【作者】 张莹；

【导师】 陈艳；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 会计学， 2020， 博士

【摘要】 企业并购是企业实现外延式成长和扩张的重要方式,同时也是我国优化资源配置、促进产业结构升级的重要途径。自2014年以来,我国颁布了《关于进一步优化企业兼并重组市场环境的意见》、《上市公司重大资产重组管理办法》等一系列与并购有关的政策,以引导企业并购行为,实现行业整合和产业升级战略。然而,在实践中,并购帮助企业实现跨越式成长,促进产业结构升级的同时,却伴随出现了大量的损害公司价值以及违背政策初衷的并购现象,比如,并购后长期绩效为负、并购后商誉大额减值、并购行为背后的利益输送以及政策套利等。这些现象的出现使得如何规范和引导企业并购行为成为现阶段亟待解决的重要问题。而解决这一问题的关键则在于厘清企业并购行为及绩效的影响因素以及这些因素在并购过程中的内在影响机理。学术界将并购后的价值损毁归因于委托代理问题。并购行为的初衷是追求协同效应,但是由于实际控制人和管理层的自利动机,导致企业很多的并购行为是无效的、盲目的。行为动机往往决定了行为的后果,以自利动机为出发点的并购行为,无论在并购前的尽职调查、目标筛选,还是在并购交易结构设计的环节,都存在导致最终并购价值损毁的因素。CEO是企业并购行为的决策主体,其效用函数与股东的效用函数不同,作为“理性人”追求薪酬和权力的动机,会直接扭曲企业的并购决策。因此,如何设置有效的激励机制来缓解CEO在并购过程中的委托代理问题从而改善并购绩效,是近年来学者们研究的重点课题。纵观从管理者激励视角研究企业并购行为影响因素的文献,学者们主要聚焦于企业内部的薪酬等显性激励和管理层权力、晋升等隐性激励的角度,探究企业内部的激励机制对并购全过程的影响。从货币薪酬的激励角度来看,由于我国大部分CEO的薪酬设计与企业规模等因素相关,因此会诱发CEO的短期行为、盲目并购,扩大企业规模。而晋升激励,特别是国有企业中高管的政治晋升机会让高管面临较大的成长压力,促使高管选择并购来快速实现企业成长,但是会造成交易中并购溢价水平较高,并购后长期绩效较低的经济后果。从某种程度上,货币性薪酬和晋升在并购过程中对CEO的激励是无效的。对CEO进行适当的长期激励是解决并购悖论的有效方式之一,对CEO提供限制性股票期权激励能够影响企业并购决策,并且激励强度与并购绩效正相关,严格的激励条款能够促进契约的有效执行。但是,一方面,激励条款越详尽,契约的执行成本越高;另一方面,激励条款越严苛,契约的监督成本越高。值得一提的是,当管理层权力过大时,无论是货币性薪酬激励还是股权激励所发挥的激励效果都会大打折扣,CEO会追求控制权带来的私有收益而发起并购。综合以上的研究,虽然学者们试图寻求有效的激励机制来引导CEO以协同效应为并购动机,减少无效、盲目的并购活动,但是现有来自企业内部的激励机制都难以发挥有效的治理作用。Fama认为“时间”可以无成本地解决委托代理问题,长期的委托代理关系可以利用“声誉效应”激励和约束代理人的行为,即使没有显性激励契约,代理人迫于经理人市场的竞争压力和长期的职业发展考虑也会努力工作。外部经理人市场通过强化CEO对个人声誉的关注来约束CEO的行为,从而发挥激励作用。相比于企业内部的激励机制,经理人市场的声誉机制与股权激励作用的长期性具有相似之处,但激励成本更低。一方面,由于股东与CEO之间存在信息不对称,CEO的行为不能完全被观测到,仅通过薪酬、晋升等内部激励契约来约束CEO行为需要较高的执行与监督成本,并且容易产生激励偏差,而CEO声誉来自于经理人市场的竞争,是CEO自发的、为了不被取代而努力工作的动因,声誉这种隐性激励机制不但节约了执行与监督成本,更能够促进内部激励作用的实现。另一方面,高声誉不仅可以给CEO带来高薪酬、高权力以满足其低层次的物质需求,还能满足其社交、尊重和自我实现等高层次的心理需求,这是影响个体决策的内在驱动力,其价值更为稳定和持久。考虑到契约的不完全和显性激励的不足,本文从CEO声誉这一隐性激励机制的视角,探究CEO声誉对企业并购决策、支付方式、并购溢价以及并购绩效的影响。具体而言,本文试图回答以下问题:(1)CEO声誉激励能否发挥治理作用影响企业并购行为及绩效?(2)CEO声誉如果能够影响企业的并购行为及绩效,影响机理是什么?作用机制又如何?(3)在企业并购过程的不同阶段以及不同的情境下,CEO声誉的治理效应是否会表现出异质性?为了回答上述问题,本文遵循如下研究思路:本文遵循的研究路径为“背景介绍与问题提出→文献回顾与述评→理论基础与概念界定→CEO声誉对并购行为的影响研究→研究结论与建议”。首先,通过对CEO声誉和并购影响因素的相关研究进行梳理,界定CEO声誉的概念、确定CEO声誉的度量方式,并归纳总结出CEO声誉发挥激励作用的理论依据,为后续实证研究提供理论基础。其次,理论分析并实证检验CEO声誉对企业并购决策、支付方式、并购溢价以及并购绩效的影响。再次,检验CEO声誉影响并购行为的作用机制以及不同情境下CEO声誉治理效应的异质性。通过中介效应模型检验CEO声誉影响并购行为的中介机制,并结合并购行为的影响情境,综合检验在产权性质、成长性等不同情境中,CEO声誉治理效应的异质性分析。最后,以实证结论为依据提出相应的政策建议。本文主要包括以下三大研究部分:第一,理论基础研究部分。包括本文第1章、第2章和第3章。其中,第1章为绪论。包括本选题的现实背景以及理论背景,选题价值,研究问题,研究的理论意义与实践价值,研究目标,为实现该研究目标所遵循的研究思路、研究内容和研究方法,以及研究创新。第2章为文献综述,本部分对CEO声誉和并购影响因素的相关理论与实证研究进行了全面细致的梳理。总结归纳了国内外关于CEO声誉的相关研究,包括声誉的内涵,CEO声誉的形成,CEO声誉的度量,和CEO声誉的治理效应四个方面,厘清了 CEO声誉的概念、度量以及CEO激励效应发挥的机制。对国内外关于并购影响因素的相关研究进行梳理,分析总结了企业并购动因,并根据研究主题从管理者激励的角度,系统梳理了国内外管理者激励对并购行为的影响研究,查找现有激励机制对并购行为的治理作用发挥的不足之处。再针对CEO声誉在企业投资中的影响进行重点梳理。对CEO声誉和并购影响因素的相关研究现状进行总述与评价,并引出本文的研究方向。第3章为理论基础与概念界定,本部分对CEO声誉激励相关的理论和并购相关的理论进行梳理后,对本文的关键概念进行界定。第二,CEO声誉影响企业并购行为的实证检验部分。包括本文第4章、第5章、第6章和第7章。通过理论演绎法和逻辑推理法推出本文的研究假说,并分别实证检验CEO声誉对并购决策、支付方式、并购溢价和并购绩效的影响。其中,并购决策主要指并购意愿,包括是否并购以及并购规模;支付方式包括现金支付的概率以及现金支付金额占总并购金额的比例;并购溢价包括企业实际的并购溢价水平以及经过行业标准化的并购溢价;并购绩效包括短期并购绩效和长期并购绩效,短期并购绩效主要使用并购宣告前后短期市场反应来衡量,长期并购绩效又区分为长期经营绩效与长期市场绩效。第三,CEO声誉影响并购行为的作用机制检验以及CEO声誉治理效应发挥的情境检验部分。包括本文第4章、第5章、第6章和第7章的进一步分析。通过中介效应模型检验CEO声誉影响并购行为的中介机制,并结合并购行为的影响情境,综合检验在产权性质、成长性等不同情境中,CEO声誉治理效应的异质性分析。最后,第8章总结研究结论并在此基础上对企业治理效率的提升和经理人市场声誉评价机制的完善提出相应的政策建议。本文的主要研究结论如下:结论一:CEO声誉与企业并购决策研究部分。大多数企业并购后都难以创造价值,但并购活动仍然频繁发生,学术界将其归因于并购过程中的委托代理问题。这里既包括股东与管理者之间的代理冲突,又包括大股东与中小股东之间的代理冲突,即管理层自利动机与大股东掏空动机是解释现有并购活动违背初衷的两个主要原因。本文认为高声誉的CEO为了避免声誉受损会谨慎的选择并购项目,减少出于自利动机盲目扩张的并购活动;同时降低与大股东的合谋,减少大股东出于套利动机发起的有损企业价值的并购活动。