【作者】 黄健青；

【导师】 陈进；

【作者基本信息】 对外经济贸易大学 ， 产业经济学， 2017， 博士

【摘要】 中小企业“融资难、融资贵”是世界性难题,这其中既有企业自身的原因,也有我国尚不健全的资本市场体系的因素。互联网金融应运而生并迅猛发展,将是对传统金融业的有效补充,同时也必将带来冲击和挑战。因此,对其模式、机制、趋势等的研究具有重要的理论和现实意义。人们对互联网金融的概念普遍认同的是运用互联网技术,包括互联网思维对金融业带来的融合和渐进式的变革,其理想目标是金融脱媒,实现资源配置的优化。文本则从银行基本职能在互联网金融发展中的体现以及网络信息技术对传统金融模式带来的影响角度,将互联网金融定义为:互联网金融是基于新兴平台经济规则,运用现代信息技术手段,通过创新资金融通、支付结算等方式,实现金融高效资源配置的新型服务模式。与传统融资相比,互联网融资最显著的特点有:大数据的应用降低了信息的不对称;互联网平台的搭建提高了资源配置效率;网络融资的发展促进了普惠金融的实现。在新常态下,“互联网+”已成为驱动经济发展的新引擎。互联网金融使两大主导行业相互渗透,形成竞争与合作共存的局面。从研究视角看,融资理论、平台经济和声誉机制是三个重要的观测点。融资学作为一门学科主要从宏观和微观两个层面研究投融资与社会经济发展的关系。随着信息经济学和制度经济学的发展,关于企业融资需求与供给方面的理论也日益丰富,这些理论在研究互联网借贷时具有重要的指导意义。平台经济作为一种新兴的经济形态,已广泛地存在于现代社会。平台经济是一个双边或多边市场,具有增值性、网络外部性和开放性等特点。国内外对平台经济学的理论研究刚刚起步。声誉的本意指公众对某人的评价,200多年前,亚当·斯密提出声誉是一种保证契约诚实执行的重要机制。声誉及与声誉相关的应用研究是现代经济管理领域中的热点话题,形成了标准声誉、声誉交易和声誉信息三大主要理论,之后的声誉激励理论与声誉网络理论也有较大的影响。声誉理论的实证研究则集中于研究不同市场特征下声誉对价格的影响。从金融最核心的功能角度看,互联网金融中的网络借贷和众筹是两类利用互联网实现大众化融资的创新模式。随着P2P网贷平台在我国的不断发展,演变出不同的业务模式和风险控制机制,其中一些变味的P2P模式隐含了巨大的风险。国家监管部门已颁布有关规定,明确引导P2P网贷平台向信息中介方向发展,实现P2P平台只做信息展示及撮合交易的功能,但短期内P2P担保模式依然会存在。学术界对声誉的研究始于二十世纪七十年代,声誉具有社会性、综合性、历史性和脆弱性等特点。“声誉机制”可理解为在一个声誉系统中,不需要外在手段就能实现声誉的自我实施过程,包括在声誉的产生、声誉的影响、声誉的保持、声誉的消费以及声誉的交易等方面的管理模式和方式。声誉机制发生作用则需要有基本条件、过程条件和结果条件,对应在时间、信息和权利要件上。p2p网贷平台中借款人的声誉由三部分组成,即借方个人基本特征,如年龄、性别、单位、家庭婚姻状况等相对静态的指标;借方历史借贷表现,反映借款人在借贷市场中的偿还历史;其他指标,如个人在朋友圈中的行为表现等。声誉机制发生作用首先要满足重复博弈或关联博弈的基本条件,其次,在网贷平台交易中,平台应及时将行为主体的违约行为传递到所有相关方,第三,在失信行为的惩罚方面,一种是市场机制的自发作用,另一种是法律的强制性惩罚。网络借贷与传统民间借贷相比,在社会关系、信任机制和惩罚机制等方面存在本质差别。通过对国外典型p2p平台的分析可以看到,“声誉机制”都建立在完善的征信系统之上,针对我国国情,提出如下建议:(1)构建适合我国国情的声誉机制(2)建立统一的信用评价机制(3)推动信用信息共享(4)构建网络借贷“熟人圈”(5)关注平台“黄牛”行为。通过对p2p平台上借贷双方静态和动态博弈分析,得到结论:(1)如果借款人预期还款行为带来的长期收益大于违约的短期收益,则借款人会选择还款,长期的声誉机制就可以建立。(2)在不完全信息下,借贷双方并不了解彼此的类型,投资者只能做出一个先验判断,随着博弈的推进,投资者能根据借款人的行为调整自己的后验概率,这种调整就是声誉的形成过程,研究表明,声誉机制在p2p平台上能够约束理性借款人的行为。(3)借款人在权衡违约利弊时,受到以下三个印象的影响:违约成本、时间因素和声誉传递机制。在定性分析及理论探讨基础上,本文根据大众投资心理及投资者风险偏好预期,以拍拍贷为例,基于贷款人的各项信息与p2p借贷平台上的基本行为,构建了贷款人在p2p网络借贷平台中投资利率选择的关键因素模型。采用多元线性回归分析方法得到以下结论:(1)年龄越大、平台注册时间越长意味着贷款人拥有更丰富的投资经验,这类贷款人更愿意投资利率较高的项目。(2)贷款人自身的认证程度对于其投资利率选择具有正向影响。(3)“借款-全额还清次数”越多的贷款人倾向于投资利率较高项目。(4)平台中,累计的投资总量是影响贷款人投资利率选择的主要因素,阶段内投资频率则非关键因素。(5)具有一定风险偏好的投资者并没有因为在平台的失败经历而改变其偏好,平台投资者具有一定的非理性。本文将经济学研究中“声誉”及“声誉机制”的概念应用在新兴网络借贷平台中,界定了p2p网贷中“声誉”要素的构成,分析其声誉机制的过程及发生作用的条件,同时比较传统个人民间借贷与新兴网络借贷在声誉机制中的本质差别。另一方面,从博弈论视角较为系统地分析了声誉机制的作用机理及影响因素,通过建立借贷博弈模型将声誉机制引入借贷分析过程,提出了对P2P借贷模式给予规范和审慎监管、平台自身完善信用评级和信息披露制度等建议。由于P2P网络借贷平台是互联网时代的新生儿,对其声誉的研究无论是作为一个企业角度的集体声誉,还是平台上借款人这类特殊群体的个体声誉,都还缺少系统深入的理论探讨。针对平台中借款人声誉的理论模型研究也十分匮乏,实证研究则多关注声誉对价格、成功率等其他变量的影响而非声誉本身的机制,对理论模型的实证或实验检验则更为罕见,这些都有待今后进一步深入研究。更多还原

【Abstract】 It is a worldwide problem that most small and medium enterprises hard to financing and they also need to bear the higher cost.The reason both for their own business,but also have the fact that our countries’ capital market system is not sound.In this environment Internet Finance came into being and experienced rapid development.It will be an effective complement to the traditional financial industry,but also bring the impact and challenges to the industry.Therefore,the study of its model,mechanism and trend has important theoretical and practical significance.People generally agree on the concept of Internet Finance is the use of Internet Technology,including Internet Thinking on the financial industry to bring the integration and gradual change.Its goal is to get rid of financial and realize the optimization of resource allocation.This paper defined Internet Finance from the perspective of the basic functions of the bank in the Internet Financial development and the impact of network information technology on the traditional financial model as a new service model which based on the emerging platform economic rules,use modern information technology,through innovative financing payment and settlement to achieve efficient allocation of financial resources.Compared with the traditional financing,the most significant characteristics of Internet financing are: information asymmetry reduced by the application of big data;Internet