【作者】 王亚；

【导师】 刘峰；

【作者基本信息】 厦门大学 ， 会计学， 2017， 博士

【摘要】 本文从经理人激励与风险角度研究企业的零负债行为。现代财务理论一般认为:适当的负债有助于提高企业价值。然而,近年来上市公司出现了新的财务特征:低负债,有限投资与高现金,即所谓的零负债之谜。这种现象普遍存在于世界各国。既往文献已经关注到企业的零负债之谜,从现代资本结构理论出发,将其存在归因于来自融资约束(供给方效应)、财务弹性(需求方效应)、公司治理、外部机制等多个方面。但现有经典资本结构理论与财务保守之因文献都无法全面合理地解释零负债现象。本文以此为契机,从不同的角度——企业经理人的激励风险,探讨企业的零负债之谜。通过资金供求双方的制度与现实分析,我国的银行信贷依然占据上市公司不同外部融资方式的主渠道地位。随着银行信贷在利率、业务、产品等方面的渐进式改革,银行间竞争不断加剧,对优质客户的争夺也更加激烈,即银行作为资金供给方对贷款的作用更加趋向市场化。另一方面,因IPO高门槛、中介机构帮助等原因,IPO企业的质量偏高,再加之其上市身份能够带给银行除贷款以外的其他金融服务,也会降低银行管理层的职务风险。企业的上市身份意味着其在获得银行信贷方面更具吸引力与竞争力,即上市公司作为资金需求方对银行信贷更具话语权。本文认为我国资本市场的上市公司具备一定的零负债选择权。本文认为经理人作为企业零负债决策的制定者,其在决策制定中的考量因素——潜在收益(激励)与潜在损失(风险),是导致企业零负债行为的重要原因。以企业经理人为研究对象,本文结合期望理论、损失厌恶观点等,考察经理人的股权激励与流动性风险感知(民企)、晋升激励与晋升风险感知(国企)是否影响以及如何影响企业的零负债与低负债行为,并考虑宏观环境变化(货币政策变化(民企)、反腐事件与限薪令颁布(国企))如何影响以上关系。本文进一步讨论企业的这种零负债行为所产生的经济后果。本文的主要研究结论如下:企业经理人的激励和风险的不对称程度是形成企业零负债的一大原因。而且,不对称的激励与风险对企业零负债的影响会因外部环境的变化而有所不同。本文进一步通过变换主要解释变量、变更样本、改变回归方法等方式进行稳健性检验,研究结论保持一致。另外,我国上市公司的零负债行为具有一定的持续性。企业是否零负债以及零负债持续性均会显著影响投资效率与企业价值(会计业绩与市场业绩),而这种作用会受到企业所处地区的市场化程度的影响。本文的研究将有助于理解企业“零负债之因”与“低负债之因”,甚至可能有助于重新审视现有的资本结构理论。更多还原

【Abstract】 The dissertation aims to study how executive incentive and risk perception affect the zero-leverage behavior of listed firms.The capital structure theory believes that appropriate leverage ratio is beneficial for improvement of corporate value.In recent years,however,the phenomenon of low-leverage or even zero-leverage has emerged as a growing trend of internationalization which is called "zero leverage puzzle".Current literature has pay attention to the zero-leverage puzzle,which is attributed to financial constraint,financial flexibility,corporate governance and macro environment based on capital structure theories.However,both current theories and literature cannot give a rational explanation for why the phenomenon of zero-leverage exists.Therefore,the dissertation discusses the zero-leverage behavior of listed firms from the aspects of executive incentive and risk perception.Based on the analysis of institutional background of the supply and demand of capital,banking is still the main channel of the corporate external financing in China.There has being some gradual reform in terms of interest rate,business,product and so on.Banking confront with increasing capital competition and more intensive customer battle.Moreover,listed companies are always excellent enterprises because of rigorous market admission mechanism and the guidance of professional organizations.And listing qualification of companies can bring other financial services besides banking to banks,and reduce the banks’ risk lending to post-IPO companies,which can improve the borrowers’ ability to gain loan.The dissertation tends to believe that the institutional background in Chinese capital market makes it possible for listed firms to choose zero-leverage proactively.The executives of companies which own decision-making rights play a crucial role in the zero-leverage behavior of listed firms,and the incentive and risk perception of executives are the reasons why listed firms choose zero-leverage proactively.Based on expectancy theory and loss aversion theory,the dissertation discusses the determinants of zero-leverage behavior of listed firms,which including equity incentive and liquidity risk perception in non-SOEs,promotion incentive and related risk perception in SOEs.Moreover,the relationship above is affected by the change of macro environment,such as monetary policy,anti-corruption case and the implementation of pay ceiling order.The dissertation also discusses the consequences of zero-leverage behavior.The main findings are as follows.Both insufficient incentive and high risk perception are important determinants of zero-leverage behavior.And the relationship above is affected by monetary policy,anti-corruption case and the implementation of pay ceiling order.The dissertation takes robustness tests through changing variables,samples,regression methods and so on.The results are robust.In addition,zero-leverage behavior of listed companies is a persistent phenomenon in China.The choice and persistence of zero-leverage can affect the investment efficiency and firm performance,and the relationship above changs with the marketization of the regions.The dissertation will help to understand the mystery of zero-leverage and low-leverage,and rethink current capital structure theories.更多还原