研究发现,首先,相比低声誉的CEO,高声誉的CEO企业并购概率较低,并购规模较小。其次,本文检验了 CEO声誉降低并购决策的作用机制。高声誉的CEO出于对声誉的维护会减少盲目性和投机性并购活动,本文以关联并购和无关多元化并购来衡量无效并购,发现CEO声誉与关联并购概率和无关多元化并购概率负相关,从源头上控制了企业的无效并购。再次,受到微观企业特征、个体生命周期和宏观经济政策的影响,CEO声誉与并购决策之间的关系表现出了异质性。具体而言,国有企业担负着更多的政策性目标,因此,在国有企业中CEO声誉与并购概率、并购规模的负相关关系减弱;成长性较高的企业中,CEO声誉与并购概率的负相关关系减弱,但与并购规模的负相关关系增强,说明高声誉的CEO更为谨慎,在不可避免进行并购的情况下会控制企业的并购规模;随着年龄的增长,CEO声誉与并购概率和并购规模的负相关关系减弱;在经济政策不确定性较高的情境下,CEO声誉与并购概率、并购规模的负相关关系减弱。最后,双重差分模型和Heckman两阶段模型的检验结果说明,在控制了内生性问题后,CEO声誉与并购决策的负相关关系仍然成立,本文的结论是稳健的。结论二:CEO声誉与并购支付方式研究部分。现有并购活动的并购方式主要为现金支付、股权支付以及现金和股权混合支付,并且现金支付所需的现金主要来自于债务融资。CEO选择现金支付还是股权支付取决于在控制权被稀释的风险和企业举债能力之间进行权衡。本文认为高声誉的CEO较为谨慎,更倾向于选择现金支付规避控制权被稀释的风险以及股权支付带来的审批风险与潜在的竞争风险;同时,高声誉的CEO能够提高企业的举债能力,降低信息不对称。研究发现,首先,CEO声誉与现金支付之间存在显著的正相关关系。相比低声誉的CEO,高声誉的CEO在并购总价中的现金支付比例更高,相比股权支付,更倾向于现金支付的对价方式。其次,本文检验了高声誉CEO偏好现金支付的传导机制。高声誉的CEO有能力缓解并购方融资约束,提高企业的举债能力,从而保证企业选择更具有竞争优势的现金支付方式。再次,受到并购方产权性质和成长性的影响,CEO声誉与现金支付方式的关系表现出了异质性。具体而言,国有产权促进了 CEO声誉与现金支付比例和现金支付概率的正相关关系。但是,在成长性较高的企业中,抑制了 CEO声誉与现金支付比例和现金支付概率的正相关关系。最后,本文替换了并购支付方式的度量以及变换了对应的实证模型,替换了 CEO声誉的度量方式,并采用Heckman两阶段模型控制了自选择问题后,CEO声誉与现金支付的正相关关系仍然成立,本文的结论是稳健的。结论三:CEO声誉与企业并购溢价研究部分。我国企业并购溢价水平普遍较高,而高溢价并购是引发并购价值损毁的主要原因。高并购溢价一方面是源于并购方大股东以套利为目的“有意而为”,另一方面是源于并购过程中固有的不确定性和信息不对称导致的“无意而为”。本文认为,在声誉机制的约束下,CEO会减少与大股东通过并购合谋套利的动机;同时有能力获取充分的估值信息,提高估值的准确性。研究发现,首先,CEO声誉与并购溢价之间存在显著的负相关关系。相较于低声誉的CEO,高声誉的CEO企业并购溢价水平较低,将并购溢价进行行业标准化后,该结论仍然成立。其次,本文验证了 CEO声誉能够进一步降低企业并购后计提商誉减值的概率,以及高声誉的CEO通过提高内部控制质量降低并购溢价的作用机制。再次,受到并购方产权性质和成长性的影响,CEO声誉与并购溢价之间的关系表现出了异质性。具体而言,在国有企业中,CEO声誉与并购溢价的负相关关系减弱。在成长性较高的企业中,CEO声誉对并购溢价的抑制作用降低。最后,本文按照公司进行cluster、替换CEO声誉的度量方式以及使用Heckman两阶段模型控制自选择效应后,本文的结论依然成立。结论四:CEO声誉与企业并购绩效研究部分。大量研究证实并购并没有为并购方股东创造财富,原因在于两个方面,一方面是并购方出于管理层自利动机和大股东掏空动机发起的无效并购,另一方面是并购整合能力欠缺导致的整合失败。第4章我们已经证实,声誉可以发挥治理作用,减少管理层发起的盲目和无效并购活动,而是以并购方价值创造为出发点,尽可能选择有利于实现协同效应的并购标的,从并购的源头加以控制。在此基础上,并购绩效的高低取决于并购后的整合能力。本文认为并购整合的关键在于文化、人力资源整合以及业务整合,高声誉的CEO具有较高的整合能力,能够有效实现文化整合、人力资源整合以及业务整合。研究发现,首先,CEO声誉与长期并购绩效之间存在显著的正相关关系,但对短期并购绩效无显著影响。其次,本文检验了 CEO声誉影响并购绩效的作用机制。高声誉的CEO通过提高企业内部控制质量来提升长期并购绩效。再次,受产权性质和CEO年龄的影响,CEO声誉与并购绩效的关系表现出了异质性。具体而言,在国有企业中,CEO声誉与长期并购绩效之间的正相关关系减弱。随着CEO年龄的增长,CEO声誉与长期并购绩效之间的正相关关系减弱。最后,本文替换了并购绩效和CEO声誉的度量法方式,并采用Heckman两阶段模型控制了自选择问题后,CEO声誉与长期并购绩效之间的正相关关系仍然成立,本文的结论是稳健的。简而言之,CEO声誉对企业并购行为及绩效的影响表现为:CEO声誉与并购概率、并购规模负相关;CEO声誉与现金支付概率和现金支付比例正相关;CEO声誉与并购溢价水平负相关;CEO声誉与并购后长期的经营绩效和市场绩效正相关。更多还原

【Abstract】 Merger and acquisition is an important way for enterprises to realize extensive growth and expansion,as well as an important way for China to optimize resource allocation and promote industrial structure upgrading.Since 2014,China has promulgated a series of policies related to mergers and acquisitions,such as opinions on further optimizing the market environment for enterprise mergers and reorganizations and measures for the management of major asset reorganization of listed companies,in order to guide enterprises to conduct mergers and acquisitions and realize the strategy of industry integration and industrial upgrading.In practice,however,mergers and acquisitions to help enterprises leapfrog growth,promote the upgrading of industrial structure at the same time,but with appear a lot of damage to the value of the company as well as against the policy of the original acquisition phenomenon,for example,after long-term performance after the merger is negative,the merger and acquisition goodwill behind the behavior of large write-downs,mergers and acquisitions the indemnification and policy arbitrage.The emergence