【作者】 李刚；

【导师】 侯晓红；

【作者基本信息】 中国矿业大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2016， 博士

【摘要】 终极控制权研究是股权集中环境下分析公司大股东与小股东利益冲突的重要研究范式,而控制权强化方式是深入分析终极控制权行使的新视角。本文研究目的是分析我国上市公司终极控制股东使用金字塔结构、单一控制和董事会席位超额控制三类控制权强化方式的动态调整特征、经济后果和选择行为,为公司终极控制股东行为治理提供经验证据,对于保护投资者利益和加强公司治理具有重要意义。论文首先从不同控制权强化方式运用角度扩展了终极控制权多维度理论,分解计算了终极控制股东使用三类控制权强化方式在上市公司中导致的现金流权与控制权分离程度。随后从我国制度背景出发建立了终极控制股东性质、外部市场化进程和公司内部特征交互影响的分析框架,选择2007-2013年存在终极控制股东而且没有发生变更的A股非金融行业922家上市公司为样本,采用面板数据固定效应多元回归分析方法对研究问题展开实证研究。控制权强化方式动态调整方面的结论表明,2007-2013年间私有终极控制股东表现出降低金字塔结构和单一控制导导致两权分离度而提高董事会席位超额控制导致两权分离度的特征,这种趋势在处于市场化程度较低区域的私有终极控制上市公司中更为显著。而地方政府作为终极控制股东时,处于“政府与市场关系”指数较高区域的上市公司中三类控制权强化方式导致两权分离度均呈现增大趋势。这一结论从动态视角扩展了现有文献多数从静态角度考察某一年度控制权强化方式运用特征的研究范畴。在控制权强化方式的经济后果方面,私有终极控制样本下的研究发现,金字塔结构和单一控制运用对上市公司市场业绩有负面影响并呈现倒U型关系,董事会席位超额控制则没有显著影响;外部市场化程度和公司未来盈利水平提高能够缓解控制权强化方式的负面经济后果。而国有终极控制样本下的研究发现,金字塔结构运用对上市公司市场业绩具有正面影响,单一控制运用对公司市场业绩有负面影响且呈现倒U型关系,董事会席位超额控制同样对公司市场业绩没有显著影响;“政府与市场关系”指数越低、终极控制股东行政层级越低,国有终极控制股东使用控制权强化方式的正面经济后果越显著。在控制权强化方式的选择行为方面,私有终极控制股东互补运用金字塔结构和单一控制,替代运用董事会席位超额控制与其它两类控制权强化方式。其选择行为内生于被控制公司特征和外部市场环境,市场化进程通过公司治理和外部融资约束渠道影响控制权强化方式选择。国有终极控制股东互补运用金字塔结构与单一控制,替代运用董事会席位超额控制与单一控制。其选择行为受被控制公司特征影响较小,外生性较强;国有资本投资和政府公共治理质量是影响控制权强化方式选择的主要因素。上述结论揭示了公司终极控制股东同时使用三类控制权强化方式的经济后果差异和选择组合运用规律,而且通过对比研究也扩展了国有性质终极控制股东控制权强化方式运用的理论内涵。在以上结论的基础上,论文提出了上市公司终极控制股东治理的政策建议。应该区分终极控制股东性质采取不同治理策略,对于私有终极控制股东采取持续市场化改革引导其合理运用控制权强化方式,管制策略是以“事后监管审查”限制控制权强化方式的滥用;而对于国有性质终极控制股东应该采用顶层设计方式探索科学的控制权强化方式组合。降低单一控制程度、强化控制权强化方式的信息披露对两类终极控制股东而言都是当务之急。更多还原

【Abstract】 Ultimate control rights research is the main research paradigm in anlysing the interest conflicts between large shareholders and minority shareholders in companies with concentrated ownership structure. Control-ehancing mechnisms(CEMs) are the innovation perspective to study the exercise of ultimate control rights. So we will study the dynamic adjustment characteristics, the economic consequences and choice behaviors of CEMs including pyramid structure, single control and disproportionate board representation using by the ultimate controllers in China listed companies. Then we can get some empirical evidences to promote the ultimate controller governance, which has a important significance upon the protection of investors’ interests and enhancing corporate governance.The thesis firstly develops the multi-dimension theory of ultimate control rights from the view of various CEMs, and measures the divergences between cash flow rights and control rights caused by three kinds of CEMs. Then the thesis builds an analysis framework based on China institutional background which can analyze the interaction between the natures of ultimate controllers, the characters of coporation and external marketization process. After selecting 922 A-share listed companies in non-financial industry as examples which have the same ultimate controller from 2007 to 2013, the thesis conducts empirical studies using fix-effect model with panel data.During 2007 to 2013, the ultimate controllers reduce the use degree of pyramid structure and single control but increase the use degree of disproportionate board representation. This trend of dynamic adjustments of CEMs is more significant in lised companies controlled by private ultimate controller in regions where the level of marketization process is relatively low. But the local governments in regions where the level of marketization process is relatively high increase the use degree of three kinks of CEMs in this period. These conclusions extend the research category of CEMs using from dynamic view.The empircal results about the economic consequences of CEMs using by the private ultimate controlle indications rs show as follows. The separations between two rights caused by pyramid structure and single control have negative correlation with corporations’ market performance. At the same time, there is also a prominent inverse-U shape relationship between the separation degrees and corporations’ market performance. But the separation between two rights caused by disproportionate board representation has no significant effect on corporations’ market performance. The improvement of the level of marketization process and the future profitability of companies can alleviate the negative economic consequences of CEMs. But in companies controlled by government sectors, the separation between two rights caused by pyramid structure has positive correlation with corporations’ performance. The separation between two rights caused by single control has negative correlation with corporations’ market performance, and there is also a prominent inverse-U shape relationship between them. The separation between two rights caused by disproportionate board representation has no significant effect on corporations’ market performance. The lower the level of marketization process and the administrative hierarchy of governments, the economic consequences of CEMs are more positive.The empircal results about ultimate controllers’ choice behaviors of CEMs show as follows. The private ultimate controllers use pyramid structure and single control complementarily, and use disproportionate board representation alternatively with above two CEMs. The private ultimate controllers’ choice behaviors endogenously derive from the controlled companies’ characteristics and external market environment. Marketization influences the choice of CEMs through the channels such as corporate governance and external financing constraints. In companies controlled by government sectors, the ultimate controllers use pyramid structure and single control complementarily, use disproportionate board representation and single control alternatively. The ultimate controllers’ choice behaviors are less affected by the character of controlled companies. State-owned capital investment and the quality of government public administration are themajor factors that influence the choices of CEMs. These conclusions reveale the differences in economic consequence and the pattern of CEMs combined application when the ultimate controllers use three CEMs simultaneously. After contrastive studies, these conclusions also extend the theoretical connotation about the CEMs used by state ultmate controllers.On these foundations, the thesis proposes some policy recommendations to govern the ultimate controllers of listed companies. We should take different governance strategies according to the nature of ultimate controllers. To the private ultimate controllers, we should continuously push forward China’s marketization reform which would guide the private ultimate controllers to use CEMs rationally. The strategy of regulation for CEMs using by the private ultimate controllers should be "ex post regulatory review" to restrict the abusing of CEMs. But to the ultimate controllers of state owned companies, we need the top-level design to guide the using of CEMs. After all, these are urgent to reduce the degree of single control and enhance the disclose of CEMs for the two kinds of ultimate controllers.更多还原