【作者】 杨小山；

【导师】 谢联辉； 林奇英；

【作者基本信息】 福建农林大学 ， 植保经济学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 农药是农业生产的重要物资之一,对全球粮食安全和消除贫困有着突出贡献。另一方面,农药生产、流通和使用所带来的一系列环境污染、生态失衡、健康危机等问题,受到世界各国的高度关注。中国政府更是如此,不仅对此加强管理,还将“防治农药、化肥和农膜等面源污染”写入《中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十一个五年规划纲要》的“建设社会主义新农村”篇中。目前中国农药管理主要采用命令——控制式工具（CAC）,然而要预防和解决农药的生产、运输、储藏、销售和使用环节出现的各种问题,还须从环境、经济、社会的角度出发,分析各个相关利益主体之间的关系,灵活运用多种政策工具加强农药环境经济管理,进一步提高农药全方位管理的效率,确保生态环境安全和人畜健康。鉴于此,本研究综合运用植物保护学、经济学、生态学和管理学等领域的理论,借鉴前人的研究成果,着重从环境经济学和管理学的角度,剖析农药环境经济管理中各行为主体之间的关系,针对不同的行为主体构思了农药环境经济管理政策。本研究在概述中国农药环境经济管理概况的基础上,提出中国农药环境经济管理中存在的问题,运用博弈论分析了农药环境经济管理中的主体行为,并以福建省为例对农药环境经济管理中的农户、农药经销商和农产品消费者行为进行调查分析,然后从制度和技术两方面来分析中国农药环境经济管理中存在问题的原因,评述发达国家的农药环境经济管理,寻求其对中国的启示,在此基础上,对农药环境经济管理进行了政策构思,并建立了农药环境经济管理政策效果评价指标体系,给出了综合评价方法。那么可用于农药环境经济管理的政策工具有哪些?国内外相关的研究进展如何?作为研究的起点,本文概述了可用于农药环境经济管理的政策工具有命令——控制式工具、市场化工具及其他工具,然后分别从农药环境经济管理的政策设计、政策评估、相关利益主体的行为分析、农药环境经济效益评估与风险评价四个方面综述了其国内外研究进展。为找出中国农药环境经济管理存在的问题,本研究评价了农药在植物保护中的功与过,揭示农药污染的问题不在于农药本身,而是人为的利用问题,然后分别从法律法规、农药管理体制和政策措施三方面来阐述中国的农药环境经济管理概况,指出中国农药环境经济管理的问题在于法律法规欠完善、执法体系不健全、管理体制有缺陷、管理措施未到位、技术推广体系不健全、资金投入不足、科技基础性工作较薄弱。为进一步理清中国农药环境经济管理存在的问题,本研究对农药环境经济管理主体行为进行了博弈分析。政府与农药经销商的完全信息静态博弈分析表明,政府和农药经销商的混合战略纳什均衡为（?）,政府以p=p^*=（?）的概率进行决策,农药经销商以q=q^*=（?）的概率进行决策,政府的检查频率与检查成本、政府对违规销售高毒农药的罚款都严重影响农药经销商销售高毒农药的概率;政府与农药生产企业之间的完全信息动态博弈表明,政府与农药生产企业博弈的混合战略纳什均衡解为低农药生产企业治污成本和政府检查成本、加重对违规排污农药生产企业行贿以及对滥用职权的政府部门的罚款,将会利于农药生产企业的治污、提高政府检查的频率、降低农药生产企业的行贿概率和政府滥用职权的概率;政府与农户之间的不完全信息静态博弈表明,次优配置方案对于政府确保征税或补贴政策（对使用高毒农药的农户采取征税,对使用无公害或绿色农药的农户采取补贴）的有效实施是一种可行的方案;农户与农产品消费者的不完全信息动态博弈分析表明,在完全竞争市场条件下,由于生产者农户与农产品消费者之间的信息不对称,逆向选择会使所有θ>（?）的农产品退出市场,最终的市场均衡将是（劣,劣）均衡的“柠檬市场”。因此,政府应当进一步完善农产品农药残留检测体系和无公害、有机、绿色农产品标签制度,及时向消费者提供无公害、有机、绿色农产品的市场信息。通过上述理论分析,可以得出中国农药环境经济管理的相关利益主体行为存在很多问题,那么这些行为主体在实践中如何呢?本研究以福建省为例对农药环境经济管理中的主体行为进行了调查分析。首先,以福建省为例对农药环境经济管理中的农户行为进行了调查分析,结果表明,大多数农户在购买农药时以防治效果为首选因素,大部分农户凭经验用药,对化学农药的污染和危害有一定的认识,在施药时大部分农户也能采取安全防护措施,对农药安全间隔期也有一定的了解,但对农药包装、废弃物的处理方式仍然不当,补贴手段对农户使用无公害或绿色农药虽有激励作用,农药污染税的征收也有一定的可行性,但如能与补贴手段结合效果会更好。然后采用二分类logistic模型,进行了农户对农药污染税交纳意愿的影响因素分析,研究结果表明,农户使用农药时是否采取安全防护措施（x₉）、农药经销商是否告诉农户用药时的安全防护措施(x₁₄)以及农药包装、废弃物和剩余农药的处理方法(x₁₅)达到1%统计检验显著水平,农户的年龄（x₁）、农户的文化程度（x₂）、土地碎化率（x₅）和农药残留情况(x₁₁)达到5%统计检验显著水平,经营规模（x₄）和土地使用权的持续性（x₆）达到10%统计检验显著水平,说明上述9个变量对农户是否愿意交纳农药污染税的影响是显著的。其次,就福建省漳州市和龙岩市的农药经销商行为进行调查,结果表明,同行的不正当竞争是农药经销商遇到最多的问题,绝大多数农药经销商在销售农药时能向农户介绍有关使用农药和植保技术知识,大部分农药经销商高于农药说明书的标准向农户推荐农药用量,农药经销商对农户购药行为具有重要影响,绝大多数农药经销商能够认识到化学农药为环境和人类健康带来的危害,但对农药使用征税的设想大都不持赞同态度,而对无公害农药使用进行补贴的设想持较为积极的态度。再次,以福建省漳州市和龙岩市为例对农药环境经济管理中的农产品消费者行为进行调查,结果表明,大部分农村地区消费者听说过安全蔬菜,但对安全蔬菜的了解程度较低,消费者对安全蔬菜有较强的购买意愿。为探究中国农药环境经济管理存在问题的原因,本研究分别从制度和技术两个层面进行了深入分析。在制度层面,中国农药环境经济管理存在市场失灵和政府失灵问题,市场失灵的原因主要有农药环境经济管理相关主体的有限理性、农药污染信息的不对称性、农药污染的负外部性、农药环境经济管理的公共物品属性以及生态环境资源市场的不成熟性;政府失灵的原因主要包括政府农药环境经济管理政策的滞后性、政府制定农药环境经济管理政策的信息不完全性、农药环境经济管理对象的寻租行为、政府不合理干预市场造成价格扭曲以及地方保护主义问题。在技术层面,主要有农药研发能力较弱、农药残留检测和降解技术尚需发展、农药在环境中的行为等规律有待进一步研究、农药器械落后和农药使用技术落后等问题。本研究为解决中国农药环境经济管理存在的问题,根据主要发达国家农药环境经济管理对中国的启示,构思了中国农药环境经济管理政策,并对其政策效果给出综合评价指标体系和评价方法。首先,分别评述了美国、日本和欧盟的农药法律法规、农药管理体制和政策措施,主要发达国家农药环境经济管理中法律法规的完善、管理体制的优化以及多种手段灵活运用都对中国农药环境经济管理有一定的启示。然后,针对不同行为主体进行了农药环境经济管理的政策构思,其中有关农药生产企业的政策有命令——控制式工具、排污收费、排污权交易、补贴和公众参与;有关农药经销商的政策有标准、禁令、许可证、征税、补贴和教育手段;有关农户的政策有命令——控制式工具、征税、补贴、押金一返还制度、自愿方法和教育手段;有关农产品消费者的政策有教育手段和公众参与。并从理论上分析了这些政策的适用性和可行性。最后,构建了农药环境经济管理政策效果综合评价指标体系,运用层次分析法确定权重,并按权重大小给出了指标的重要性排序,就横向评价和纵向评价两种模式,给出了评价方法,所建立的评价指标体系和评价方法,在数据资料的支持下,可用于实际评价,结果可用于被评价对象的优劣排序,可以较客观地评价出不同地区或不同年度的农药环境经济管理政策效果,有利于管理者找出管理中存在的问题,并究其原因,从而进一步提高农药环境经济管理的政策效果。更多还原