of these phenomena makes how to standardize and guide the merger and acquisition of enterprises become an important problem to be solved urgently.The key to solve this problem is to clarify the influencing factors and the internal influencing mechanism of these factors in the process of M&A.The academic circles attribute the value destruction after merger to the principal-agent problem.The original intention of mergers and acquisitions is to pursue synergies,but due to the selfish motivation of the actual controllers and the management,many mergers and acquisitions are ineffective and blind.The behavioral motivation often determines the consequences of the behavior.The self-interested M&A behavior,whether in the pre-M&A due diligence,target screening or the structure design of the M&A transaction,will lead to the destruction of the value of the final M&A.The CEO is the decision-making subject of enterprise M&A,and his utility function is different from that of shareholders.As the motivation of "rational man" to pursue salary and power,he will directly distort the decision-making of enterprise M&A.Therefore,how to set up an effective incentive mechanism to alleviate the principal-agent problem of CEO in the process of M&A so as to improve the performance of M&A has been the focus of scholars’research in recent years.Through a review of the literature on the factors affecting the M&A behavior from the perspective of manager motivation,scholars mainly focused on the explicit incentives such as internal compensation and the implicit incentives such as management power and promotion to explore the influence of internal incentive mechanism on the whole process of M&A.From the perspective of monetary compensation incentive,since the salary design of most CEO in China is related to factors such as enterprise scale,it will induce the CEO’s short-term behaviors,blind mergers and acquisitions,and expand the enterprise scale.The promotion incentive,especially the political promotion opportunity of the senior executives in state-owned enterprises,puts the senior executives under great pressure to grow,and encourages them to choose M&A to realize the rapid growth of the enterprise.However,it will lead to the economic consequences of high M&A premium in the transaction and low long-term performance after M&A.To some extent,monetary compensation and promotion do not motivate CEO in the M&A process.Proper long-term incentive for CEO is one of the effective ways to solve the M&A paradox.Providing CEO with restricted stock option incentive can influence the decision-making of M&A,and the incentive intensity is positively correlated with the performance of M&A.Strict incentive clauses can promote the effective execution of contracts.However,on the one hand,the more detailed the incentive terms,the higher the execution cost of the contract;on the other hand,the more stringent the incentive terms,the higher the cost of contract supervision.It is worth mentioning that when the management has too much power,the incentive effect of both monetary compensation incentive and equity incentive will be greatly reduced,and the CEO will pursue the private benefits brought by control rights and launch M&A.Based on the above studies,although scholars try to find effective incentive mechanisms to guide CEO to take synergy effect as the motivation for M&A and reduce ineffective and blind M&A activities,the existing