platform improved the efficiency of resource allocation;the development of network financing has promoted the realization of Inclusive Finance.In the environment of China’s new normal,"Internet +" has become a new engine to drive economic development.Internet finance has made the two leading industries to penetrate each other,and the situation of competition and cooperation coexistence has been formed.From the perspective of research,financing theory,platform economy and reputation mechanism are three important observation points.As a discipline,Finance mainly focus on both macro and micro level to study the relationship between finance & investment and the social economics development.With the development of information economics and institutional economics,the theory of financing demand and supply is becoming more and more abundant.These theories have important guiding significance in the study of Internet loan.As a new economic form,Platform economy has been widely present in modern society.Platform economy is a bilateral or multilateral market,with value-added,network externalities and openness etc.characters.Domestic and foreign theoretical research on platform economics has just started.The original meaning of reputation is the evaluation of someone,more than 200 years ago,Adam Smith believes that reputation is an important mechanism to ensure the honest implementation of the contract.The research of reputation and the application related to reputation is a hot topic in the field of modern economic management,and has formed three major theories of the standard reputation,reputation transactions and reputation information,after that,the reputation of incentive theory and reputation network theory also have a greater impact.The empirical study of reputation theory mainly focuses on the impact of reputation on prices under different market characteristics.From the perspective of the core function of finance,Internet Finance and Crowdfunding are two kinds of innovative modes of using the Internet to realize inclusive financing.With the P2 P network loan platform continuous development,different business model and risk control mechanism start to appear.Some of the taste of the P2 P model implies a huge risk.The national regulatory authorities have promulgated the relevant provisions,clearly guide the P2 P network loan platform to the information intermediary direction,to help achieve P2 P platform only be an information display and match the transactions.However,P2 P guarantee mode will still exist in the short term.The study of reputation in academia began in the 1970 s,and the reputation has social,comprehensive,historical and fragile characterizes."Reputation mechanism" can be understood as a self-implementation process of reputation in a reputation system that does not require external means,it includes residual production,impact,retention,consumption,and transactions.The role of the reputation mechanism requires basic conditions,process conditions and outcome conditions,corresponding to time,information and rights.The reputation of the borrower in the P2 P network loan platform is composed of three parts,the basic characteristics of the borrower,such as age,sex,unit,family marital status and so on;The borrower’s historical loan performance reflects the repayment of the borrower in the lending market History;other indicators,such as personal behavior in the circle of friends.The role of the reputation mechanism must first meet the basic conditions of repeated game or related game,secondly,in the net loan platform transaction,the platform should promptly pass the default of the borrower to all stakeholders;Thirdly,in terms of the punishment of dishonesty,one is the spontaneous effect of the market mechanism,the other is the mandatory punishment of the law.Compared with the traditional folk borrowing,there are essential differences in social relations,trust mechanism and punishment mechanism.Through the analysis of the