【作者】 黄伟；

【导师】 张卫国；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 企业管理， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 协同创新因能给企业带来有效利用外部优势创新资源、分担成本和风险、形成协同优势等诸多好处，成为了企业技术创新的重要方式。同时，协同创新也得到政府的大力支持。2013年11月党的十八届三中全会指出，要建立“产学研用”协同创新机制，促进企业成为创新主体。但是由于资金缺乏、逆向选择、利益分配不合理和道德风险等原因，协同创新的成功率一直不高。对于资金缺乏问题，我国政府以往一般采取直接财政资助模式对协同创新活动进行支持。然而，在该模式下，由于信息不对称和专业知识的缺乏，政府很难准确选出资助对象。因此，借助于创业投资公司在项目选择上的专门才能，由政府出资成立引导基金，并以此为杠杆撬动社会资本成立创新投资基金，对协同创新进行间接资助成为我国政府支持科技创新的重要模式。然而，从实际运作的情况看，虽然创新投资基金在创新项目选择及投资上拥有专业技能，取得了一定的成效，但因信息不对称带来的逆向选择等问题仍然没有从根本上得到解决。此外，产、学、研在合作过程中不按契约进行投入，通过减少投资甚至“搭便车”来获取不当利益的道德风险，以及合作收益的分配不合理等也是阻碍我国协同创新规模扩大和效率提升的重要因素之一。如何解决逆向选择、道德风险和利益分配不合理等问题，仍然是投资基金模式下协同创新成功运行的关键问题。针对逆向选择、道德风险和利益分配不合理导致我国协同创新成功率低下，甚至无法达成的问题，论文通过对协同创新中利益分配机制、对赌机制的研究，设计了协同创新中防范逆向选择和道德风险的激励机制，促使协同创新成员如实披露私人信息、提高创新投入，促进协同创新的成功，为投资基金、企业、科研机构、高校以及政府管理部门制定相关策略提供决策借鉴。论文主要研究内容如下：①解决逆向选择的协同创新对赌机制设计本部分由第3章“投资基金与企业协同创新对赌机制设计”构成。考虑创新企业计划实施一个市场前景好的创新项目，由于资金限制，创新企业希望寻求投资基金进行协同创新，通过构建创新企业与投资基金的对赌博弈模型，研究了创新企业如何通过对赌协议的设计，解决协同创新中因信息不对称导致的逆向选择问题，促进协同创新形成，并通过理论及仿真分析得出创新企业与投资基金协同创新的形成条件及最优对赌协议。②协同创新中合理的利益分配机制设计本部分由第4章“多委托-多代理下协同创新利益分配机制设计”、第5章“投资基金模式下协同创新讨价还价分配机制设计”组成。第4章考虑两家企业分别委托不同的外部独立机构开发新产品，且承包方之间由于存在着创新技术人员的沟通、交流或流动，或研发信息、技术的交换等导致的创新投资溢出，构建了存在投资溢出环境下的多委托-多代理协同创新模型，研究了创新发包方与承包方的合作决策，得出了发包方的最优合作策略以及承包方的最优创新投资策略，并在此基础上分析了投资溢出对承包方创新投入的影响。第5章考虑由于资本约束，企业将技术创新活动交给外部科研组织的同时，寻求与创新投资基金进行合作，由其出资参与协同创新，针对协同创新参与各方通过讨价还价进行合作及收益分配的本质特征，通过构建投资基金参与下的协同创新讨价还价合作博弈模型，研究了创新投资基金、企业及高校或科研机构间的分配策略，并分析了参与各方讨价还价能力等相关因素对分配策略的影响，并通过理论及仿真分析，得出了协同创新的最优分配方案。③协同创新中防范道德风险的利益分配机制及投资机制设计本部分由第6章“投资基金模式下协同创新利益分配及投资机制设计”构成。考虑企业将新产品开发活动以契约形式外包给创新承包方，且引入创新投资基金投资参与协同创新，构建了创新投资基金主导下的协同创新博弈模型，研究了创新投资基金如何通过协同创新利益分配机制及基金投资策略的设计，激励企业和创新承包方提高协同创新投入，提升协同创新投资规模和绩效，并通过理论和仿真分析得出了引导基金主导下协同创新最优分配机制和基金投资策略。论文具有以下理论和方法上的创新：①构建创新企业与投资基金的对赌博弈模型，研究了创新企业如何通过对赌协议的设计，解决协同创新中因信息不对称导致的逆向选择问题现有协同创新研究中，多是由信息劣势方采用信息甄别的方式，解决逆向选择问题。本文则考虑由信息优势方(即企业)采用信号传递的方式（即提出对赌协议），使投资基金确信自己传递的是真实私人信息，以此解决协同创新中的逆向选择问题，促进协同创新的形成，并通过理论及仿真分析得出创新企业与投资基金协同创新的形成条件及最优对赌协议。②分别构建存在基于投资溢出效应的多委托-多代理协同创新博弈模型，以及构建投资基金模式下的协同创新讨价还价合作博弈模型，设计出合理的协同创新利益分配机制，解决利益分配不合理问题考虑同一产品市场上有两家企业分别委托不同的外部研发组织开发同一新产品，且创新存在投资溢出效应，通过构建存在基于投资溢出效应的多委托-多代理协同创新博弈模型，设计出企业的最优合作及利益分配策略以及研发组织的最优创新投资策略，并在此基础上分析了投资溢出对承包方创新投入的影响；接着针对现有研究多采用Cournot或Stackelberg等非合作博弈分析协同创新合作博弈，以及现实中协同创新各方一般是通过讨价还价达成合作协议，通过构建投资基金模式下的协同创新讨价还价合作博弈模型，研究了创新投资基金、企业及研发机构间的分配策略，并分析了参与各方讨价还价能力等相关因素对分配策略的影响。③构建创新投资基金模式下协同创新博弈模型，设计出协同创新利益分配和分阶段投资机制，防范道德风险问题通过构建创新投资基金、企业、研发机构间的协同创新博弈模型，研究了创新投资基金如何通过协同创新利益分配机制及基金阶段性投资策略的设计，激励企业和创新承包方提高协同创新投入，提升协同创新投资规模和绩效，为基金、企业、研发机构间通过协同创新分阶段投资机制设计，防范企业和研发机构的道德风险提供新思路和新方法。更多还原

【Abstract】 Collaborative innovation brings many advantages for enterprises, such as superiorexternal resources, share costs and risks, synergy effects and so on. Therefore, it hasbecome the important mode of enterprises innovation. Meanwhile it gets supports fromgovernment. In The Third Plenary Session of the18th CPC Central Committee, it ispointed out that China should establish industry-university-institution-costumercollaborative innovation mechanisms to promote enterprises to become the main part ofinnovation.However, due to the lack of capital, adverse selection, unfair profit-sharing, andmoral hazard, the proportion of collaborative innovation succeeding is not high. As forthe lack of capital, Chinese government used to adopt direct financial funding model tosupport collaborative innovation. However, under this mode, due to informationasymmetry and the lack of expertise, it is hard for government to select the right project.Therefore, governments establishing funds of investment fund to attract social capitaland use the investment firms’ expertise in project selection, which is an indirect supportmode, has become an important mode of government supporting science andtechnology innovation.Though