【作者】 陈华；

【导师】 林木西；

【作者基本信息】 辽宁大学 ， 区域经济学， 2015， 博士

【摘要】 由于我国商业地产区位选择经验不足、缺乏长期考量,开发商与地方政府受短期利益驱动盲目开发商业地产项目,导致了商业地产区位分布不合理、结构失衡,而且同质化严重。再加之,地方政府为了追求政绩、解决“财政饥渴”,进一步推动了商业地产盲目开发热潮,加剧了区域泡沫化风险。目前的商业地产区位分布既是开发商自由进行区位选择的结果,也是受地方政府“土地财政”、地方官员“晋升锦标赛”作用的结果。因此,本文从区域经济视角,探讨了全国31个省市的商业地产区位布局与选择,以及商业地产区位选择中开发商引力与地方政府引力。为了说明在商业地产区位选择过程中的开发商引力与地方政府引力,本文引入了商业地产区位选择的开发商引力与地方政府引力模型。在确定我国商业地产区位选择的主要影响因素后,建立了商业地产区位选择的评价指标体系。在引力模型中,首先明确两个引力的影响因素:开发商引力主要受自然引力和市场引力影响,地方政府引力主要受社会经济引力和生态环境引力影响。然后,结合空间计量模型与面板数据计量理论,同时考虑到了空间单元相关性与时间尺度相关性,构建出一个新的综合性引力模型,利用定性与定量结合分析法、对比分析、综合分析与逻辑归纳等方法对我国31个省市的商业地产区位选择进行详细分析,从而得到商业地产区位选择中的开发商引力系数和地方政府引力系数。最后,根据所得到的开发商引力和地方政府引力对商业地产区位投资的系数,通过引力作用的差异性分析,进一步分析开发商引力和地方政府引力在商业地产区位选择过程中的作用过程,以及双引力视角下的商业地产区位选择空间格局。根据商业地产区位选择的双引力模型,开发商的引力系数大于地方政府的引力系数,说明开发商在商业地产区位选择中的意愿或意向较强;同时,除西藏外,全国30个省市的地方政府引力作用大于开发商引力作用,这是开发商引力和地方政府引力在商业地产区位选择中的决定或实力角力的结果,与我国目前地区政府的现行体制高度一致,说明在“土地财政”主导的环境下,商业地产开发成为地方政府的热衷,这也是造成目前商业地产投资过热的体制因素。这说明开发商在与地方政府的博弈过程中,达成了某种默契或共识,存在着地方政府被“俘虏”,或地方政府被开发商“绑架”,或自愿被“绑架”的现象。在这一博弈过程中,开发商引力的传导机制是完全有效传导(甚至传导到地方政府),而地方政府引力的传导机制则为部分无效传导,亦或完全无效传导。在双引力视角下,商业地产区位选择既受到开发商逐利性作用,存在着短视性与负外部性,又受到地方政府“土地财政”和“唯GDP论”的干扰,存在区域性、盲目性。因此,本文从微观和区域选择角度转化到宏观区位选择角度,分析了双引力视角下的商业地产区位选择的效应与局限性。双引力作用下的商业地产区位选择,由于中心—外围效应和空间累积因果效应,容易产生区域不平衡等问题,再加上区位资源利用具有外部性,以及市场失灵等局限性,纯粹的双引力商业地产区位选择不利于区域经济的协调发展,因此需要从更全面的角度对商业地产区位选择进行整体引导与管理。随着微观区位因子宏观化趋势,区位选择的过程应该从以往的双引力视角移化到三引力视角(开发商引力、地方政府引力和中央政府引力)。商业地产开发商希望通过区位选择为企业创造利润;地方政府希望通过商业地产区位选择促进地区经济发展,并增加地方财政收入;中央政府希望通过商业地产区位选择带动区域协调发展,促进商业地产健康发展,增加社会福祉。房地产开发商与地方政府所进行的商业地产区位选择存在着局限性、发展的短视性,甚至其决策行为在一定程度上会造成外部不经济性,而中央政府所进行的商业地产区位选择具有全局性,注重长期目标和整体协调性。立场不同,其所进行的决策行为也会存在巨大的差异。从经济学角度来说,开发商与地方政府侧重于自身效益的最大化,而中央政府则希望达到社会效益的最大化。因此,利用中央政府的宏观调控填补目前商业地产区位选择的弊端,促进区位选择的合理性与科学性,结合微观区位选择与宏观区位选择,促进全社会整体效益的提高。本文的商业地产主要是指用于商业经营的房地产,即商业营业用房,主要包括商场、市场、娱乐与餐饮业的商业物业、购物中心以及各种形式的商业街和批发市场。本文的商业地产区位选择主要是指基于全国31个省市商业地产现状,从全国层面或区域层面所进行的商业地产区位布局及选择,并非是开发商项目选址。本文的创新点在于:首次探讨了商业地产区位选择中的开发商引力与地方政府引力问题,并为此建立了商业地产区位选择开发商引力与政府引力模型及其评价指标体系,提出了“在商业地产区位选择中,开发商引力系数大于地方政府引力系数”等观点。更多还原