incentive mechanisms from within enterprises are difficult to play an effective governance role.Fama believed that "time" could not solve the principal-agent problem locally,and the long-term principal-agent relationship could use the "reputation effect" to motivate and constrain the behavior of agents.Even if there was no explicit incentive contract,agents would work hard under the competitive pressure of the manager market and considering long-term career development.The external manager market plays an incentive role by strengthening CEO’s attention to personal reputation to restrain CEO’s behavior.Compared with the internal incentive mechanism,the reputation mechanism of the manager market is similar to the long-term effect of equity incentive,but the incentive cost is lower.On the one hand,because of information asymmetry between shareholders and the CEO,the CEO’s behavior is not fully observed,only through the internal incentives,such as pay,promotion contract governing the execution and supervision of CEO behavior need higher cost,and easy to produce incentive deviation,managers and CEO reputation from the market competition,is the CEO of spontaneous,in order not to be replaced and the reason of hard work,reputation the recessive incentive mechanism not only saving the cost of the execution and supervision,more can promote the realization of internal incentive.On the other hand,a high reputation can not only bring a CEO high salary and power to meet his low-level material needs,but also meet his high-level psychological needs such as socialization,respect and self-realization,which are the internal driving forces that influence individual decision making,and its value is more stable and lasting.Considering the incomplete contract and the deficiency of explicit incentive,this paper,from the perspective of CEO reputation,a hidden incentive mechanism,explores the influence of CEO reputation on corporate M&A decisions,payment methods,M&A premium and M&A performance.Specifically,this article tries to answer the following questions:(1)Can CEO reputation incentive play a governance role in corporate M&A?(2)If CEO reputation can influence the M&A behavior of enterprises,what is the influencing mechanism?(3)Will the governance effect of CEO reputation show heterogeneity at different stages and under different circumstances?In order to answer the above questions,this paper follows the following research ideas:this paper follows the research path of "background introduction and question proposal→literature review and review→theoretical basis and concept definition→research on the influence of CEO reputation on M&A behavior→research conclusions and Suggestions".First,the concept of CEO reputation is defined,the measurement method of CEO reputation is determined,and the theoretical basis for CEO reputation to play an encouraging role is summarized by combing the relevant studies on CEO reputation and the influencing factors of M&A,so as to provide a theoretical basis for subsequent empirical studies.Secondly,the influence of CEO reputation on M&A decision,payment method,M&A premium and M&A performance is analyzed theoretically and empirically.Thirdly,the paper examines the mechanism of CEO reputation influencing M&A and the heterogeneity of CEO reputation governance effect in different situations.The mediating effect model was used to test the mediating mechanism of CEO reputation