innovation investment fund has expertise in innovation project selection, itis still unable to completely solve adverse selection caused by information asymmetry.In addition, the moral hazard of industry, university and institution, such as reducinginvestment or “free ride”, and the unfair profit-sharing are the main factor hinderingthe scale expanding and efficiency improving of collaborative innovation. How to solvethe adverse selection, unfair profit-sharing and moral hazard is still a key issue tocollaborative innovation run successfully with investment fund.Aiming at the problems that adverse selection, moral hazard and unfairprofit-sharing causes low success rate of collaborative innovation, or even can not bereached, the paper studied how to design the incentive mechanisms such asprofit-sharing and valuation adjustment to prevent adverse selection and moral hazard,and make participant truthfully disclose their private information, raise innovationcommitment and promote the success of collaborative innovation. The result of thispaper provides a reference for investment funds, industries, research institutions,universities and governments making collaborative innovation decision. The main contents of this paper are as follows:①valuation adjustment mechanism for solving adverse selection in collaborativeinnovationThis section consists of chapter3"valuation adjustment mechanism design forcollaborative innovation between investment fund and industry". Considering anenterprise, who plans to invest an innovation projects with good market prospects, seeksa collaborative innovation with a capital fund due to the lack of capital, this chapterdeveloped a game model between innovation enterprise and capital fund to study howan innovative enterprise to solve the adverse selection in collaborative innovation due toasymmetric information through designing valuation adjustment mechanism. Thequalification for innovation enterprise and capital fund forming collaborative innovationand the optimal valuation adjustment mechanism is obtained through theoretical andnumerical analysis.②mechanism design for sharing profit fairly in collaborative innovationThis section consists of chapter4“profit-sharing mechanism design formulti-principal-multi-agent collaborative innovation” and chapter5“bargaingingprofit-sharing mechanism design for collaborative innovation with investment fund”.In chapter4, considering the two enterprises (outsourcers) individually cosign twoexternal independent agencies (suppliers) to develop a same new product, and there areinput spillovers due to the researchers’ communication, exchange or flow, or theexchange of technology information, a multi-principal and multi-agent R&Doutsourcing model with input spillovers is developed to study the R&D outsourcingpolicy of the outsourcers and suppliers. The optimal outsourcing policies of outsourcerand the optimal commitment policies of suppliers are obtained and the impact of inputspillovers on the commitment policies is analyzed.In chapter5, considering that due to the lack of capital, the enterprise not onlyconsigns innovation activities to an external research organization, but invite aninvestment fund to take part in the collaborative innovation, a bargaining game modelamong the enterprise, the research organization and the investment fund is presented tostudy their profit-sharing mechanism, according to the main characteristic ofcollaborative innovation, that is, the participants share profits through negotiation. Theeffects of the main parameters such as participants’ bargaining powers on theprofit-sharing mechanism are analyzed, and the optimal profit-sharing mechanism isobtained through theoretical and numerical analysis. ③profit-sharing mechanism