【作者】 刘铁彬；

【导师】 杜两省；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 国民经济学， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 商业银行是经营存贷款业务的高风险企业,其经营风险具有很强的传导性和破坏性,因此应始终坚持稳健的经营理念。然而自上世纪八十年代以来,国外银行业多次爆发危机,许多商业银行在危机中破产倒闭。这些经营失败的银行普遍存在不稳健的经营行为。本文经分析认为,中国商业银行存在强烈的信贷扩张冲动。信贷扩张冲动的根源在于商业银行高管,尤其是行长,在政治激励和内部人控制下倾向于制定激进的业务发展计划,并通过不合理的考核体系转化为各级分支机构的信贷扩张冲动。中国商业银行的风险管理体系尚未完全实现垂直管理,难以保证风险管理决策的独立性,因而无法抑制分支机构的信贷扩张冲动。同时,银行风险管理部门的内部人控制导致信贷投放结构失衡,向房地产、地方政府融资平台等较高风险领域过多投放了贷款。本文按照“发现问题—分析问题——解决问题”的逻辑思路展开。通过对文献的总结和对委托代理理论的分析,发现商业银行存在信贷过度扩张和冒险经营倾向。本文通过分析指出中国商业银行存在强烈的的信贷扩张冲动,其根源在于商业银行总行高管层(尤其是行长)的内部人控制。信贷扩张冲动导致中国商业银行向产能过剩行业、房地产、地方政府融资平台等领域过多投放了贷款。为了防范化解中国商业银行的信贷系统性风险,本文分别从业务操作层面和公司治理(含风险管理架构)层面提出了对策建议。本文包括四个部分,共九章。第一部分,包括第一章和第二章。第一章为导论,介绍论文研究背景、研究目的及意义、研究框架等内容。第二章为文献综述。本章利用前人的研究成果从银行股东道德风险、信贷投放亲周期、公司治理结构不完善等角度分析银行信贷过度扩张和冒险经营的原因。第二部分,包括第三章和第四章。其中,第三章利用委托代理理论分析了银行的“内部人控制”问题和道德风险行为,指出中国商业银行委托代理关系的特殊性。第四章通过分析中国商业银行的信贷投放总量、增速和结构等情况,指出中国商业银行存在强烈的信贷扩张冲动。中国商业银行偏好信贷规模扩张的主要原因是银行高管层倾向于制订激进的年度业务发展计划,并通过一整套考核指标体系下达给分行。由于考核以年度为单位,考核奖励年底兑现,而贷款几乎是完成各项指标(如利润、存款、中间业务等)的最关键手段。因此,这种考核体制直接导致了分支机构的信贷扩张冲动。同时,银行风险管理部门和市场部门也存在“内部人控制”问题,风险管理部门的内部人控制会导致信贷投放结构失衡,市场部门的内部人控制会导致信贷资产质量不实等问题。第三部分,包括第五、第六、第七和第八章,为专题分析部分。本部分对中国银行业当前信用风险最突出的四个领域(产能过剩行业贷款、房地产行业贷款、地方政府融资平台贷款和理财业务)的发展动因和风险进行了较为全面深入的分析,揭示了商业银行开展上述业务的原因,以及上述业务面临的主要风险,并从商业银行的角度提出了风险化解对策。第四部分,包括第九章。从防范重点领域的信贷系统性风险、解决委托代理问题(内部人控制问题)角度提出了政策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 Commercial banks are enterprise operating in high-risk lending and deposit business, and its business risk has a strong conductivity and destructive, so they should always adhere to sound business philosophy. However, since the early eighties last century, several outbreaks of foreign banking crisis, many commercial banks went bankrupt in these crises. These banks existed widespread imprudent business behavior in operations. This article suggests that the Chinese commercial banks have strong credit expansion impulse. The root reason of credit expansion is the impulse of commercial bank executives, especially the "number one" president, political motivation and the control of insiders tend to develop aggressive business development plan, and through unreasonable assessment system into branches at all levels credit expansion impulse. Chinese commercial bank’s risk management system has not been fully realized vertical management, so it is difficult to ensure the independence of the risk management decision-making, and therefore can not suppress the urge to branches of credit expansion. Meanwhile, the bank’s risk management department insiders control led to structural imbalances in credit, and banks put in too much to risky real estate industry, local government in financing platform loans.In this paper, according to "find the problem-analysis the problem-solve the problem" mode, the logic of ideas gradually unfold. By summarizing the literature and principal-agent theory, this paper discoverer the existence of excessive credit expansion of commercial bank operations and risk propensity. Through the analysis this paper pointed out that Chinese commercial banks have strong credit expansion impulse, has its roots in commercial banking headquarters and senior management level (especially the "number one" governor) of internal control. Credit expansion impulses cause Chinese commercial banks put too much loans to the field of overcapacity industry, such as real estate, local government financing platform loans. In order to guard against and defuse Chinese commercial bank’s credit systemic risk, the paper separately from the operational level and corporate governance (including risk management framework) level gives some suggestions. This paper consists of four parts, a total of nine chapters. The first part includes Chapters I and II. The first chapter is an introduction, and it introduces the research background, purpose and significance, research framework and so on. The second chapter is a literature review. This chapter uses the previous research framework in moral hazard from bank shareholders. This paper from pro-cyclical credit, corporate governance structure, imperfect angles to analyze the reasons and excessive expansion of bank credit risk management.The second part includes chapters III and IV. Among them, the third chapter analyzes the use of principal-agent theory on bank’s "internal control" issues and moral hazard behavior, noting the special nature of Chinese commercial banks entrusted agency relationship. The fourth chapter analyzes the total amount of credit by commercial banks in China, the growth and structure, etc., indicate the presence of a strong Chinese commercial bank credit expansion impulse. The main reason Chinese commercial banks prefer bank credit expansion is senior tend to develop aggressive year business development plan, and issued to the branches through a set of evaluation index system. As the assessment on an annual basis, appraisal award to honor the end, while the loan is almost the indicators (such as profits, deposits, fee-based business, etc.) of the most critical means complete. Therefore, this assessment system led directly to the credit expansion impulse affiliates. Meanwhile, the bank’s risk management and market sector there are also "internal control" issues internal control risk management department who will lead the structural imbalance of credit, market sector insiders control the quality of credit assets will result in no real issues.The third part, including the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth chapter, thematic analysis section. This part analysis four most prominent areas of credit risk in the Chinese banking sector currently (industry overcapacity loans, real estate loans, local government financing platform loans and wealth management financial services) and the risk of developing motivation for a more in-depth analysis reveals the reasons the banks to carry out these operations, as well as the main risks faced by these businesses, and from the perspective of commercial banks The third part proposed risk mitigation countermeasures.The fourth part includes Chapter IX. This part makes some policy recommendations in guard against systemic risk from key areas of credit, and solves the principal-agent problem (internal control issues).更多还原