【Abstract】 Pesticide is one of the major materials of agricultural production, which contributes notetably to global food security and poverty eradication. At the same time, a series of problems about environmental pollution, ecological unbalance, and the health crisis of human resulted from pesticide production, transport and use have acquired global concern, particularly, Chinese government not only strengthen management on that, but also entries "controlling non-point source pollution such as pesticides, fertilizers, and plastic sheeting "into the" Constructing Socialism New Countryside " of "the 11th Five-Year plan of People’s Republic of China national economic and social development program ". At present, Chinese government mainly adopts command and control instruments（CAC） in the pesticide management. However, for the purpose of preventing and solving various problems appeared during the production, the transport, the storage, the sale and the use of pesticide, Chinese government must analyse the relationships among relevant stakeholders from the aspects of environmental, economic and social, and strengthen environmental-economic management of pesticide whith various policy instruments, in order to enhance furtherly the efficiency of pesticides management in all aspects, and ensure ecological or environmental safety and the health of the people and livestock.In view of this, the relationships among relevant stakeholders of environmental-economicmanagement of pesticide are analysed and environmental-economic management of pesticidepolicies for different stakeholders are conceived in this research, by applying the theory ofplant protection, economics, ecology and management comprehensively and the researchresults of our seniors, emphasizing the perspective of environmental economics andmanagement. In this research, based on outlining the general situation ofenvironmental-economic management of pesticide in China, the existing problems ofenvironmental-economic management of pesticide in China are proposed; and the actors’behaviors of environmental-economic management of pesticide are analyzed using gametheory. And the behaviours of farmers, pesticide dealers and agricultural product consumers ofenvironmental-economic management of pesticide in Fujian Province are surveyed andanalyzed. Then, the reasons of the existing problems of environmental-economic managementof pesticide in China are indicated from two aspects of systems and technology. Theapocalypses of environmental-economic management of pesticide in china are elicited basedon reviewing environmental-economic management of pesticide in developed countries. Inthe following, the policies of environmental-economic management of pesticide are conceived,further more, the index system of environmental-economic management of pesticide policiesevaluation are established, and comprehensive evaluation methods are given.Well then, what kind of policy instruments can be used for environmental-economic management of pesticide. What research progress home and abroad they have. As the starting point for this research, the policy instruments used for environmental-economic management of pesticide include comanding and controling instruments, market-based instruments and other nstruments, then, the research progress of environmental-economic management of pesticide home and abroad are expatiated from four aspects of policy design, policy evaluation, the behavior analysis on the main stakeholders, pesticide environmental risk assessment and economic evaluation. In order to find out the existing problems of environmental-economic management of pesticide in China, the benefits and defects of pesticides in plant protection are evaluated, the fact