【作者】 张伟；

【导师】 田利辉；

【作者基本信息】 南开大学 ， 金融学， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 本文分别研究了新股发行制度变迁对IPO抑价的影响,以及政治关联、终极控股股东所有权结构对IPO长期回报的影响。首先,本文研究了监管市场化与IPO抑价的关系。中国证券市场渐进式改革所取得的经济绩效显著优于其他转轨经济体,有效地促进了证券市场的发展。上市公司的总市值、交易量和交易额逐年提高,融资规模及其效率明显增强,新股发行抑价率显著降低。结合我国一级市场制度变迁,本文运用供求分析框架,发现新股渐进市场化改革带来了发行规模逐步增大,发行定价逐步放松,IPO首日超额抑价逐渐降低。进一步地,我们实证检验了新股渐进式市场化改革所取得的绩效。本文发现,随着新股市场化改革的推进,审核制度与新股首日抑价率显著负相关且系数逐步减小,定价制度与新股首日抑价率显著正相关且系数逐步减小。在理论分析和实证检验相互支持的基础上,本文指出,以去行政化为核心的新股发行制度渐进式改革有效缓解了一级市场供求,极大地减小新股超额抑价,促进了证券市场的发展。新股渐进式改革是可行有效的。其次,本文研究了高管政治关联与新股长期回报的关系。在我国上市公司中,高管的政治关联普遍存在。董事长政治关联、董事长和总经理政治关联以及董事会政治关联分别为40%、46%和82%。以2001年至2008年在沪深证券交易所上市的A股公司为研究样本,本文分析了政治关联对新股长期表现的影响以及政治关联的作用机制。综述政治关联文献,我们提出了社会负担效应、产权保护效应和政府偏袒效应三大假说。我们发现,政治关联长期中显著增加了新股长期收益率,这种政治关联长期正回报主要来源于民营控股公司,而在国有控股公司中政治关联对新股长期回报率影响并不明显。这不同于Fan等(2007)政治关联引致IPO长期回报不佳的结论。进一步考察政治关联的作用机制,本文发现,国有控股公司中,政治关联在为企业带来更多偏袒的同时,也导致了更多的社会负担；民营控股公司中,政治关联不仅可以作为较差制度环境的替代机制保护私有产权,而且为民营企业带来了更多贷款、更长的贷款期限、更低的税负以及更多的政府补贴。我们认为,社会负担对公司业绩具有负面影响；产权保护营造了民营公司与国有公司公平竞争的市场环境,有利于资源配置的优化；而政府偏袒则扭曲了政治关联公司与无政治关联公司公平竞争环境,进而异化了我国企业的市场行为。最后,本文采集了2001至2008年在沪深交易所上市的527家公司,按照终极控制人将样本划分为政府控股公司和家族控股公司,研究了控制权现金流权分离(两权分离)与新股长期价值关系。研究发现,两权分离有利于家族股东实施利益侵占,而政府股东的两权分离与利益侵占关系不明显。这不同于Claessens等(2002)以及Fan等(2013)的研究结论,但却支持了本文提出的利益侵占假说、政府扶持假说以及家族隧道假说。通过分析两权分离作用机制,我们发现,民营公司两权分离导致控股股东利用关联交易、占用上市公司资金、减少资本支出等手段侵占其他股东利益,降低了上市公司价值。进一步地,我们分析了改善控股股东利益侵占的途径,发现高管持股比例、高管薪酬、分析师关注、股权制衡度等公司治理因素能够抑制控股股东对其他股东的利益侵占。我们认为,政府股东出于良善性动机出售股份,拉长了控制链条,释放了放松管制减少干预的信号,从而政府股东减少了利益侵占；而家族股东控制权与现金流权不匹配导致大股东以中小股东利益为代价,转移上市公司资源获取控制权私利,严重侵害了中小股东利益。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper investigates the relationship between incremental reform and extreme IPO underpricing, the effects of political connections of senior executives and the deviation of controlling shareholders on Post-IPO long term returns based on Chinese firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.First, we review the process of institutional reform in Chian’s IPO market. There are still some market distortions in China and IPO underpricing is up to181.6%on average during the past two decades. With theoretical analysis of supply and demand and empirical tests, our paper finds that the incremental reform made by the government can significantly reduce the degree of IPO underpricing. Relaxing the government control of supplies and pricing of new shares, the incremental reform is market-oriented and thus it is effective. In a nutshell, institutional change of primary market can promote financial development.Second, using the sample of561firms listed on shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in China from2001to2008, Developing Fan et al.(2007), we examine the effects of political connections in firms with different types of controlling shareholders on post-IPO long term performance. We find that political connections actually bring about better post-IPO performance in the long term in the firms controlled by the family shareholders, but not in the government-controlled firms. We further find that political connections in family-controlled firms are associated with better access to bank loans and tax rebates. We argue that political connections can be a substitute for property protection and even be a channel for government patronage under poor institutional environment.Third, we also investigate the influences of the deviation between control right and cash flow right of government-controlled and family-controlled firms sorted by types of the ultimate controlling shareholders on post-IPO long term returns. It is found that the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights has a negative effect for family-controlled firms, but the effects of deviation of cash flow rights from control rights is insignificant in government-controlled firms. The result is not fully consistent with Claessens et al.(2002) and Fan et al.(2013). Further, we document controlling shareholders in family-controlled firms expropriate other investors through such main channels as related party transaction, intercorporate loan, and capitial expendicture. In addition, it is evidenced that tunneling and moral hazard by controlling shareholder in family-controlled firms can be ameliorated through corporate governance mechanisms, such as managerial shareholding, managerial payment, analyst number following the IPO, and power balance.更多还原