【作者】 梁伟；

【导师】 齐明；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 民商法学， 2019， 博士

【摘要】 利益冲突与平衡是破产程序中恒久的话题,利益冲突与平衡充斥于破产重整规范与司法实践的各个角落,几乎不可能总结出全部的冲突样态与平衡路径。这一方面是因冲突类型的繁杂,很难全部囊括;另一方面是因为社会的不断发展与变动随时改变重整中的利益博弈状态,进而随时衍生出新的冲突。但破产重整程序作为破产程序框架下的子项目,以利益相关者的经济人理性为基础,通过再建企业并释放企业的持续经营价值(Going Concern Value)的制度价值却未发生变化。当陷入财务困境但具有可持续经营价值的企业,亟需要破产重整进行拯救时,却因利益冲突而阻遏重整程序的顺利推进,这便需要反问,究竟为何债权人等利益相关者失去理性的经济思考,而排斥重整程序?虽然主要建立在个案分析之上的研究,不能发现全部的利益冲突类型,并且建立在个案研究基础上的解决路径也可能是相对狭隘的,毕竟债务人企业与债务人企业之间存在差异,企业的债务结构、盈利状况、经营模式、市场前景、企业文化等均存在差异,恰如莱布尼茨所说:“世界上没有两片相同的树叶”,但对个案深入的剖析可以发现冲突的真实样貌,最直观的了解到破产重整中利益冲突的面相,在此基础上的平衡路径可以为其他案件提供一定的建议和参考。破产重整程序是市场竞争失败主体拯救本位程序,司法介入下利益相关者协商博弈平台的制度架构能够促进市场化主导资源配置的实现,但在利益协商与博弈的过程中却存在着冲突。冲突的化解与利益平衡的实现是破产重整制度功能发挥的手段和方式,利益平衡的实现可从社会结构维度推动破产重整制度功能的发挥,既包括社会行为维度的指引功能,也包括社会文化维度的转化功能,甚至是社会经济维度的资源配置转变与宏观经济政策落实功能,但这均需以利益平衡的实现为前提。企业财务困境造成债务人财产不能满足于各方的需求,进而从企业进入破产程序后将可能爆发激烈的利益冲突,如何实现利益平衡是破产重整程序需要解决的问题。角色多样与利益诉求重合是破产重整中利益冲突复杂的表征,探明利益冲突的实然面相是实现破产重整中利益平衡的必然选择,以利益相关者的角色及诉求为视角进行实证分析,既包括以数据为主的分析去解构企业的财务困境与可持续经营价值现实,也包括田野调查发现利益相关者的真实诉求,实证研究能够穿透重整司法实践与制度规范间的迷雾,明晰债权人、债务人及战略投资人等利益群体的诉求,以及行政权、审判权等角色在重整程序中的真实样态。但破产重整程序不可能对全部利益冲突逐一化解,利用破产重整程序实现企业拯救,保留与释放债务人企业的可持续经营价值是维护社会公共利益的方式,也能够实现重整制度的价值功能,而在此目的之下,对破产重整程序中的利益冲突类型化,对应其成因探索体系化的解决路径。首先是债务人财产与破产重整利益平衡的关联,毋庸讳言,财产的价值归属是利益相关者博弈的目标,企业进入破产重整程序是基于财务困境的现实,财务困境的现实背后是债务人财产价值和变现能力的有限与不足。人具有逐利的本质,以债权人为代表的利益相关者为了争夺有限的债务人财产,以满足自己的利益诉求而实施利己的策略,在重整博弈中发生利益冲突。所以,实现破产重整中利益平衡的基础就是提升债务人财产价值并进行妥当的分配。债务人财产保值增值一直未上升到破产法基本原则维度,但破产法相对非破产法的重要特征就是基于破产撤销权、自动冻结制度等以实现债务人财产保值为目标的制度设计,其背后的逻辑是以实现债权人整体利益最大化目标下的实质公平追求。而挖掘债务人企业破产期间继续经营能力,能有效的实现债务人财产增值。对债务人财产的分配需以非破产法规则为基础确定权利人,锁定权利人范围,并以破产期间时间轴上坐标为尺度,对破产重整前、重整期间及重整完毕后的权利人进行有序的分配与清偿,从而实现破产重整程序制度背后的实质公平和效率价值。破产重整程序利益平衡的实现需要市场化和法治化路径为指引,以债务人财产分配和债务人企业拯救为目的的利益平衡路径也需要在上述框架下实现,重整程序这一司法平台的制度建构要求审判权主导并负责应对重整中利益的冲突,努力实现重整中利益的平衡。可在集体行动逻辑之下,因为重整程序中规范不完备、冲突剧烈而造成审判机关对重整程序持审慎态度。企业破产重整能否成功关乎地方经济发展、职工安置等多重因素,行政权难免不对其产生关注,但行政权的介入会冲击审判权的中立地位,使利益偏离平衡的天平而向某一方倾斜,进而损害其他权利主体的利益。此外,破产管理人的履职受到法院中心主义的影响,而弱化了其自身功能,究其根源在于缺少市场化与科学化的履职评价体系,而变成行政领导式履职,与市场化要求相悖。破产重整利益的平衡需要外部公权力介入的保障,也需要内部管理人权力的积极行动,权力在行政权、审判权与管理人之间能否进行妥当的配置影响着重整程序的成功。审判权基于纠纷裁判者的司法权威性而享有破产重整程序主导权,而其正确运用破产宣告权、重整计划强制批准权等实现程序控制以克服审慎态度是其正确样态;市场经济体制不完备之时,破产重整程序无法有效的借助市场,弱化重整功能,行政权应以辅助破产重整程序成功和企业拯救为目的,从程序主导权的享有者退化为程序失灵时的弥补者;而管理人则应以市场化为基础,以积极能动的履职去实现自身收益的最大化,在重整程序中妥当利用商业判断规则,并建立以债务人财产价值为基础的评价标准,以激励管理人积极履职,来实现各方的利益平衡。最后是重整中利益平衡的实现路径,利益平衡的实现是利益的分配过程,破产重整中利益的分配需要接受利益位阶的调整,按照利益位阶的不同进行不同的保护,并将权利人以不同的债务人财产进行清偿。公共利益、群体利益与个体利益是重整中利益的三个位阶层次,在权变理论下,金融债权保护被上升到社会公共利益的范畴予以关注,而群体利益保护也加入了程序参与权,以保障其信息的对称,最后才是通过克服僵化性的一致原则去对个体利益实现保护。针对不同利益位阶中利益相关者的诉求,在重整规范不完备的空白地带,凭借管理人的积极履职与行政权的协助,在审判权的主导之下探索诸如和解式重整的路径,克服僵化的思路去实现重整中的利益平衡,以达到推动破产重整程序成功,保护企业可持续经营价值及发挥重整制度功能的目的。更多还原

【Abstract】 Conflict and balance of interest in bankruptcy proceedings is a permanent topic in bankruptcy law.Conflict and balance are rife in every corner of bankruptcy reorganization norms and judicial practice.In previous studies,no scholar has been able to summarize all conflict patterns and balance paths.On the one hand,it is because of the complex types of conflicts;on the other hand,it is because of the constant development and changes of the society to change the game state of interests in the restructuring at any time,and thus generate new conflicts at any time.But the bankruptcy reorganization procedure subproject under the framework of a bankruptcy procedure,based on the stakeholders of the rational economic man,through to build enterprise and release the continuing operations of the enterprise value(Going Concern),the value of the system was not changed,when faced with a financially,but with the value of sustainable enterprise need to make a save of bankruptcy reorganization,but because of conflicts of interest and stem the reorganization process smoothly,it will need to ask,why lose rational economic thinking,such as those creditors,and exclude reorganization process.Mainly based on case analysis research,is unable to find all the types of conflicts of interest and the solution of the established on the basis of their findings conflict type path may be relatively narrow,because there are differences between the debtor and the debtor enterprise enterprise,enterprise’s debt structure,profitability,operation mode,market prospect,enterprise culture and so on are differences,just as Leibnitz,puts it: "There are no two identical leaves in the world",but the in-depth analysis of the case can find the real appearance of