【作者】 李莉；

【导师】 王永海；

【作者基本信息】 武汉大学 ， 会计学， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 从证券市场建立伊始，证券监管机制和理论就伴随着不同的历史阶段发生着不断的变化。监管还是放任？成为证券市场发展中永恒的变奏曲。在1929年大危机之前，无论是英国政府还是美国政府，对于证券市场的态度是“自由放任（laissez-faire）”（Burk，1985）。1929大危机中充斥了投机、操纵、欺诈、骗局，使得政府不得不实施证券市场监管，以打击非法市场交易行为，维护投资者的利益。在此基础上，美国确定了以信息披露为主的监管机制——1933年证券法和1934年证券交易法。二战后，以美国为核心的西方资本主义国家进入战后的黄金发展阶段，纯粹的市场自由化思想占据主流，使得经济学家们开始质疑证券监管的必要性和有效性。以Stigler为代表的“修正主义者”甚至认为，“证券法导致了高额的成本支出而毫无收益可言”。在此基础上，各国政府逐步对证券领域放松了监管，相关金融创新产品和交易模式也开始层出不穷，最终导致了2008年的金融危机。金融危机之后，各国政府开始重新审视在全球化和电子通信技术高度发达的新的历史阶段，以信息披露制度为基石的证券监管的必要性与有效性。中国证券监管的历史也是如此，从开始简单的计划审批监管，到计划与注册相结合，最后借鉴欧美发达国家构建了以信息披露为核心的证券监管体系。然而，无论是中国证券市场初期的“宝延”事件，还是此后的“科龙”和“银广夏”事件，都说明中国证券市场的会计信息披露违规行为还是较为恶劣和猖獗的。同时，也对中国证券市场的会计信息披露体制提出了全新的思考。本文从法玛的有效市场假定处罚，结合博弈论，从静态双方博弈到动态双方博弈，从简单两方博弈到复杂多方博弈，建立了一个基于中国证券市场监管体制的多元化动态的会计信息违规披露博弈模型，，从逻辑动机上深入分析了中国上市公司为什么会选择采用违规行为进行会计信息披露，同时也从模型结构上明确了上市公司在何种情况下，考虑了那些利益因素才会进行行为选择。从两方到多方，从静态到动态，全面构建了在现有监管机制下上市公司信息披露的行为选择策略和逻辑路径，为实证分析和制度建设提供了有力的思想基础。在此基础上，笔者通过艰苦庞大的数据采集工作，见了从2000-2010年十年的会计信息披露违规处罚数据库，获取了近十年来因会计信息披露违规而受到处罚的所有上市公司公告及相关财务信息，并进行了全面的实证分析，通过对不同年度、不同市场的比较分析，充分剖析了中国证券市场会计信息披露违规的处罚特征、行为特征和动机要素分析，并建立了与处罚相关的线性回归分析函数。与此同时，本文还通过对处罚时间、重复违规、非正常收益率指标的分析，评价了近十年会计信息披露违规处罚的有效性。最后，根据博弈框架和实证分析的结论，对中国证券市场会计信息披露处罚机制存在的问题进行了全面梳理，并提出了行之有效的解决措施。更多还原

【Abstract】 From the stock market at the beginning of establishment, the securitiessupervision mechanism and theory with the different historical stages as happenedwith the constant change. Supervision or indulge? As the stock market developingeternal set of variations. In the1929years before the great crisis, whether the Britishgovernment or the U.S. government, for securities market attitude is "laissez-faire(laissez-faire)"(Burk,1985).1929great crisis are filled with speculation,manipulation, fraud and deception, making the government had to implement thesecurities market supervision to crack down on the illegal market transactions, andsafeguard the interests of investors. On this basis, the United States determinedmainly by information disclosure supervision mechanism-1933securities law and1934of the securities and exchange act. After the second world war, the United States,for the core of western capitalist countries into the postwar golden development stage,pure market liberalization thought occupies the mainstream, make economists beginto question the necessity of the securities supervision and effectiveness. Stigler to as arepresentative of the "revisionist" even think,"securities law led to high costs andthere is no income." On this basis, the governments of the securities field graduallyrelaxed regulatory, innovative products and related financial trading pattern alsobegan to emerge in endlessly, which eventually led to the2008financial crisis. Afterthe financial crisis, governments began to take a new look at globalization andelectronic communication technology in highly developed new historical stage, basedon the information disclosure system as the foundation stone of the necessity of thesecurities supervision and effectiveness.The China securities regulatory history also is so, from start simple plan forexamination and approval supervision, to plan and registration, and the combinationof the last European and American developed country for reference model withinformation disclosure as the core of the securities supervision system. However,neither the China securities market in the early years of the "treasure delay" events, or later "kelon" and "YinGuangXia" event, that shows that China’s securities marketaccounting information disclosure of the violations or more severe and rampant. Atthe same time, China securities market of accounting information disclosure system toput forward new thinking.This article from the Jordan Fama effective market assume that punishment,combined with the game theory, from the static two sides game to dynamic two sidesgame, from simple to complex game two party many game, set up a China securitiesmarket supervision system based on the diversity of the accounting informationdisclosure violations dynamic game model， from the logic of motivation deeplyanalyzes the listed company why using illegal conduct accounting informationdisclosure, and also from the model structure of the clear to appear on the marketcompany in what circumstances, consider the factors that will benefit for the behaviorchoice. From the two parties to many, from the static to dynamic, comprehensivebuilding on the existing regulatory mechanism of listed company informationdisclosure behavior selection strategy and logical path, for empirical analysis andsystem construction provides a strong ideological basis. On this basis, the author ofthe huge data acquisition work hard, saw from2000-201010years of accountinginformation disclosure with breaking the database, for nearly ten years for accountinginformation disclosure was punished illegal all listed companies and relatedannouncement financial information, and an empirical analysis, and through differentannual, analysis and comparison of the different market, fully analyzed the securitiesmarket accounting information disclosure of the punishment of the illegal behaviorcharacters and features, motivation factor analysis, and established a punishment ofrelated linear regression analysis function. At the same time, this paper also throughtime, repeated violations, punishment abnormal yield index analysis, evaluation fornearly ten years accounting information disclosure with breaking the effectiveness.Finally, according to the game framework and empirical analysis of the conclusion ofthe China securities market accounting information disclosure punishment mechanismthe existing problem of comprehensive comb, and took out the effective measures.更多还原