for preventing moral hazard in collaborativeinnovationThis section consists of chapter6“the profit-sharing and investment mechanismfor collaborative innovation with investment fund”. Considering that an enterprise signa contract with a innovation supplier to outsource the new product developmentactivities to it, and invite a investment fund to join in collaborative innovation, a modelof collaborative innovation with investment fund is developed to study how theinvestment fund incentives the enterprise and the innovation supplier to raise theirinvestment in collaborative innovation through designing a reasonable profit-sharingmechanism. The optimal profit-sharing mechanism and the investment fund’sinvestment policy are obtained through theoretical and numerical analysis.The main distributions of this paper are as follows:①designed a valuation adjustment mechanism for collaborative innovationbetween the investment fund and the enterprise to solve adverse selection throughestablishing a game model between innovation enterprise and investment fundIn most of the existing collaborative innovation studies, the party of informationdisadvantage adopts information screening approach to solve adverse selection. In thispaper, the party of information superiority (enterprise) adopts signal transmission(proposing a valuation adjustment agreement) to make the investment fund believe theprivate information transmitted to it is true. As a result, the adverse selection is solvedand collaborative innovation is formed. The qualification of forming collaborativeinnovation and the optimal valuation adjustment agreement are obtain throughtheoretical and numerical analysis.②designed the collaborative innovation profit-sharing mechanisms to solve theproblem of unreasonable profit-sharing through respectively establishiing amulti-principal multi-agent collaborative innovation game model with input spilloversand a cooperative bargaining game model with investment fundFirstly, considering two enterprises individually consign two external independentresearch organizations to develop the same new products, and there are input spilloversin innovation, a multi-principal multi-agent collaborative innovation game model withinput spillovers is presented to find the optimal profit-sharing policy and the optimalinvestment policy of the research organization, besides, the effects of input spillovers onthe optimal investment policy are analyzed. Secondly, aiming at that the most existingresearches adopts non-cooperative game such as Cournot or Stackelberg to analyze collaborative innovation, which belongs to cooperative game, as well as the reality thatcollaborative innovation is generally formed through negotiation, a cooperativebargaining game model with investment fund is established to study the profit-sharingmechanism among the investment fund, the enterprise and the research organization,and analyze the effects of bargaining power of the parties on the profit-sharingmechanism.③designed the profit-sharing arrangement and phased investment mechanism incollaborative innovation to prevent the problem of moral hazard through establishingcooperative innovation game model with investment fundA collaborative innovation game model among the investment fund, the enterpriseand the research organization is developed to study how the investment fund incentivethe enterprise and the research organization to raise their investment and enhancecollaborative innovation investment scale and performance through designing theprofit-sharing mechanism and phased investment policy. The results of this chapterprovide new ideas and methods for preventing moral hazard of enterprises or researchorganizations through designing phased investment mechanism.更多还原