conflict,the most intuitive understanding of the face of the conflict of interest in bankruptcy reorganization,on this basis,the balanced path can provide some Suggestions and reference for other cases.Bankruptcy reorganization is a rescue procedure for the subjects who fail in market competition.The system structure of stakeholder negotiation and game platform under judicial intervention can promote the realization of market-oriented dominant resource allocation,but there are conflicts in the process of interest negotiation and game.To resolve conflicts with the interests of balance function is the implementation of the bankruptcy reorganization system means and ways,the realization of the balancing of interests can be driven from the dimension of the social structure of bankruptcy reorganization system function,both dimension of social behavior guidance function,including social and cultural dimensions of the transformation function,even is the transformation of social and economic dimensions of resource allocation and the macroeconomic policy to carry out the function,but it must be on the premise of the realization of the interests balance.Conflicts of interest and balance in the bankruptcy reorganization of the eternal theme,enterprise financial distress caused by the debtor’s property can not meet the needs of all parties,and then from the enterprise into the bankruptcy process will be likely to break out fierce conflicts of interest,how to achieve the balance of interests is the bankruptcy reorganization process needs to solve the problem.Diverse roles and interests overlap is conflicts of complex representation of bankruptcy reorganization,identify the reality faces a conflict of interest is a necessary choice to realize the balancing of interests in the bankruptcy reorganization,in the perspective of the role of stakeholders and appeal to the empirical analysis,both give priority to with the data analysis to deconstruct the enterprise financial distress and sustainable business value,including field survey found that the real demands of stakeholders,the empirical research to penetrate fog of reorganization between judicial practice and system specification clear creditors,the debtor and the demands of strategic investors and other interest groups,as well as the role of executive power and jurisdiction in the reorganization process of the real.However,it is impossible to resolve and balance all the conflicts of interest in the bankruptcy reorganization process.To successfully save the enterprise through the bankruptcy reorganization process,preserving and releasing the sustainable operating value of the debtor enterprise is a way to safeguard the public interests,and can also realize the value function of the reorganization system.For this purpose,we can find a systematic solution to the conflicts of interest in bankruptcy reorganization.Firstly,it is the relationship between debtor’s property and the balance of interests of bankruptcy reorganization.Needless to say,the value attribution of property is the goal of the game of stakeholders,and the bankruptcy reorganization of enterprises is based on the reality of financial distress,which is behind the limited and insufficient property value and liquidity of debtors.People have the nature of pursuing profits,and stakeholders represented by creditors implement self-interested strategies for limited debtors’ property,resulting in interest conflicts in the game.Therefore,the basis of realizing the balance of interests in bankruptcy reorganization is to improve the property value of debtors and make proper distribution.Debtor’s property the value has not been up to bankruptcy law basic principle dimensions,but the important feature of the bankruptcy law and the bankruptcy law system is based on bankruptcy revocation right,automatic freeze in order to realize the debtor property value as the goal of system design,the logic behind is the essence of the creditors under the overall benefit maximization goal fair pursuit.And mining the debtor’s business ability during bankruptcy can effectively realize the debtor’s property appreciation.Distribution of the debtor’s property to be on the basis of the bankruptcy law rules to determine the right holder,the holder of the lock range,and in bankruptcy during the time axis coordinates for scale,the bankruptcy reorganization,restructuring