【作者】 许涛；

【导师】 何亚伯；

【作者基本信息】 武汉大学 ， 结构工程， 2017， 博士

【摘要】 随着“十三五”规划的推进,为了拓展社会整体基础设施建设空间,以基础设施建设为主要产出的BT项目的建设模式越来越受到政府和社会企业的广泛关注。BT建设模式不仅可以缓解政府财政收入紧张问题,还有助于拓展社会企业发展规模,因而具有极为巨大的发展机遇。但在BT项目管理过程中,普遍存在着大小不一、性质不同的诸多的风险,如何对这些风险进行合理有效的分担是BT项目管理中的关键问题,因此,对BT项目中的风险分担问题进行研究和探讨将成为本文的研究重点,其具有重要的现实意义和理论价值。然而,现有的对BT项目的建设模式中的风险研究主要集中风险因素的梳理及评估,对风险分担的研究相对不多且不够深入,其中涉及到风险分配的研究大部分是通过问卷、访谈等方式进行的定性研究,而量化分析研究则较为有限。因此,如何量化分析风险分担问题,对BT项目的风险分担研究具有重要的实际意义和理论价值。本文将采用定性及定量分析相结合、理论分析与实证相结合的方式对BT项目风险分担问题进行研究,主要研究内容及结论如下:(1)运用RBS-WBS矩阵识别风险,识别出我国BT项目的51个风险因素;根据风险因素是否具有不可抗逆性属性对其进行界定归类,将其分为系统性风险和非系统性风险,51个风险因素中有15个系统性风险和36个非系统性风险;详细分析了 BT项目风险因素的发生起源和相应的归责对象,若BT项目系统性风险因素属于不可抗力风险,其产生来源主要是项目外在环境,没有与项目参与者直接相关的归责对象;而项目非系统性风险因素属于可抗力风险,其产生于项目运作流程中,其的归责对象主要是与BT项目具体建设程序相关的具体负责人如项目投资方、项目公司及相关建设方等。因此,在实际探讨BT项目风险分担时,应该重点探讨项目系统性风险因素。(2)采用物元可拓法进行风险评价,首先构建BT项目风险评价指标体系进行优劣对比分析,结合BT项目风险评价指标的不确定性和模糊性,根据物元可拓可拓理论和关联度函数,使用集值统计对风险进行量化,建立了基于物元可拓模型的风险评价模型;然后进行实证分析,确定了 BT项目系统性风险的等级水平和各风险指标等级水平,验证了物元可拓模型在BT项目中的实用性和合理性,并且评价结果对BT项目各参与利益主体的风险控制与风险分担有使用价值。(3)构建了在完全信息条件下具有不同风险态度的参与方(政府和投资公司)的风险分担博弈模型,首先分析了政府和投资公司之间关于风险分担的讨价还价过程,并得到在无限期讨价还价的情况下双方最优风险分担比例;接下来对政府和投资公司的风险态度进行刻画,通过选择风险厌恶系数来构造双方的合适的效用函数,并使用确定性等价原理解出期望效用;然后,对建立的模型进行求解,并进行实际的算例分析,得到了政府和投资公司的风险态度和其风险分担比例之间的关系。(4)构建了在不完全信息条件下具有不同风险态度的参与方(政府和投资公司)风险分担博弈模型,首先分析在不完全信息条件下,政府和投资公司之间的讨价还价过程,得到在无限期讨价还价博弈中的最优风险分担比例,同时选择合适的效用函数刻画政府和投资公司的风险态度,求解不完全信息下的风险分担博弈模型,可以得到风险分担比例与参与方风险态度之间的关系。(5)分析了具有有限理性的BT项目参与方(政府和投资公司)风险分担的博弈过程,讨论了在不完全信息条件下,参与双方的贴现因子、政府部门的嫉妒心理、内疚心理对共担风险分配比例的影响,并结合实际案例带入数值进行分析验证。本文通过对BT项目中的风险因素进行识别、界定和分析,运用物元可拓法构建风险评估模型,结合讨价还价博弈理论和风险偏好因素及有限理性思想,分别构建了在完全信息条件下和不完全信息条件下的BT项目分担模型,为BT项目风险分担理论研究提供了新的思路,具有一定的理论价值;同时理论结合实际,本文对构建的模型进行了实证分析,为解决实际BT项目中的风险分担问题提供了参考和借鉴,具有一定的现实意义。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the promotion of the 13th Five Year Plan,for expanding the construction space of overall social infrastructure,infrastructure constructions as the main construction mode of the BT project are getting more and more attention by the government and social enterprises.The BT construction mode can not only alleviate the problem of government revenue,but also help to expand the scale of social enterprise development;thus it has very great development opportunities.However,in the process of BT project management,there are many risks of different sizes and different nature.How to reasonably and effectively share these risks is a key problem in BT project management.Therefore,researching and discussingproblem of risk allocation in BT project will be the focus of this paper,which has important practical significance and theoretical value.However,the existing researches on the risk research in the construction mode of BT projects aremostly focused on outlining and evaluating the risk factors,and the research on risk sharing is relatively limited and not deep enough.Most of the researches on risk allocation are qualitative researches through questionnaires and interviewsand quantitative analysis are more limited.Therefore,how to quantify the problem of risk allocationhas important practical significance and theoretical value for the BT project research of risk allocation.This paper will use the method,which combines of qualitative and quantitative analysis,also combines theoretical analysis and empirical study,to discuss the risk allocation for BT project.The main research content and conclusions are as follows:(1)51 risk factors of China’s BT project are identified by using RBS-WBS matri x;They are classified into systemic risk and non-systematic risk factors in the 15 syst emic risk and 36 non-systemic risk according to whether the risk factors have irrevers ible attributes;Analyzing in detail the BT project risk factors and the corresponding at tribution of the target,the main producer is not the project participants responsible for the object but project’s external environment if the BT project systemic risk factors a re force majeure risk;The project non-systemic risk factors are resilient risk,which o ccurred in the project operation process,its object of responsibility is mainly the rele vant specific person in charge with the BT project specific construction procedures,s uch as project investors,project companies and related construction side.Therefore,we should focus on the project system risk factors in the actual discussion about BT p roject risk sharing.