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赖尔的行为主义研究
On Ryle’s Behaviourism
【作者】 刘君;
【导师】 李国山;
【作者基本信息】 南开大学 , 外国哲学, 2014, 博士
【摘要】 赖尔在《心的概念》中毫不讳言自己的心理学是行为主义的,但他的行为主义不同于传统的行为主义。首先,构成这个行为主义的基本概念如心灵、行为,并非我们已经熟知的那些概念。因此,其研究的身心关系属于另外一个领域,如要准确的表达这种关系,应是向性与智力行为的关系。其次,赖尔曾明确指出,向性的逻辑状态既非定言也非假言,所以不能用“语义行为主义”或“语言行为主义”来框定它。通常认为,他试图把关于向性的陈述还原为有关行为的假言命题,这种观点是错误的。再者,传统的行为主义是一种关于他心的认知理论,但赖尔的行为主义没有这种限定。至今延续下来的解释版本有“本体论或形而上学的行为主义”、“方法论的行为主义”、“折衷论的行为主义”等,它们仍存在各种疏漏和错误,且互相不能达成一致。历史教训说明,只有先确定与赖尔中期的哲学兴趣相符的问题域或心理学视野,才可能为行为主义做进一步定位。赖尔中期致力于建立一种常识的心理学以服务于哲学治疗,这种心理学在风格上介于胡塞尔现象学与实用主义之间,试图以心灵的给予性来消除一切二元对立与矛盾。《心的概念》的哲学兴趣表现为,试图集中处理两个彼此相关的问题,即传统行为主义深陷领域-范畴混淆的泥沼,如何能够实现一种哲学的治疗以及如何建立一种“哲学的行为主义”。赖尔的行为主义不仅具有方法论的意义,也具有本体论的意义。方法论的行为主义包括两个层面的内容,即由行为到心灵的验证和由心灵到行为的推论。传统行为主义将心灵的验证与事实的验证相等同,并在多数情况下以假定的物理过程替代推论层面的真实情况。为了实现两方面的治疗,赖尔以向性模型来揭示心灵验证的特殊逻辑,又以有关“知道怎样”的视野分析来澄清推论层面的事实。相应的本体论同时涉及世界本体论和心灵本体论。前者的基本观点为,世界只有一个,即生活世界,它以向性行为为基本单位,以行为的存在方式为自身的存在方式。后者的基本观点为,心灵不是实体,心灵的活动也不可被看作过程或事件。它作为行为的潜能,必定在世界之外。
【Abstract】 In The concept of mind, Ryle holds nothing back when he confess that his psychology is behaviouristic. However, his behaviourism is different from traditional behavourism. First, those basic concepts constituted this kind of behaviourism, such as "mind" and "behaviour", are not the same as those we have recognized. Therefore, the relationship between physical and mental which it attempt to investigate should belong to another field. And if to be exact, that is the relationship between disposition and intelligent behaviour. Second, Ryle had said that the logical state of disposition is neither categorical not hypothetical, so we cannot call it "semantic behaviourism" or "linguistic behaviourim" for framing. It is said that he intends to reduce all dispositional statements into hypothetical propositions, this view cannot be true. Last but not the least, traditional behaviourism is a sort of theory in its account of our standing of other minds, but Ryle’s behaviourism is not restricted in the same account. The explanatory versions which have continued till today, such as "ontological or metaphysical behaviourism", methodological behaviourism", Eclectic behaviourism" and so on, still have various omissions and mistakes. They also disagree with each others.We have learn from these historical lessons that, only by finding out the problem domain or the scope of psychology which fits with mid-Ryle’s philosophical interests can we positioning his behaviourism further. Mid-Ryledevoted to set up a psychological method of common sense for philosophical treatment. This psychological method attempt to clear up all sorts of opposition and conflict that dualism arouse, the style of which can be estimated between of Husserl’s phenomenology and pragmatism. The philosophical interests of TheConcept of Mind can be illustrated as that, it intends to deal with two interrelated questions:how to actualize a philosophical therapy for traditional behaviourism which has sunk deep into field-category mistake, and how to set up "philosophical behavourism".There is also further research suggesting that Ryle’s behaviourism has not only methodological significance but also ontological significance. The methodological behaviourism contains two main contents:validation of mind by behaviour, inference of behaviour by mind. The traditional behaviourism equates validation of mind with verification of fact and substitutes assumed physical process for the true situation at inference level. To meet the treatment needs of both sides, Ryle try to uncover the specific logic of validation by showing the model of disposition, and clarify the fact at inference level by analyzing the scope of "knowing how". Ontological behaviourism involves ontology of world and ontology of mind. The major viewpoints of the former can be concluded as follows. There is only one world exists. The one is the world of everyday life that, treating the dispositional behaviour as basic unit of which, as existence of behaviour as its existence. The major viewpoints of the latter can be concluded as follows. Mind is not entity, its activity cannot be recognized as occurrence or events. As potency of behaviour, it must lie outside the world.
【Key words】 Behaviourism; Philosophical psychology; Disposition; Phenomenology;