influencing M&A behavior,and the heterogeneous analysis of CEO reputation governance effect in different situations,such as property right nature and growth,was comprehensively tested in combination with the influence situation of M&A behavior.Finally,based on the empirical conclusion,the corresponding policy suggestions are put forward.This paper mainly includes the following three research parts:First,basic theoretical research.It includes chapter 1,chapter 2 and chapter 3.Chapter 1 is the introduction.It includes the realistic background and theoretical background of the topic,the value of the topic,the research questions,the theoretical significance and practical value of the research,the research objectives,the research ideas,research contents and research methods followed to achieve the research objectives,as well as the research innovations.Chapter 2 is a literature review.This part makes a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the theories and empirical studies on the influence factors of CEO reputation and M&A.This paper summarizes the related researches on CEO reputation at home and abroad,including four aspects:the connotation of CEO reputation,the formation of CEO reputation,the measurement of CEO reputation,and the governance effect of CEO reputation.About M&A impact factors related research at home and abroad for carding,analysis summarizes the M&A motivation,and according to the research topic,from the perspective of managers incentive system combed the domestic and foreign managers incentive effect on M&A behavior research,find the existing incentive mechanism of M&A action governance role play of deficiencies.Secondly,the influence of CEO’s reputation on corporate investment is analyzed.This paper summarizes and evaluates the research status of CEO reputation and the influence factors of M&A,and leads to the research direction of this paper.Second,the empirical test of the influence of CEO reputation on M&A behavior.It includes chapters 4,5,6 and 7.Through deductive theory and logical reasoning method,the hypothesis of this paper was developed,and the influence of CEO reputation on M&A decision,payment method,M&A premium and M&A performance was empirically tested.Among them,M&A decision mainly refers to the intention of M&A,including whether to conduct M&A and the scale of M&A.The payment method includes the probability of cash payment and the proportion of cash payment in the total M&A amount;M&A premium includes the actual level of M&A premium and the M&A premium standardized by the industry.M&A performance includes short-term M&A performance and long-term M&A performance.Short-term M&A performance is mainly measured by short-term market reaction before and after M&A announcement.Long-term M&A performance is divided into long-term business performance and long-term market performance.Thirdly,the functional mechanism test of CEO’s reputation on M&A and the situational test of CEO’s reputation governance effect.It includes the further analysis of chapter 4,chapter 5,chapter 6 and chapter 7.The mediating effect model was used to test the mediating mechanism of CEO reputation influencing M&A behavior,and the heterogeneous analysis of CEO reputation governance effect in different situations,such as property right nature and growth,was comprehensively tested in combination with the influence situation of M&A behavior.Finally,chapter 8 summarizes the