that the problem of pesticide contamination is not a question of pesticides, but of human utilizing is educed. Then the general situation of environmental-economic management of pesticide in China is expounded respectively from three areas of the laws and regulations, pesticide management system and the policies and measures, and the existing problems of environmental-economic management of pesticide in China are the lack of proper laws and regulations, no sufficient sound law enforcement system, shortcomings in the management system, management problems, no perfect pesticide-related technology extension system, insufficient capital investment, the weak foundation work of science and technology.In order to understand fully the existing problems of environmental-economic management of pesticide in China,the actors’ behaviors of environmental-economic management of pesticide are analyzed using game theory. The result of the complete information static game analysis between government and pesticide dealers shows that the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium of the government and pesticide dealers is , the probability of decision-making of government is , theprobability of decision-making of pesticide dealers is , the frequency of inspections and the costs of the inspection of government and the fine of government to pesticide dealers saling high toxicity pesticide have great impact on the probability of pesticide dealers saling high toxicity pesticide; the result of the complete information dynamic game analysis between government and pesticide manufacturer enterprises shows that the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium of the government and pesticide manufacturer enterprises , indicatingthat reducing the pollution controlling costs of pesticide manufacturer enterprises and the cost of the inspection of government, increasing the fines of illegally sewaging pesticide manufacturer enterprises’ bribery and the government abusing of power, will benefit pesticide manufacturer enterprises controlling pesticide pollution, the increasing of the frequency of inspections of government , the reducing of the probability of pesticide manufacturers enterprises bribery and government abusing of power. The result of incomplete information static game analysis between government and fanners shows that sub-optimal configuration project is an effective project for the government ensuring the effective implement of taxes or subsidies policy （impose taxes on those farmers who use highly toxic pesticides, and subsidize those farmers who use non-pollution or green pesticide）;the result of incomplete information dynamic game analysis between fanners and consumers shows that, in fully competitive market conditions, as the asymmetry information between farmers and consumers, adverse selection will lead to all agricultural products of Withdraw the market, and ultimately the market balance will be "Lemon market" of （bad, bad）. Therefore, the government should strengthen the pesticide residue detection system of agricultural products and the labelling system improvement of non-pollution agricultural product, organic agricultural product and green agricultural product, in order to provide consumers with the market information of non-pollution agricultural product, organic agricultural product and green agricultural product timely.Through these theoretical analysis, the existing problems of the actors’ behaviors ofenvironmental-economic management of pesticide in China can be elicited, then, what aboutthese actors to do in practice. The