【作者】 李超；

【导师】 骆建文；

【作者基本信息】 上海交通大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2016， 博士

【摘要】 资金约束是阻碍供应链有效运营的瓶颈之一。若供应链中的上游企业因资金约束而无法顺利生产或及时交货,则下游企业将会面临供应短缺甚至供应中断的风险;若供应链中的下游企业因资金约束而难以足量采购以满足市场需求,则会导致产品失销和客户流失。实践中缓解资金约束的方法主要有交易信用和银行融资两种:交易信用是指供应链上下游企业之间或企业与客户之间在产品或者服务交易过程中利用商业信用解决资金约束问题的方法,包括延期付款交易信用和预付款交易信用;银行融资是指企业直接从银行获得授信以弥补资金短缺的方法。研究资金约束供应链成员企业的融资与运营策略具有重要的理论意义和实践价值。本论文研究了供应链成员企业基于不同结算方式单边交易信用和双边交易信用的最优库存决策问题;分析了供应链上游企业的资金约束对运营决策的影响,研究了预付款交易信用对资金约束上游企业的融资功能及其相对于银行融资的优势,设计了基于预付款交易信用的供应链协调机制;在资金约束的下游企业采用银行融资的框架下,考虑下游企业的破产风险和破产成本对供应链运营的影响,研究了存在二次订购机会的供应链成员企业最优运营决策与银行的利率决策。论文共分为六章,其中第一章阐述了论文研究的背景、研究意义和研究创新点;第二章对与本文有关的研究文献进行了总结。第三章研究了资金约束供应链基于单边和双边交易信用不同结算方式下的最优库存决策问题。已有的相关研究往往只关注交易信用的发生时间,即按照货款支付时间与交货时间的先后顺序将交易信用分为延期付款交易信用和预付款交易信用,并没有考虑货款的结算方式;而本文在此基础上分别考虑了单边和双边交易信用的结算方式对供应链库存决策的影响,分别在连续型结算方式和一次付清型结算方式下研究交易信用对供应链运营决策的影响。具体而言,本章在分别假设供应链下游企业对上游企业采用一次性货到付款和一次性预付款的基础上,基于市场客户六类结算方式的交易信用建立了供应链成员企业的库存决策模型,六类结算方式的交易信用分别为连续型货到付款模式、连续型延期付款模式、连续型预付款模式、一次付清型货到付款模式、一次付清型延期付款模式和一次付清型预付款模式,同时考虑了交易过程中因为支付货款而产生的资金时间价值和销售收入所带来的投资收益,求解了各类交易信用模式下的最优订购周期、最优订购批量以及在最优订购决策下的供应链成员企业的最优利润。本章进一步对比分析了单边和双边交易信用不同的结算方式下供应链最优库存决策以及供应链成员企业的最优利润,结果表明供应链的最优库存订购决策与客户交易信用的时间无关,而与各类客户交易信用下产品的市场价格有关;当产品的市场售价和产品的批发价格满足一定的条件时,供应链的最优订购量大于经典的经济订购批量;客户的一次付清型预付款交易信用模式比其他交易信用模式能够更大程度提升供应链的最优订购量。第四章研究了面向资金约束上游企业的预付款融资策略以及基于预付款融资的供应链协调机制。建立了上游企业存在资金约束的一对一拉动式供应链模型,以不存在资金约束的供应链为对照,分析了上游企业的资金约束对供应链运营决策的负面影响。为了消除这种负面影响,讨论了下游企业预付款对供应链成员企业利益的改进效果,结果表明下游企业可以通过预付款在一定程度上激励上游企业提高生产量,但是无法达到供应链整体利益最大化的效果。本章进一步研究了将预付款与传统的供应链契约进行组合的供应链契约协调机制,一方面由下游企业预付款融资方式保证上游企业的生产资金的充足性,二是由供应链契约实现供应链的协调运作,使得供应链成员企业能够在分散决策下制定与集中决策下相同的渠道产量,并使得这种协调机制有足够的弹性实现双方的帕累托改进。结果表明通过设计满足一定条件的预付款和回购契约的组合协调机制或基于预付款的收益共享协调机制,可以实现资金约束供应链的协调运作并能够任意分配渠道利润,从而实现供应链成员企业的帕累托改进。第五章研究了存在破产成本和二次订购机会下资金约束供应链的融资与运营策略。建立了由一个供应商通过带预定折扣的批发价契约向一个资金约束的零售商进行产品销售的动态博弈模型,零售商面对着随机市场需求。零售商可能需要从外部银行获得融资以向供应商支付货款来完成预定订单;供应商为了应对零售商可能进行的二次订购而制定生产量决策。销售期开始后,零售商需要利用预定产品的销售收入还清银行贷款的本息,若无法还清贷款本息则进入破产程序,零售商的收入归银行所有;银行在零售商破产中需要支付一定的破产成本,包括固定成本和可变成本。若零售商能够还清银行贷款本息,则零售商可以利用所持有的资金进行二次订购以满足额外的市场需求。通过模型求解,发现供应商的生产量决策和零售商的订购量决策都是批发价格、价格折扣以及零售商初始营运资本的函数。本章进一步研究了零售商的初始营运资本水平对其最优订购量决策、供应商的最优生产量决策以及银行的利率决策的影响。结果表明,在零售商的初始营运资本水平满足一定的条件下,零售商倾向于选择在销售期到来之前不进行预定,而仅仅利用营运资本进行二次订购来满足市场需求;供应商的最优生产量决策在零售商的资金水平满足一定的条件下等于经典报童问题的最优产量,若零售商不进行预定而仅仅利用营运资本进行二次订购,则供应商的最优生产量决策为零售商的营运资本所能购买的产品数量。第六章对全文的结论进行了总结,指出了论文研究的不足之处并对论文的进一步可行的研究方向进行了展望。论文的主要的创新点体现在以下几个方面:(1)揭示了预付款的融资功能,分析了预付款对资金约束的拉动式供应链效率的提升作用,得到了预付款下供应链成员企业利益的帕累托改进空间,证明了预付款对资金约束供应链能够起到部分协调的作用。现有关于供应链资金约束企业融资模式的选择问题的研究大都集中在供应链下游企业存在资金瓶颈的情形,对供应链上游企业存在资金约束时融资模式的选择问题的研究较为缺乏,特别是供应链上游企业的自有资金为零情形下的研究较为稀少,本论文研究了上游企业自有资金为零的情形下从银行融资和下游企业预付款融资进行选择的决策问题,同时研究了选择各融资模式所满足的基本条件;本论文还分析了上游企业存在一定量的自有资金,但自有资金不足以支持其生产情形下的供应链下游企业预付款对双方利益的改进作用以及对供应链整体效率的提升作用,即对供应链的部分协调作用。(2)设计了面向资金约束上游企业的基于预付款的供应链契约协调机制,得到了该机制协调供应链运营的条件,突破了目前文献中仅研究预付款对供应链最优库存决策的影响的局限。目前关于面向资金约束上游企业的预付款融资的研究大都集中在对预付款下供应链成员企业运营决策的变化问题上,少数研究讨论了预付款融资下与传统报童模型假设下的运营决策的对比和供应链成员企业利益的对比问题,对面向资金约束上游企业供应链的协调问题的研究较少。本论文提出了基于供应链下游企业预付款融资的供应链契约协调机制,本质上是设计了预付款与供应链契约的组合协调机制,这种组合协调机制弥补了单纯依靠预付款融资情形下的无法完全协调供应链运作的问题,论文分析了在拉动式供应链中预付款与供应链契约组合协调机制的参数所满足的条件,即能够使供应链在分散决策下达到和无资金约束下集中决策的效果并且能够实现在供应链成员企业之间任意分配渠道利润的条件。(3)分析了单边和双边交易信用对供应链成员企业最优利益的影响,得到了单边和双边交易信用下供应链系统的最优运营决策,而目前有关双边交易信用下供应链运营的研究成果较少。在金融领域和运营管理领域,已有的研究更多关注供应链上游企业依照行业惯例或者因下游企业存在资金约束而为下游企业提供延期付款交易信用的情形;而面向供应链上游企业资金约束的研究或者研究供应链下游企业向上游企业以预付款交易信用的方式提供资金援助的研究比较少,在为数不多的研究预付款融资的文献中,大都是关注单个企业面临下游预付款的情形;分析两层延期付款交易信用的文献较多,而分析在供应链下游企业对上游企业提供预付款融资的情况下,基于客户不同交易信用模式下供应链最优决策的研究较少。本论文分析并证明了确定性市场需求下的供应链客户交易信用模式对供应链成员企业最优库存决策和供应链渠道利益的影响,将客户的交易信用按照结算方式分为连续型和一次付清型,按照支付时间分为货到付款、延期付款和提前付款,分别基于此六类单边交易信用模式分析了供应链系统的最优订购决策以及供应链成员企业的最优利润;本论文还讨论了基于下游企业的预付款和客户的不同结算方式下的交易信用模式,即双边交易信用对供应链最优运营决策的影响,并求解了供应链系统的最优订购决策以及供应链成员企业的最优利润。(4)得到了存在破产成本和二次订购机会下的供应链成员企业的最优运营策略,揭示了企业的营运资本和银行的破产成本对供应链成员企业的最优运营决策和银行利率决策的影响。已有文献考虑了在单次订购的问题中企业破产风险和破产成本对企业运营策略的影响,但是较少考虑同时存在二次订购机会和破产成本下的供应链成员企业的最优决策;有些文献研究了二次订购对缓解供应链上游企业的资金瓶颈问题的作用,但没有考虑银行在缓解资金瓶颈中所起的作用,也没有考虑资金约束的企业可能面临的破产风险以及相应的破产过程产生的破产成本。本论文考虑了供应链下游企业由于资金不足而向外部银行融资时可能产生的破产风险,考虑了破产过程带来的破产成本,并考虑了二次订购对供应链成员企业决策的影响,得到了存在破产成本和二次订购机会下的供应链成员企业最优决策,弥补了以往研究中的不足。更多还原