(2)The method of matter-element extension to is used in risk evaluation.Firstly,the BT project risk evaluation index system is constructed to compare the advantages and disadvantages.Combined with the uncertainty and fuzziness of the BT project risk evaluation index,according to the matter-element extension theory,the risk model is established by using the set value statistics to quantify the risk and the risk evaluation model based on matter-element extension model is established.And then the empirical analysis is used to determine the BT project system risk level and the level of risk indicators and verify the material-element extension model in the BT project in the practicality and rationality.The evaluation of the BT project participants in the interests of the main Risk control and risk sharing are of value.(3)The risk-sharing game model of the participants(government and investment company)is constructed with different risk attitudes under the condition of complete information.Firstly,the process of bargaining between the government and the investment company on risk sharing is analyzed and obtain the optimal risk-sharing ratio between the two parties in the case of indefinite bargaining.And then the risk attitudes of the government and the investment company are described,and the appropriate utility function is constructed by selecting the risk aversion coefficient and the expected utility is solved by using the deterministic equivalence principle.At last,the model is solved and the actual case analysis is carried out.The relationship between the risk attitude of government and investment company and the proportion of risk sharing is obtained.(4)The risk-sharing game model of the participants(government and investment company)is constructed with different risk attitudes under the condition of incomplete information.Firstly,the process of bargaining between government and investment companies under incomplete information is analyzed and obtain the optimal risk sharing ratio in the indefinite bargaining game,By choosing the appropriate utility function to describe the risk attitude of the government and the investment company,the risk sharing game model under the incomplete information is solved,we can get the risk sharing ratio and the participant’s risk attitude Relationship.(5)The game proccess of risk sharing of BT project participants(government and investment companies)with bounded rationality is analyzed.The discount factors of participation,the jealousy of government and the impact of the risk allocation ratio are discussed in both the incomplete information,which combined with the actual case into the value of the analysis and verification.Based on the identification,definition and analysis of the risk factors in the BT project,this paper constructs the risk assessment model using the element-element extension method.Combining the bargaining game theory,the risk preference factor and the bounded rationality theory,this paper constructs the BT project sharing model under the complete information condition and the condition of incomplete information.The BT project sharing model provides a new idea for the theoretical research of BT project risk sharing.It has certain theoretical value.At the same time,combining theory with practice,this paper makes an empirical analysis of the constructed model.This paper provides a useful reference to solve the actual risk sharing problem.It has a certain practical significance.更多还原