actors’ behaviour of environmental-economic managementof pesticide in Fujian Province are surveyed and analyzed in this article. Firstly, the farmers’behaviour of environmental-economic management of pesticide in Fujian Province aresurveyed and analyzed. The following parts are the results. Firstly, most farmers considerfirstly the pesticide’s prevention and cure effect in purchasing pesticide, and use pesticidesdepending on their experience. Secondly, they have a certain degree of recognition ofchemical pesticide pollution and endanger, the majority of farmers take security measureswhen they use pesticides, and they have a certain understanding on pesticide safety interval.Howerer, the disposal methods of pesticide package and waste is improper. Althoughsubsidize instruments has incentive effect to farmers using non- pollution pesticide or greenpesticide, tax charge of pesticide pollution is feasibile, the combination of the subsidy andtaxation instruments will be better. Then, the influential factors of the willingness to pay thepesticide pollution tax of the fanners is analysed by applying two Category logistic model.The results show that, farmers whether adopting security measures or not when sprayingpesticide （x₉）, pesticide dealers whether telling farmers security measures or not when usingpesticide (x₁₄), and the disposal methods of pesticide package and waste or not (x₁₅) reaching1% significant level of statistical test, the age of farmers （x₁）, the education degree of farmers（x₂）, land fragmentation rate （x₅） and pesticide residues (x₁₁) reaching 5% significance level of statistical test, the scale of operation （x₄） and the durative of land use rights （x₆） achieving 10% significant level of statistical test, indicating the nine variables above is significant to the willingness to pay the pesticide pollution tax of farmers. Secondly, the pesticide dealers’ behaviour of environmental-economic management of pesticide in Zhangzhou City and Longyan City are surveyed and analyzed. The results are showed as followed. Most problems pesticide dealers encountered are unfair competition between craft brothers. The overwhelming majority of pesticide dealers can tell farmers the knowledge about pesticide using and plant protection when saling the pesticides. The majority of pesticide dealers recommend pesticides with much more pesticides than the standard quantity of the instructions. Pesticide dealers have an important impact on the purchasing behaviour of the farmers. Most pesticide dealers have recognized the hazards to environment and human health of chemical pesticides, however, they haven’t an optimistic attitude on the taxation, but have an optimistic attitude on the subsidy. Thirdly, the behaviour of the consumers of agricultural product in environmental-economic management of pesticide in Zhangzhou City and Longyan City are surveyed and analyzed. The result shows that, the majority of consumers in rural areas have heard of safe vegetables, but the degree of it’s understanding is lower. However, the consumers have stronger desire to buy safe vegetables.In order to research the reasons of the existing problems of environmental-economic management of pesticide in China, the reasons from two aspects of system and technology are analyzed. From the system aspect, market failure and government failure exist in environmental-economic management of pesticide in China. The main reasons of market failure inlude the bounded rationality of the relevant stakeholders of environmental-economic management of pesticide, the asymmetric information