【作者】 李永辉；

【导师】 傅利平；

【作者基本信息】 天津大学 ， 技术经济及管理， 2015， 博士

【摘要】 一般来说,市场机制是提升企业投资效率的理想方式。但现阶段,我国正处于转型阶段,市场机制未能在企业投资活动中发挥决定性作用。与之相对应,地方政府行为能够在一定程度上对企业生产经营的外部环境产生深刻影响,而这种影响势必会导致市场竞争和价格机制无法完全有效地指导企业的投资行为,进而影响企业投资效率。事实上,政府行为只是官员这一政治权力控制者的动机的外在体现。因此,将政府层面研究延伸到官员个人层面,准确识别地方政府官员、市场化程度对企业投资效率的影响机理和作用效果,并重点诠释市场化程度如何影响政企关系,可为政府影响企业生产经营活动的内在机理提供一种新的解释,对于优化我国官员治理模式,夯实经济增长的微观基础具有重要的现实意义。本文采用信号传递博弈方法,结合政府干预理论等相关理论,对地方政府官员、市场、企业的行为及其均衡状态进行了分析,建立了地方政府官员晋升竞争行为、市场化程度影响企业投资效率的理论模型。从地方政府官员晋升竞争、个人特征角度,实证分析了地方政府官员对辖区内企业投资效率的影响,并通过对样本数据的分类,考察了企业所有权性质、企业所在地区对地方政府官员晋升竞争与企业投资效率之间关系的影响。引入市场化程度变量,并将其与地方官员晋升竞争同时纳入企业投资效率分析框架。研究表明,地方政府官员晋升竞争能够对企业投资效率产生显著的抑制作用,且这种抑制作用会因企业所有权性质、所处地区的不同而有所差异;企业投资效率还受到地方政府官员年龄、任期、来源等个人特征的影响;市场化程度既可优化企业投资效率,还能弱化官员晋升竞争对企业投资效率的抑制作用。进一步研究表明,在官员考核机制中持续增加环境、民生两个方面指标的权重能够有效降低晋升竞争对企业投资效率的抑制作用,并最终使其对企业投资效率产生促进作用。本文创新之处在于:采用信号传递博弈方法,构建了地方政府官员晋升竞争、市场化程度影响企业投资效率的理论模型;将地方政府与企业投资效率的关系研究拓展到更为微观的层面,尝试从地方政府官员所面临的晋升竞争及其个人特征角度出发,分析其对企业投资效率的影响;尝试改进官员考核机制,并实证考察这种改进对地方政府官员晋升竞争与企业投资效率之间关系的影响。更多还原

【Abstract】 The market mechanism is an ideal way of promoting the investment efficiency of enterprises in general but it fails to act as a decisive role with the economic transformation of China. Correspondingly, the local government behavior may have a profound impact on the external environment of the enterprise production and management to some extent which will certainly result in the failure of the guidance of the market competition and price mechanism on the investment behavior of the enterprises which may affect the investment efficiency. In fact, the government action is a kind of outward manifestation of the officials’ motivation. Therefore, the study is broadened from the government to the officials by evaluating the influence mechanism and effect of local officials and marketization degree on the investment efficiency. Besides, the study interprets the influences of marketization degree on the relationship between the government and the enterprises. So a new explanation for the internal mechanism of how the government affects the production and management activities of enterprises is provided. As a result, the study will have a practical significance on optimizing China officials governance model and consolidating the micro foundation of economic growth.The thesis adopts the method of signaling game theory combining with the government intervention theory to analyze the behavior and equilibrium state of local officials, market and enterprises, which establishes the theoretical model of how local officials’ promotion competition and the marketization degree influence the investment efficiency of enterprises. The thesis empirically analyzes the influence of local officials on the investment efficiency of the enterprises within the domain from the perspective of the local officials’ promotion competition and personal characteristics. And by classifying the sample data, the influence of the corporate ownership nature and the enterprises location on the promotion of local officials and investment efficiency is discussed. Both the marketization variables and the local officials’ promotion competition are included into the analysis framework of the investment efficiency of enterprises. The study shows that the local officials’ promotion will inhibit the efficiency of local enterprise investment and the inhibition will vary with the property of business ownership and regions. The investment efficiency of enterprise is also affected by local government officials’ personal characteristics like age, tenure, sources and work experience. Besides, the degree of marketization can not only optimize the investment efficiency of enterprises, but also weaken the inhibitory effect of the officials’ promotion competition on the investment efficiency of enterprises. Further research shows that increasing weight of environment and people’s livelihood indicators in the official examination system continuously plays a role in improving the investment efficiency and weakening the inhibitory effect of the promotion competition.The first innovation of this thesis is that by adopting the method of signaling game theory, the study establishes the theoretical model about how local officials’ promotion competition and the marketization degree influence the investment efficiency of enterprises. The second one is that the study of the relationship between investment efficiency and local government is expended into a more micro level, with the thesis focusing on the relationship between the local government officials and the investment efficiency of the enterprises from the perspective of promotion competition and personal characteristics of local government officials. The last one is that we try to improve the official assessment mechanism and empirically analyze the influence of this improvement on the relationship between the local government officials’ promotion competition and the investment efficiency of the enterprises.更多还原