research conclusions and puts forward corresponding policy suggestions for the improvement of corporate governance efficiency and the improvement of managers’ market reputation evaluation mechanism.The main research conclusions of this paper are as follows:Conclusion 1:the research on CEO reputation and M&A decision.Most enterprises are difficult to create value after merger and acquisition,but merger and acquisition activities still occur frequently,which is attributed to the principal-agent problem in the process of merger and acquisition.This includes not only the agency conflict between shareholders and managers,but also the agency conflict between major shareholders and minority shareholders.In other words,the self-interested motive of management and the hollowing out motive of major shareholders are the two main reasons why the existing M&A activities violate the original intention.In order to avoid reputation damage,CEO with high reputation will carefully choose M&A projects and reduce the blindly expanding M&A activities motivated by self-interest.At the same time,the collusion with major shareholders should be reduced,and the merger and acquisition activities initiated by major shareholders out of the motivation of arbitrage should be reduced.The study found that,first of all,the CEO with a high reputation had a lower probability of M&A and the M&A scale was smaller.Secondly,this paper examines the mechanism by which CEO reputation reduces M&A decisions.For CEO with high reputation,the maintenance of their reputation will reduce the blindness and speculative M&A activities.This paper measures the ineffective M&A by related M&A and unrelated diversified M&A,and finds that CEO reputation is negatively correlated with the probability of related M&A and unrelated diversified M&A,thus controlling the ineffective M&A of enterprises from the source.Further,from the CEO reputation and the quality of internal control and the intermediary effect between mergers&acquisitions inspection found that high reputation CEO through the establishment of the high quality of internal control,optimize the environment of governance to achieve internal checks and balance between the interest subjects,information transfer and the accurate assessment of the risk,so as to select high quality targets,reduce invalid mergers and acquisitions.Thirdly,the relationship between CEO reputation and M&A decision shows heterogeneity under the influence of macroeconomic policies and micro-enterprise characteristics.Specifically,in the context of high uncertainty of economic policy,the negative correlation between CEO reputation and M&A probability and M&A scale is weakened.State-owned enterprises bear more policy objectives.Therefore,the negative correlation between CEO reputation and M&A probability and M&A scale is weakened in state-owned enterprises.In enterprises with high growth,the negative correlation between CEO reputation and M&A probability is weakened,but the negative correlation between CEO reputation and M&A scale is strengthened,indicating that CEO with high reputation are more cautious and will control the M&A scale in the case of inevitable M&A.Finally,the test results of the dual difference model and the Heckman two-stage model show that the negative correlation between CEO reputation and M&A decision is still valid after controlling the endogeneity problem.The conclusion of this paper is