of pesticide pollution, the negative externality of pesticide pollution, the attribute of the public goods of environmental-economic management of pesticide and the immaturity of the market of the ecological environment and natural resources. The reasons of the government failure contain the delay of environmental-economic management of pesticide policies, the incomplete information of the policies of environmental-economic management of pesticide formulated by government, the rent behaviour of environmental-economic management of pesticide subject, the price distortions caused by government’s unreasonable interference to the market, and local protectionism. From the technical aspect, the reasons are in the following part. Researching and developing capability of the pesticide is weak. The technology of detection and degradation pesticides residues and the rules of pesticide environmental behaviours need to be more researched, the pesticide equipment and the technology of the use of pesticide are backward.In order to solve the existing problems of environmental-economic management of pesticide in China, according to the apocalypses of environmental-economic management of pesticide in china are elicited based on reviewing environmental-economic management ofpesticide in developed countries, the policies of environmental-economic management ofpesticide are conceived, further more, the index system of environmental-economicmanagement of pesticide policies evaluation are established, and comprehensive evaluationmethods are given. In the first place, the laws and regulations, the management systems andthe management policies of pesticide of United States, Japan and EU are reviewedrespectively, the perfect of laws and regulations, the optimization of management system andthe flexible application of multifarious instruments of environmental-economic managementof pesticide in the developed countries enlighten environmental-economic management ofpesticide in China. And then, the policies of environmental-economic management ofpesticide are conceived for different actors, the policies for those pesticide manufactureenterprises include comanding and controling instrument, pollution charge, marketablepollution permit, the subsidy and the engaging of the public; the policies for pesticide dealersinclude the standard, the ban, the permit, the tax, the subsidie, the educational instrument; thepolicies for farmers include comanding and controling instruments, the tax, the subsidy, thedeposit - return system, the voluntary method, the educational instrument; the policies forconsumers of agricultural product include the educational instrument and the engaging of thepublic. And the applicability and the feasibility of these policies are analysed. Finally,comprehensive evaluation index system on the effects of environmental-economicmanagement of pesticide policies is constructed, the index weights are confirmed withAHP-method, the importance taxis is presented based on the index weights. And theevaluation methods of horizontal and vertical evaluation are presented. Supported by the data,this index system can be used for the actual evaluation, the results can be used for thearranging of the evaluated objects, the effects of environmental-economic management ofpesticide policies of the different regions or different years, it can be benefit of finding out theexisting problems of environmental-economic management of pesticide and analysing itscauses for governor, then order to improve the effect of environmental-economic managementof pesticide policies.更多还原