报告。其次,公司总部位于犯罪率较低的城市时,消极的偶发性事件造成了更显著的情绪冲击,导致受影响的公司更少地披露该类盈余信息以及报告了更低的每股盈余。最后,本文发现年轻的CEO在自愿性信息披露的过程中更容易受到情绪的影响。第三,基于财务信息决策有用观的视角,公司披露会计信息的初始目的是为了报告可靠而相关的盈余信息,以满足利益相关者的信息需求,从而降低资本市场的信息摩擦。管理层情绪对公司会计稳健性以及非通用会计准则信息披露的影响,会造成对盈余信息的主观扭曲还是会提高公司的盈余信息含量,是一个有待探究的实证问题。于是本文进一步检测了管理层情绪对公司盈余信息含量的影响,以验证非理性因素是否造成了信息披露偏误,降低了会计信息的披露效率。采用盈余的回报率模型进行回归分析,研究结果表明,在袭击事件发生后的第一个季度,总部位于事件发生地附近的公司,其季度盈余报告和非通用会计准则盈余公告的盈余反应系数显著降低,这表明公司会计盈余的信息含量显著下降。结合悲观情绪增加了会计稳健性和降低了非通用会计准则每股盈余的研究结果,本文的研究结论可以理解为:管理层悲观情绪导致了消极有偏的盈余信息,扭曲了会计信息对公司经济实质的客观反映,最终降低了会计信息的估值功能。基于上述研究内容和研究结论,本文丰富了管理层特征、会计稳健性、公司非通用会计准则信息披露等相关的文献研究,为今后的研究提供了理论基础和实证经验。本文的研究意义主要体现在以下三个方面:第一,会计信息作为公司与其利益相关者建立契约关系的重要载体,探讨何种因素影响上市公司的信息披露行为具有极其重要的现实意义。本文从非理性因素的视角研究了管理层情绪对公司信息披露的影响,拓展了“委托代理理论”对公司信息披露行为的传统解释。而以往的文献大都从代理冲突和信息不对称的视角展开,忽略了非理性因素对管理层行为的潜在影响,本文有助于理解上市公司的信息披露行为,揭示了非理性因素对上市公司乃至资本市场的重要作用。第二,本文丰富了“高层梯队理论”的经验证据,以往的研究大都集中在管理层的人口统计学特征,比如年龄、性别以及外貌特征等方面;或者管理层的背景特征,比如,学历、职业、家庭和婚姻状况以及儿时经历等方面。这些特征虽然较易识别,但只是对管理层的心理特征、认知差异以及风险偏好的间接体现。而本文关注管理层情绪这种内在的心理特征,研究其如何影响管理层的行为决策。采用外生的消极事件来识别附近地区管理层情绪的波动,进而研究管理层情绪如何影响公司的信息披露行为,为管理层的心理特征影响公司行为决策的观点提供了直接的经验证据,拓展了“高层梯队理论”的研究视角。第三,本文的研究结果对上市公司、外部利益相关者以及政府部门具有积极的启发意义,一方面,本文的研究结果表明,管理层情绪或将导致盈余信息披露中的主观偏差,降低会计信息的披露效率。研究结论将有助于公司内部关注非理性因素的经济后果,并据此制定相应的措施以约束管理层的非理性行为。例如,在信息披露方面,公司内部需要强化管理层信息披露的客观依据,并对公司信息披露进行合法性和合规性的管理,以缓解管理层的非理性行为导致的主观偏差。另一方面,本文的研究结果有助于利益相关者了解公司的非理性行为,本文的结果暗示,外部利益相关者在与公司建立契约关系之前,应充分了解管理层的特征以及管理层的非理性行为可能引发的特质性风险。最后,本文的研究结果表明,极端的外生冲击影响了上市公司的信息披露行为,增加了资本市场的信息摩擦,结论有助于政府部门评估经济市场中的风险和不确定因素对上市公司和资本市场的潜在影响,进而制定和调整相关政策以创造更稳定的市场环境。
【Abstract】 The market-oriented economy is a rational market in that rational behavior always leads the direction of economic development.However,the impact of irrational factors on the market is inevitable.Thus understanding the role of irrational factors that paly in the market can help to reduce the market distortion and alleviate the market frictions,which will have important practical value for establishing and perfecting the socialist market economic system.The capital market is essentially an information market,which acts as an intermediary role in the marketoriented economy.And information disclosure is the reference basis for the firm to establish contractual relationships with its stakeholders.Given the importance of firm disclosure practice in the information production process for the capital market,this study aims to identify the irrational factors in corporate disclosure process,which has great significance to the operation and sustainable development of the capital market and the entire economic market.Based on the upper echelon theory and limited rationality theory,this thesis focuses on the irrational behavior of the managers and examines the potential impact of managerial sentiment on corporate information disclosure.This research could help investors and other market participants to better understand corporate information disclosure behavior and eventually reveal the important role of irrational factors in capital market.Both neoclassical economic theory and agency theory assume managers are rational in their information disclosure process.And they believe managers have complete knowledge and forecasting ability,which can help them to make rational adjustments to the corporate accounting information after the trade-offs between costs and benefits,and then publish this information to the market.However,these theory ignores the behavioral biases caused by managerial psychological factors and cognitive deviations,which cannot withstand in the practical market.While prior studies rarely consider the differences caused by irrational factors in the corporate information disclosure process,this study aims to complement previous research by examining whether and how managerial sentiment affects corporate information disclosure.With reference to recent research,this study utilizes the terrorist attack as an exogenous shock that leads a variation in managerial sentiment of local firms.I focus on both mandatory information disclosure and voluntary information disclosure in order to develop a comprehensive understanding on how sentiment affects corporate reporting.Specifically,I investigate the effect of managerial sentiment on firms’ accounting conservatism and nonGAAP earnings disclosure.The research conclusions are summarized as follows:First,I find that the exogenous shocks of negative events lead to more pessimistic sentiment,resulting in more conservative information disclosure for the firms in following two quarters after the events.I also examine the specific transactions that reflect the accounting conservatism,and find that managerial pessimistic sentiment increases firm’s asset write-downs,goodwill impairment,and restructuring costs in the short term.In addition,following the related studies in psychology,this thesis conducts three cross-sectional tests from the perspective of attack characteristics,firm’s geographic location,and management characteristics.The research results show that(1)the effect of pessimistic sentiment on accounting conservatism is more pronounced when attack events are more salient;(2)attacks have caused more serious emotional shocks when firm’s headquarter is located in a state with a low murder rate,resulting in more conservative accounting information;and(3)pessimistic sentiment results in a higher level of conservatism when managers are less experienced.Second,I get similar