period before and after the reorganization of the right holder of an orderly distribution and discharge,thus realize the bankruptcy reorganization procedure system behind the essence of the value of efficiency and fairness.And the realization of the bankruptcy reorganization procedure interests balance need marketization and government by law path as the instruction,the debtor to the debtor property distribution and enterprise save dangerous purpose of interests equilibrium path also need in the above framework implementation,reorganization procedure justice platform system construction requirements of the jurisdiction conflicts of interest in leading and responsible for dealing with reforming and implementation of the restructuring of the balance of interests,but under the collective action logic,because in the reorganization process specification is not complete,the conflict caused by the judicial organ for the cautious attitude.The bankruptcy reorganization of enterprises on the local economic development,worker placement and other factors,the administrative power inevitably does not pay attention to it.However,the intervention of the administrative power will impact the neutral position of the judicial power,make the interests deviate from the balance balance and tilt to one side,and then damage the interests of other rights.In addition,the bankruptcy administrator’s performance of duties is influenced by the centralism of the court,which weakens its own functions.The root cause is the lack of market-oriented and scientific performance evaluation system,and the bankruptcy administrator’s performance becomes leadership,which is contrary to the requirements of marketization.The balance of the interests of bankruptcy reorganization needs the guarantee of public power,and whether the power can be properly allocated between the administrative power,the judicial power and the manager affects the success of the reorganization process.The judicial power,based on the judicial authority of the judges in disputes,enjoys the dominant right of bankruptcy reorganization process,and it is correct to use the right of bankruptcy declaration,the right of compulsory approval of reorganization plan and other procedural control to overcome the prudent attitude.When the market economic system is not complete,bankruptcy reorganization process can not effectively use the market,weaken the restructuring function,the executive power should assist the bankruptcy reorganization process to succeed and save the enterprise for the purpose,from the benefit of the dominant right of the process to make up for the failure of the process;On the other hand,managers should be market-oriented and actively perform their duties to maximize their own benefits.They should make proper use of commercial judgment rules in the restructuring process and establish an evaluation standard based on the amount of debtors’ property,so as to motivate managers to actively perform their duties and achieve the balance of interests of all parties.Finally,the realization path of interest balance in restructuring,the realization of interest balance is the distribution process of interest,the distribution of interest in bankruptcy restructuring needs to accept the adjustment of interest level,different protection according to the different interest level,and the obligees with different debtor property for repayment.Public interest,group interest and individual interest are the three levels of interest in restructuring.Under contingency theory,the protection of financial creditor’s rights has been raised to the category of social public interest,and the protection of group interest has also been added to the right to participate in the process.Finally,the consistent principle of overcoming rigidity can protect individual interest.According to different interest rates,the claims of stakeholders in the arriving on reforming the specification is not complete blank,with the manager started with the assistance of the executive power,under the jurisdiction of the leading exploration such as settlement of the reforming path,to overcome rigid ideas to realize the reorganization of the benefit balance,promote bankruptcy reorganization procedure in order to achieve success,protection enterprise sustainable business value and the purpose of the reorganization system function into full play.更多还原