【Abstract】 Financial constraint is one of the obstacles that hinder effective supply chain operation.The supplier’s financial constraint may lead to unsmooth production or late delivery,which means supply shortages or supply disruption for the downstream firm;and the financial constraint of the downstream enterprise can yield lost sales and customers.In order to release financial constraint,trade credit and bank financing are commonly used.Trade credit,including delayed payment and advance payment,is the business credit between supply chain enterprises or between supply chain enterprises and their customers.Bank financing means the enterprise obtains credit from banks directly to make up the lack of funds.The research on financing and operations strategies for financial constrained supply chain has important theoretical and practical values.We firstly address the optimal ordering decision for supply chain members when unilateral trade credit or bilateral trade credit is used;and analyze the influences of upstream enterprise’s financial constraints on operational decisions.Then we discuss the financing role of advance payment and its advantages compared to bank financing when the supplier is financial constrained.We further design supply chain coordination mechanism based on advance payment.Finally,we explore the supply chain members’ operational decisions and the bank’s decision on interest rate when the financial constrained downstream firm has two order opportunities and bankruptcy risks.This thesis consists of six chapters.In the first chapter,we describe the background and contributions of this thesis.In the second chapter,we summarizes relevant literatures.In chapter three,we discuss the ordering decisions under unilateral and bilateral trade credit.with different ways of account settlement.In the previous literature,only the payment time of trade credit,is considered,i.e.,trade credit is divided into delayed payment and advance payment;while in this thesis,we also consider the ways of account settling of unilateral and bilateral trade credit,including continuous account settling and non-installment account settling.In specific,we discuss the ordering policy and the corresponding profits for six kinds of account settling trade credit,i.e.,continuous cash on delivery,continuous delayed payment,continuous advance payment,noninstallment cash on delivery,noninstallment delayed payment and noninstallment advance payment.We further compare the supply chain’s optimal ordering decision and the member enterprises’ optimal profits under different ways of account settling of trade credit.The results show that:(1)the supply chain’s optimal ordering decision is independent on the customer’s time of trade credit,but is related to the product’s selling price under all kinds of trade credit;(2)the supply chain’s optimal ordering quantity is larger than the classic economic order quantity when the product’s selling price and wholesale price meet certain conditions;(3)the customer’s noninstallment advance payment trade credit is better than the other trade credit in enlarging the supply chain’s ordering quantity.In chapter four,we address the advance payment financing strategy and the supply chain coordination mechanism for financial