robust.Conclusion 2:the research on CEO reputation and M&A payment method.The existing M&A methods are mainly cash payment,equity payment and mixed payment of cash and equity,and the cash required for cash payment mainly comes from debt financing.Whether a CEO chooses to pay cash or equity depends on a trade-off between the risk of dilution of control and the company’s ability to borrow.In this paper,it is considered that CEO with high reputation are more cautious,and they are more inclined to choose cash payment to avoid the risk of dilution of control right,approval risk and potential competition risk brought by equity payment.At the same time,a highly regarded CEO can improve the company’s ability to borrow money and reduce information asymmetry.First,the study found a significant positive correlation between CEO reputation and cash payments.The CEO with high reputation has a higher proportion of cash payment in the total price of M&A,and prefers the consideration method of cash payment compared with equity payment.Secondly,this paper examines the transmission mechanism of high reputation CEO’s preference for cash payment.A highly reputed CEO is able to ease the financing constraints of the acquirer,improve the ability of the enterprise to borrow,and reduce the information asymmetry in the process of the acquisition by improving the quality of internal control,so as to ensure that the enterprise chooses a more competitive cash payment method.Thirdly,influenced by the property right nature and growth of the acquirer,the relationship between CEO reputation and cash payment method shows heterogeneity.Specifically,in state-owned enterprises,the positive correlation between CEO reputation and cash payment ratio and cash payment probability has been strengthened.However,in higher growth enterprises,the positive correlation between CEO reputation and cash payment ratio and cash payment probability was weakened.Finally,this paper replaced the measurement of M&A payment method and the corresponding empirical model,replaced the measurement method of CEO reputation,and used the Heckman two-stage model to control the self-selection problem.The positive correlation between CEO reputation and cash payment was still valid,and the conclusion of this paper was robust.Conclusion 3:the study on CEO reputation and M&A premium.The M&A premium level of Chinese enterprises is generally high,and the high M&A premium is the main reason that leads to the destruction of M&A value.On the one hand,the high M&A premium is due to the "intentional act" of the major shareholders of the acquirer for the purpose of arbitrage;on the other hand,it is due to the "unintentional act" caused by the inherent uncertainty and information asymmetry in the M&A process.This paper argues that under the constraint of reputation mechanism,CEO will reduce the incentive to arbitrage with major shareholders through merger and acquisition.At the same time have the ability to obtain sufficient valuation information,improve the accuracy of the valuation.First,there is a significant negative correlation between CEO reputation and M&A premium,the study found.For CEO with high reputation,the level of M&A premium is relatively low,which is still true after the industry standardization of M&A premium.Secondly,this paper verifies that a highly reputed CEO can further reduce the probability of calculating and withdrawing goodwill impairment after