【作者】 李忠海；

【导师】 张涤新；

【作者基本信息】 南京大学 ， 金融学， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 在新兴转轨证券市场中,由于法律环境基础较差及投资者保护水平较低,上市公司的代理冲突更多体现在大股东和中小股东之间,即归属为第二种类型的代理问题。与其它大多数国家或地区一样,一股独大、投资者保护不力和监管力度不高等特征一样出现在我国证券市场。因此,大股东对中小股东的利益侵占,以及随之带来各种违法违规问题。这些问题既提高了我国上市公司融资成本,更是阻碍了我国证券市场持续、健康发展。面临这样的发展困局,我国证券市场主管部门借鉴成熟国家机构投资者发展经验,试图通过引进以证券投资基金为代表的机构投资者改变当下困境。1998年,我国推出第一批证券投资基金,以此拉开机构投资者发展近十五年“黄金时期”的帷幕。截至2012年底,我国机构投资者持股数量为2032家,占上市公司股票总股数的83%;合计持股市值为9.06万亿,占总市值26.54万亿的34.1%。如今,机构投资者已经成为我国证券市场资金规模最大、实力最强的重要力量。但机构投资者怎样影响持股公司绩效,不同类型的机构投资者对其持股公司的影响是否存在异质性行为等问题,以及机构投资者影响公司绩效的可能渠道等等,已成为我国理论界普遍关注的重要问题。故而,在国内既有研究的基础上,本文展开了对机构投资者如何影响其持股公司绩效这一主题的探讨与思考,主要得到如下四个方面结论。第一,通过构建理论模型,本文揭示了机构投资者影响其持股公司的微观机制。借鉴Albuquerue和Wang(2008)所提出的公司产出函数和内部人违规惩罚函数,本文构造了机构投资者参与下的公司融资理论模型,并证明当内部人最优违规强度小于先验违规强度时,其最大收益随机构投资者比例增加而提高。这表明,随着我国证券市场法律体系的不断完善、监管水平的逐渐提高及公司治理水平的持续提升,机构投资者持股比例越高越有利于其发挥监督作用,抑制公司内部人违规行为,从而降低融资成本、提高公司绩效。第二,借助邹检验及其延伸的虚拟变量检验法,识别机构投资者对其持股公司绩效发挥影响的结构性变动。借助邹检验及其延伸的虚拟变量检验法,我们证实了在我国机构投资者发展的不同阶段,机构投资者对其持股公司绩效的影响的确存在结构性变动,即:在第一阶段(2004-2007)的机构投资者对其持股各公司绩效的改善作用要略高于第二阶段(2008-2012)。第三,借助分位数回归模型和系数比较模型,本文证实了机构投资者对其持股公司绩效的影响存在异质性。一方面,在公司绩效处于较高水平或较低水平时,机构投资者对其持股公司绩效改善的作用较为明显,且两个阶段表现又有所不同。另一方面,借助同样本不同系数比较模型,我们证实了证券投资基金对其持股公司绩效的改善作用要显著高于一般法人,且在两个不同阶段均是如此。第四,在我国实际情况下,基金通过信息透明度、侵占型关联交易、代理成本等渠道改善其持股公司绩效,但作用方向、阶段及效力又有所不同。在第一阶段,基金有助于提升其持股公司信息透明度、降低其持股公司侵占型关联交易;在第二阶段,基金除了提升其持股公司信息透明度、降低其持股公司侵占型关联交易,还降低了其持股公司代理成本。在以上研究及相关实证结论基础上,本文结合我国机构投资者的实际情况及法律制度基础,提出促进机构投资者发展、提升公司治理水平的相关政策建议。其中包括:强化机构投资者监管,规范上市公司决策机制,完善行业协会运作机制,完善行业监管,优化基金管理人员激励机制,发展公司型基金等等。更多还原

【Abstract】 Agency conflicts of listed companies,in emerging stock markets,are mainly characterized as the one between the major shareholders and the small shareholders,due to poor investor protection.The expropriation of major shareholders on minority shareholders has hindered the healthy development of China’s securities market.Authorities of Chinese stock market,learning from mature States,advance the development of institutional investors,represented by the securities investment funds.Since the first batch of securities investment funds been introduced in 1998,China’institutional investors have experienced the "golden period" for 15 years.By the end of 2012,China’s institutional investors hold the shareholdings of 2032 firms,83 per cent of the total shares of listed companies,valued at $ 9.06 trillion,accounting for 34 per cent of the total market value.Nowadays,the institutional investors have become an important force in the largest stock market funds.A important issues of common concern is,whether institutional investors contributed to improving the company’s performance,and whether different type of institutional investors has heterogeneous effect.Based on existing research on Chinese firms,we constructs a theoretical model and several empirical researches to examine whether institutional investors’ shareholdings contributed to improving the company’s performance.The main conclusions are as follows.First,by building a theoretical model,we reveal the micro-mechanism of institutional investors to improve the performance of its stock ownership company.Learning from Albuquerue and Wang(2008),in this paper we construct a theoretical model of corporate finance with the participation of institutional investors.We confirmed that the higher the proportion of institutional investors holding,the more restraint to the insider’ breaches,so as to improve the company’s performance.Second,with the Chow test,we confirmed that during different stages of Chinese institutional investors’ development,there is a structural change of the role of institutional investors to improve the company’s performance.Third,using quantile regression model and coefficients-comparing models,we found the heterogeneous effect of institutional investors’ holding.When the company performance is at a high level or a low level,there will be more significant improvement of institutional investors’ shareholdings on the company’s performance.As the main two institutional investors,funds have more significantly effect to the firm than the legal person.Fourth,using agency cost,relation trade and information disclosure,we found the positive effect of institutional investors’ holding.When the company performance is at a high level or a low level,there will be more significant improvement of institutional investors’ shareholdings on the company’s performance.On the basis of the above findings,we make relevant policy recommendations for the development of institutional investors,includes:strengthening the supervision of institutional investors and listed companies’ decision-making mechanisms,improving industry associations’ operating mechanism,improving the industry regulator,optimizing the incentive mechanism of fund managers,advancing the corporate fund,and so on.更多还原