constrained upstream enterprise.We consider a supply chain composed of a retailer and a supplier where the supplier is financial constrained.The influences of the supplier’s financial constraint are analyzed and the retailer’s advance payment is proposed to eliminate the influence of the supplier’s financial constraint.The results show that the retailer can stimulate the supplier to improve production quantity via advance payment.However,the advance payment cannot make the supply chain achieve maximized profit.Based on the above results,we propose a supply chain coordination mechanism by combining advance payment and traditional supply chain contract,where the retailer’s advance payment guarantees sufficient funds for the supplier and the traditional contract make the supply chain coordinated.The proposed mechanism is also flexible to achieve Pareto improvement for both parties.Our results show that the advance payment with buy back contract and the advance payment with revenue-sharing contract can achieve supply chain coordination under certain conditions.In chapter five,we study the financing and operational strategies of financial constrained supply chain by considering the downstream firm’s bankruptcy costs and two ordering opportunities.We propose a dynamic game model where a supplier offers advance order discount to a financial constrained retailer facing stochastic demand.The retailer might need to obtain a loan from a bank to pay the supplier to execute the advance order.The supplier makes decisions about production quantity to fulfill the two orders which might be proposed by the retailer.At the start of sales period,the retailer needs to repay the loan and interest by the revenue from advance order sales;if the loan cannot be repaid,the retailer will announce bankruptcy,and the revenue would all belong to the bank,who needs to pay the retailer’s bankruptcy costs,including fixed cost and variable cost.If the retailer can repay the loan,then he can use his funds to proceed the second order to meet extra demand.Through the model,we find that the supplier’s production decision and retailer’s ordering decision are determined by the wholesale price,price discount and the retailer’s initial working capital.We further study the influence of retailer’s initial level of working capital on the retailer’s ordering decision,the supplier’s production quantity decision and the bank’s interest rate decision.The results show that the retailer tends not to order before sales period,and to satisfy demand only by using his working capital to proceed the second ordering;and the supplier’s optimal production quantity decision equals to the order quantity derived by the classic newsvendor model.Further,if the retailer does not preorder and only use his working capital to proceed the second order,the supplier’s optimal production decision equals to the retailer’s purchasing quantity by his working capital.The sixth chapter summarizes the conclusions of the thesis and points out the shortcomings and the future research directions.The main contributions of the thesis are as follows:(1)We reveal the advance payment’s financing function and its role in improving the efficiency of capital constrained supply chain.We derive the Pareto improving space of supply chain and the coordination function of advance payment for capital constrained supply chain.Most of the previous literatures focuse on the case when the downstream enterprises have capital bottlenecks and the seldom research considers the upstream enterprise’s financial constraint,especially when the upstream enterprise has zero capital.This thesis fills the gap and studies the financing mode selection when the upstream firm’s funds is zero.We also discuss the role of the advance payment in improving both enterprises’ profits and the supply chain efficiency when the upstream enterprise has certain quantity of capital but the capital is not sufficient to support its production.