typical foreign P2 P platform,we can see that the "reputation mechanism" is based on the perfect credit system,so according to our country’s situation,this paper puts forward the following suggestions:(1)Building a reputation mechanism for China’s national conditions;(2)Establishing a unified credit evaluation mechanism;(3)Promoting credit information sharing;(4)Building a network lending "acquaintance circle";(5)Focus on the platform "cattle" behavior.Through the static and dynamic game analysis of both borrowing and lending side on P2 P platform,we can see that:(1)if the borrower’s expected return on repayment is greater than the short-term gain of default,then the borrower will choose to repay,and the long-term reputation mechanism can be established.(2)In the case of incomplete information,the borrowers and the lenders do not understand each other’s thought,investors can only make a priori judgment.With the game carry on,investors can adjust their posterior probability according to the borrower’s behavior,and this adjustment is the formation process of reputation.The research shows that the reputation mechanism can restrain the behavior of rational borrowers on P2 P platform.(3)The borrower is affected by the following three factors in weighing the pros and cons of default:default cost,time factor and reputation transmission mechanism.On the basis of qualitative analysis and theoretical discussion and the public investment mentality and investor risk preference anticipation,this paper takes PPDAI as an example,with the lender’s information and P2 P loan platform on the basic behavior,has built a Key Factor Model of Investment Interest Rate Selection in Lending Platform.The following conclusions were obtained by multiple linear regression analysis:(1)An older platform or a longer registration time means a more experienced lender,who is more willing to invest in higher-paying projects.(2)The degree of self-certification of the lender has a positive impact on the choice of its investment interest rate.(3)Higher "Loans-The total number of repayments" means the lenders tend to invest in higher-interest-rate projects.(4)The cumulative total investment is the main factor affecting the choice of lender’s investment interest rate on the platform,while the stage of investment frequency is not a key factor.(5)Investors with a certain risk appetite do not change their preferences because of the failed investment on the platform,where investors have a certain irrationality.In this paper,the concept of "reputation" and "reputation mechanism" in economics study is applied to the emerging online lending platform,which defines the composition of "reputation" in P2 P online loan,and analyzes the process of its reputation mechanism and the conditions of its occurrence.Comparing the fundamental differences between conventional individual loan and emerging online lone in reputation mechanism.On the other hand,from the perspective of game theory,this paper systematically analyzes the mechanism and contributing factors of the reputation mechanism.Through the establishment of the loan game model,the reputation mechanism is introduced into the loan analysis process,and the paper puts forward the normative and prudential supervision of the P2 P loan model credit rating and information disclosure system and other recommendations.Because P2 P network borrowing platform is a newborn in the Internet era,the research on its reputation is both a collective reputation as a corporate perspective and a personal reputation of such special groups on the platform.The research on the theoretical model of the reputation of the lender on the platform is also very scarce.The empirical research focuses on the influence of the reputation on the other variables such as the price and the success rate,not the mechanism of the reputation itself.The empirical or experimental test of the theoretical model is rarer,which are to be further studied in the future.更多还原