【Abstract】 In China’s commercial real estate industry, the lack of experience in location choice and long-term consideration and the blind development of commercial real estate projects driven by short-term profits for developers and local governments have led to the irrational distribution, structural imbalance and serious homogenization of commercial real estate location. Moreover, local governments’ pursuit of political performance and requirement for resolving "financial hunger" have refueled the blind development of commercial real estate and exacerbated the risks of regional bubbles. The current commercial real estate location distribution is the result of developers’ free location choice and local governments’ "land finance" and local officials’ "promotion championship". Therefore, the commercial real estate distribution and choice, as well as the attraction of real estate developers and local governments in commercial real estate location choice in 31 provinces and cities in China were discussed in this paper from the perspective of balanced development of regional economy.To illustrate the attraction of real estate developers and local governments during the process of commercial real estate location choice, the real estate developer attraction model and local government attraction model of commercial real estate location choice were introduced in this paper. Once the major factors affecting China’s commercial real estate location choice were determined, the evaluation index system of the commercial real estate location choice was set up. Firstly, two affecting factors of attraction were defined in the attraction model: the attraction of developers is mainly affected by the natural attraction and market attraction, while that of local governments is mainly affected by the socio-economic attraction and ecological environment attraction. Secondly, in conjunction with the space measurement model and the panel data measurement theory and taking into account the spatial unit correlation and time scale correlation, a new integrated attraction model was designed, and the detailed analyses of commercial real estate location choice in 31 provinces in China were made by a method integrating qualitative analysis with quantitative analysis, comparative analysis, comprehensive analysis and logic induction to derive the attraction coefficients of developers and local governments in commercial real estate location choice. Finally, according to the coefficients of the attraction of developers and local governments for the investment in commercial real estate and through the analysis of the differences in attraction, the roles of the attraction of developers and local governments in commercial real estate location choice and the spatial patterns of commercial real estate location choice from the perspective of dual attraction were further analyzed in this paper.According to the dual attraction model of the commercial real estate location choice, the attraction coefficients of developers are greater than those of local governments, indicating that developers have stronger wishes or intents in commercial real estate location choice; meanwhile, with the exception of Tibet, the attraction role of the local governments of 30 provinces was greater than that of developers, which is the result of the decision or strength wrestling between developer attraction and local government attraction in commercial real estate location choice and well aligned with the current system of local governments in China, indicating that, in the "land finance-led" context, commercial real estate development has been the enthusiasm of local governments, which is also an institutional factor contributing to the present overheated investment in commercial real estate. This suggests that developers and local governments have reached a tacit understanding or consensus during the game, and the phenomenon that local governments are "captured" or "kidnapped" or "kidnapped" voluntarily by developers exists in China. During the game, the transmission mechanism of developer attraction works with a completely efficacious transmission effect(even transmitting to local governments), while that of local attraction works with partly or even completely invalid transmission effect.From the perspective of dual attraction, commercial real estate location choice is characterized by not only myopic views and negative externality due to developers’ pursuit of profits but also regionalism and blindness due to local governments’ interference through "land finance" and "only GDP theory". Therefore, by shifting from the perspective of micro and local location choice to the perspective of macro-location choice, the effects and limitations of commercial real estate location choice under the perspective of dual attraction were analyzed in this paper. The commercial real estate location choice under the action of the dual attraction is vulnerable to regional imbalance due to the center-perimeter effect and space cumulative causal effects, and given the limitations of the externality of the utilization of location resources and market failure, the sole dual attraction commercial real estate location choice is disadvantageous to the coordinated regional economic development, so the commercial real estate location choice should be guided and managed in a more comprehensive manner. With the macro trend of the micro location factors, location choice process should be shifted from the previous perspective of dual attraction to the perspective of triple attraction(developer attraction, local government attraction and central government attraction). Commercial real estate developers hope to create profits through location choice; local governments hope to promote local economic development and increase local financial revenue through commercial real estate location choice; the central government hopes to promote coordinated regional development and sound development of commercial real estate and increase social well-being through commercial real estate location choice. The commercial real estate location choices conducted by real estate developers and local governments are of limitations and myopic development, and the decision behaviors to a certain extent even cause external diseconomy, while those conducted by the central government focus on long-term goals and overall coordination. The decision behaviors will greatly vary with different positions. From an economic perspective, developers and local governments focus on ways to maximize their benefits, while the central government wants to maximize the social benefits. Therefore, the central government’s macroeconomic control can remedy the weaknesses of current commercial real estate location choice, promote the rational and scientific location choices, combine micro-location choices with macro-location choices and improve the overall benefits of the society.The commercial real estate in this paper mainly refers to the real estate for commercial purpose, that is, the commercial and business buildings, including the commercial properties of shopping malls, markets, the entertainment and catering sector, shopping centers and various forms of commercial streets and wholesale markets. The commercial real estate location choice in this paper mainly refers to the commercial real estate location layout and choice at the national or regional level based on the current situation of commercial real estate in 31 provinces and cities in China rather than the project site choice conducted by developers.The innovations of this paper include: the attraction of developers and local governments in commercial real estate location choice were discussed in this paper for the first time; the developer attraction model and government attraction model and the evaluation index system of the commercial real estate location choice were set up; the ideas, such as "the attraction coefficients of developers are greater than those of local governments in commercial real estate location choice", were put forward in this paper.更多还原