(2)We design the supply chain coordinating mechanism based on advance payment and derive the conditions of coordinating supply chain operation,which extends the current research about advance payment.The previous literatures about advance payment mainly focused on the advance payment’s influences on the operational decisions.Some papers also discussed the comparison of operational decisions and supply chain enterprises’ interests under advance payment and traditional newsvendor model.However,the study of supply chain coordination for capital constrained upstream enterprises is not sufficient.This thesis proposes supply chain coordination mechanism based on advance payment and other contracts.The conditions of coordinating pull supply chain by combinating advance payment and other contracts are analyzed,i.e.,the conditions that the effectiveness under centralized decision case can be achieved under decentralized decision case and channel profit can be allocated arbitrarily.(3)We analyze the impacts of unilateral and bilateral trade credits on supply chain decisions and profits,and the previous research on supply chain operations under the bilateral trade credit is not sufficient.Most of the previous literatures analyzed the issues when the supplier provides delayed payment for the retailer.The studies on the downstream firm’s advance payment or the upstream firm’s capital constraint are not sufficient.This thesis analyzes and proves the impact to supply chain enterprises’ optimal inventory decision and supply chain channel interest by supply chain customer’s trade credit mode under deterministic demand,the customer’s trade credit is divided into continuous mode and noninstallment mode according to methods of settling account,and divided into cash on delivery,delay in payment and advance payment according to payment time,and supply chain system’s optimal ordering decision and supply chain enterprises’ optimal profit are analyzed based on the six unilateral trade credit;the impact to supply chain’s optimal operation decisions by the trade credit modes based on downstream enterprise’s advance payment and customer’s different methods of settling account,i.e.bilateral trade credit are discussed,and optimal ordering decision and supply chain enterprises’ optimal profits are solved.(4)We derive the supply chain members’ optimal operational decisions under the existence of bankruptcy costs and two ordering opportunities and reveal the influences of enterprise’s working capital and bank’s bankruptcy costs on supply chain members’ operational decisions and bank’s interest rate decision.The previous literatures consider the influences of bankruptcy risks and bankruptcy costs on the enterprises’ operational decisions mainly based on the one order problems,and the two ordering opportunities situation is seldom considered.This thesis considers the supply chain downstream enterprise’s bankruptcy risks due to finance from a bank because of insufficient capital,and considers bankruptcy costs caused by the procedure of bankruptcy,and considers the influences to supply chain member enterprises’ decisions by two-order arrangement,and supply chain member enterprises’ optimal decisions when bankruptcy costs and two-order opportunity exist,which makes up the shortcomings in previous researches.更多还原