【作者】 程琳；

【导师】 徐长生；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 西方经济学， 2016， 博士

【摘要】 近年来,经济下行压力持续增大,而地方债务规模又在急剧的膨胀,迅速扩大的债务规模引起社会各界对地方政府举债的行为以及伴随的相关风险的关注,对地方债务风险的控制问题已经上升到维持社会经济持续稳定发展的高度。本文拟对我国地方政府债务的现状、成因、影响等问题进行系统性研究,以财政分权体制为切入点,探寻地方债务膨胀的深层次原因,检验其对经济增长的促进效果,分析我国地方债务体系存在的问题,提出我国地方政府债务风险防范与化解的政策建议。1994年实行分税制改革之后,地方政府的举债行为以及债务规模都在快速增长,尤其是在2008年爆发国际金融危机引起了世界范围内的经济衰退,我国中央政府为应对危机维持增长而实施了积极的财政政策,加上经济增长下行和结构转型带来的阵痛,各级地方政府配合中央政府“稳增长”的任务紧迫,加上财政分权本身就造成地方政府收支倒挂,于是地方政府纷纷选择负债经营来发展经济。但随着债务规模不断扩大,举债方式和偿债资金来源暴露出诸多问题,若不能妥善防控和化解,将有可能导致系统性金融风险的出现。在探讨地方债务的风险问题之前,首先要找出地方政府负债膨胀的原因。本文的研究认为,地方政府债务膨胀并不仅仅是由于分税制改革造成地方财力不足,而是不彻底的财政分权体制下地方政府面临的财政激励的扭曲。通过对省级和市级面板数据的计量研究发现,财政分权导致地方政府支出压力明显增大,财权上收和事权下放导致财政缺口不断增大,从而造成了地方政府负债的增加,官员的晋升激励机制进一步强化了这一过程,地区主要领导人仕途的因素显著影响了地方政府的举债融资的行为。研究中加入地方官员的特征变量之后,我们发现各级地方官员出于自身仕途的考虑,在不同任期和不同年龄有不同的表现。当省级和市级主要官员处于具有晋升可能的时期,通过政绩来获得自身优势的需求更加迫切,面临的晋升激励更大,从而举债融资的需求就更多。因此,要根除地方政府过度负债的行为,需要从财政体制和考核制度上通盘考虑。我国地方政府债务筹集的资金主要投向了市政建设等公共性项目,不仅推动了民生改善和地方经济社会发展,而且大多有经营性收入作为偿债来源,这与大多数西方国家的情况不同,这些西方国家长期实行高福利政策,当经济下行期间就只能政府举债来弥补国家消费和居民福利的亏空,属于纯消费型债务。我国地方政府债务多为生产性债务,发挥的积极作用不可否定。本文从理论上阐述了“债务-基础设施建设-地区经济增长”的作用机制,并对地方债务与经济增长的关系使用较为前沿的面板分位数回归方法进行实证检验。结果显示,地方政府举债融资对我国城市经济发展有显著的正向促进作用,但在不同经济发展水平的分位数上影响系数存在显著差异,落后地区较发达地区在债务融资过程中处于劣势,举债融资建设的效果较差,因此落后地区在适度举债融资的同时,更要大力改善投资环境、合理规划投资分配、提高资金使用效率。为了更为直观的反映地方政府债务可能存在的风险,本文通过美国底特律市破产和日本夕张市破产的典型案例,分析总结地方政府走向债务危机的经验教训。同时,在总结其他国家失败案例的基础上,通过结合我国的实际情况,提出相应的地方政府债务化解与防范的建议：首先,加快财政体制改革,建立财权和事权相匹配的中央-地方财税体系；同时,针对干部考核机制对中国地方政府债务的影响,提出改革考核机制,加大民生指标的权重,构建多元化、绿色化的考核指标体系,并在考核体系中纳入债务因素；最后,加强地方政府债务管理,健全地方政府融资渠道,引导地方政府走向债券发行的透明化、法制化道路。更多还原

【Abstract】 As the economy grows slowly and the debts of local governments expand rapidly, the debt financing behavior and its risk has attracted more attention recently. Controlling the local debt risk has become an important issue of the world economic stability and sustainable development. This dissertation tries to study the problems of local government debt in China, search for the deeper reason for the expansion of it, inspect its promoting effect on economic growth, and put forward some policy advices to prevent the local government debt risk.In 1994, Chinese government implemented the share tax reform, and since then the local government debt begins to increase rapidly. In order to stabilize the economy after the international financial crisis, the government has carried out the active fiscal policy. Local governments face the huge gap between the revenue and expenditure, and have to borrow more money to develop the economy. As the local debt expanding, the borrowing mode and the repayment source exposed many problems. If not treated well, it might trigger a systemic financial risk.To study the risk of the local government debt, we first have to know the motivation. It is not only because of the local finance shortage caused by the 1994 share tax reform, but also because of the distortion of financial incentives. By exploring the panel data of provincial and municipal governments, we find that the exceeded fiscal decentralization enlarged the expenditure and budget deficit of local governments, while the promotion incentive of the officials further strengthened this process as the promotion factors significantly influenced their debt financing behavior. Inducing their characteristic variables, we can find out different performances in different terms and ages based on the promotion. They tended to improve their performances through debt financing and thereby improve their career prospects, especially when the possibility of promotion raised. So in order to eradicate the over indebtedness of local governments, current financial system and the performance evaluation system of officials need to be reformed together.Unlike the high social welfare afforded by thedebt of western countries, the local debt in china is used chiefly in construction of urban infrastructure and public programs, and is conducive to social and economic development as well as people’s livelihood, and also has repayment sources. This dissertation describs the mechanism of "local debt infrastructure-economic growth" in theory, and testes the relationship between the local government debt and regional economic growth in China based on quantile regression model. The result showes raising money by local governments through debt financing to increase infrastructure spending will accelerate the development of regional economy, and the effectiveness varies significantly on different quantiles. The less developed regions have comparative disadvantage in investment attraction, so we should paid more attention to controlling the debt size.The Detroit and Yubari bankruptcy may hold a lesson for Chinese government to better resolve and prevent emergency of local debt risk. Base on summarizing these lessons and actual situation, we put forward the following policy advices:First, setting up a standard and rational system of the fiscal powerand responsibilities is an important content of improving fiscal system and coordinating the fiscal relationship between the central and local governments. Secondly, the assessment and grading system of the government should be reformed, taking a pluralistic and green index system into account, which contains the livelihood and the debt. The last but not the least, issuing the local government bonds to resolve local debt is the fundamental way to strengthen the management of the debt, and more transparency and legalization in local government debt data is imperative.更多还原