M&A,and the mechanism by which a highly reputed CEO reduces the M&A premium by improving the quality of internal control.Thirdly,the relationship between CEO reputation and M&A premium shows heterogeneity due to the property right nature and growth of the acquirer.Specifically,in state-owned enterprises,the negative correlation between CEO reputation and M&A premium is weakened.In companies with high growth potential,CEO reputation has less effect on M&A premium.Finally,the conclusions of this paper are still valid after the measurement method of company cluster,CEO reputation replacement and the use of Heckman two-stage model to control the self-selection effect.Conclusion 4:the research on CEO reputation and M&A performance.A large number of studies have confirmed that merger and acquisition did not create wealth for the shareholders of the merger and acquisition company.The reason lies in two aspects:on the one hand,the merger and acquisition company launched an invalid merger and acquisition out of the self-interest motive of the management and the hollowing out motive of the major shareholders;on the other hand,the integration failure caused by the lack of merger and acquisition integration ability.In chapter 4,we have proved that reputation can play a governance role and reduce the blind and ineffective M&A activities initiated by the management.Instead,starting from the value creation of the M&A party,the target of M&A that is conducive to achieving synergies should be selected as far as possible and the source of M&A should be controlled.On this basis,the level of M&A performance depends on the integration ability after M&A.This paper holds that the key of merger and acquisition integration lies in the integration of culture,human resources and business.The CEO with high reputation has high integration ability and can effectively realize the integration of culture,human resources and business.The study found that,first of all,there was a significant positive correlation between CEO reputation and long-term M&A performance,but there was no significant correlation between CEO reputation and short-term M&A performance.Secondly,this paper examines the mechanism by which CEO reputation affects M&A performance.Reputable CEO improve long-term M&A performance by improving the quality of their internal controls.Thirdly,the relationship between CEO reputation and M&A performance shows heterogeneity due to the property right nature and CEO age.Specifically,in state-owned enterprises,the positive correlation between CEO reputation and long-term M&A performance was weakened.As CEO ages,the positive correlation between CEO reputation and long-term M&A performance weakens.Finally,this paper replaced the measurement method of M&A performance and CEO reputation,and used the Heckman two-stage model to control the selection problem.After that,the positive correlation between CEO reputation and long-term M&A performance was still valid.The conclusion of this paper was robust.In short,the influence of CEO reputation on M&A behavior is shown as follows:CEO reputation is negatively correlated with M&A probability and M&A scale;CEO reputation is positively correlated with cash payment probability and cash payment ratio.CEO reputation is negatively correlated with M&A premium level;CEO reputation is positively correlated with long-term business performance and market performance after M&A.更多还原