conclusions when examining the effect of sentiment on firm’s voluntary information disclosure.Non-GAAP earnings is firm’s voluntary information provided by management to reflect the firm’s core and sustainable earnings.The results show that pessimistic sentiment causes negative expectations on firm’s core earnings,which in turn reduces the likelihood of firm’s non-GAAP earnings disclosure and lowers the magnitudes of non-GAAP earnings per share.Following the related research in psychology,I also extend the findings by carrying out cross-sectional tests from the perspective of attack characteristics,firm’s geographic location,and management characteristics.The research results show that the effect of pessimistic sentiment on non-GAAP earnings disclosure is more pronounced(1)when attack events are more salient;(2)when firm’s headquarters is located in a state with a low murder rate;and(3)when managers are less experienced.Third,from the perspective of decision usefulness,the initial purpose of firm’s information disclosure is to report reliable and relevant earnings information to meet the information needs of stakeholders and reduce information frictions in the capital market.It is an empirical question that whether managerial sentiment distorts earnings information or increases the earnings informativeness.Therefore,I futher examine the impact of managerial sentiment on corporate informativeness.Using the earnings-return model,I find that correlation between the quarterly mandatory earnings(or non-GAAP earnings)information and stock return significantly decreased.These results can be interpreted as that,managerial pessimistic sentiment leads to negatively biased earnings information,which distorts accounting information and ultimately reduces the valuation function of accounting information.This thesis contributes to previous studies by enriching the literature of management characteristics,accounting conservatism,and firm’s non-GAAP earnings reporting.It also provides theoretical basis and empirical evidence for future related research.In addition,it has some practical implications in the following three aspects:First,accounting information is an important reference to establish a contractual relationship between a firm and its stakeholders.It is of great practical significance to discuss what factors would affect the corporate disclosure behavior.This study examines the impact of managerial sentiment on firm’s information disclosure from the perspective of irrational biases.It extends the traditional interpretation of information disclosure from the perspective of agency theory.Previous studies investigate the motivation of information disclosure from the perspective of agency conflict and information asymmetry,which have ignored the potential impact of irrational factors on management behavior.The findings of this thesis would help investors and other market participants to better understand and interpret the information provided by firms.Given the importance of firm disclosure practice in the capital market,this study also helps market participants to better interpret the potential impact of behavioral biases on capital market.Second,this study enriches the empirical evidence of the upper echelon theory.Most previous research has focused on the demographic characteristics of management such as age,gender,and appearance characteristics;and their background characteristics such as education,occupation,marital status,and childhood experience.Although these features are easier to identify,they are indirect reflection of managerial psychological characteristics,cognitive differences,and risk preferences.This study investigates how psychological factors can exert influence on information disclosure by utilizing exogenous shocks to identify the variation of managerial sentiment.It provides evidence on how managerial sentiment can affect the firm’s information disclosure behavior from the perspective of psychological characteristics,which extends the research perspective of the upper echelon theory.Third,the research has positive enlightenment for firms,investors,and government.First,this study shows that managerial sentiment has led to subjective biases in information disclosure process and reduced earnings informativeness.This conclusion reminds firm to pay attention to the irrational behavior form managers and formulate corresponding policies to restrain the possible irrational biases.For example,strengthening the legality and compliance of corporate information disclosure may help to alleviate information deviation caused by management’s irrational behavior.Second,our study helps investors to better understand the firm’s information disclosure behavior.Specifically,investors and other market participants would know much better that management psychological biases is also an important determinant in corporate financial decisions.Finally,this study shows that negative exogenous shocks cause pessimistic sentiment and affect the firm’s information disclosure behavior,which in turn increase the information frictions in the capital market.This finding helps the government to better interpret the potential effect of market risks and uncertainties on listed firms and capital market,which in turn encourages government to evaluate and formulate relevant policies to create a more stable market environment.