【作者】 陈思；

【导师】 陈刚；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 科学技术哲学， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 本文是对感受质及其所代表的意识主观性的考察,目的是为感受质的本体论地位、感受质和物理实在之间的关系及其认识论意义提出一种合理的解释,使之既能符合唯物主义的原则,又能保存自身的主观质性特征。本文以第一人称视角和第三人称视角为考察维度,系统论述了当代西方心灵哲学中的主流理论对感受质问题的争论。本文认为,只有使用第一人称视角和第三人称视角相结合的研究方法,才能为感受质的本体论地位和认识论意义提供合理的解释。本文首先对感受质进行基本介绍,然后论述物理主义、取消主义、功能主义、表征主义及其反对者对感受质的看法,再对感受质与意识研究的新思路进行说明,最后得出本文的结论。第一章考察了感受质研究的前史和当代界定,以及研究意识和感受质问题的两种视角。对感受质的探讨,最早可以追溯到古希腊哲学家德谟克利特,近代的洛克和莱布尼茨也都提出过对后世具有重要影响的观点。在当代西方心灵哲学中,感受质具有多种表达形式,如原始感觉、主观特性、现象意识等等,并且在不同的流派中,感受质一词也被赋予不同的含义。第一人称视角和第三人称视角是研究感受质与意识问题的两种维度,本章也分别对它们的意义进行了介绍和论述。第二章通过介绍经验鸿沟论证、说明鸿沟、蝙蝠论证等哲学论证以及取消主义对感受质的基本看法,揭示出感受质与物理实在之间存在的张力。在经验直觉的层面上,我们不能够否认感受质的存在地位,因为它直接关系到人类意识主观性的存在；在物理实在的层面,我们对事物的说明又不能够违背物理主义的基本原则。在关于感受质问题的物理主义和反物理主义争论中,产生了对知识与事实之间的混淆,即把对感受质的认识与感受质的本体论地位问题相互混淆起来。如果从第一人称视角描述感受质,我们获得的是对感受质的体验；如果从第三人称视角看感受质的本体论地位,则会发现它是一种神经活动。第三章论述了功能主义的基本主张及其对心理状态的评判标准,并指出对事物的因果描述并不能够全面揭示对象的本质。功能主义通过使用原因和结果的相关术语来描述心理状态；实际上并没有给予心灵充分的说明。在感受质问题上,功能主义把感受质定义为某种整体功能状态,它的基本主张是,如果两个主体具有相同的感觉输入和感觉输出,那么他们就必然具有相同的感受质,这种观点遭到感受质缺失论证和颠倒感受质论证的反驳。在感受质及其所代表的意识主观性问题上,功能主义的说明存在着先天的理论缺陷,这种缺陷源于对第一人称视角和第三人称视角的混淆。第四章论述了表征主义的基本主张及其对感受质的说明。表征主义对感受质的基本观点是,感受质由表征内容所决定,如果表征内容相同,那么感受质必然相同,如果表征内容不同,感受质也必然不同。颠倒光谱论证和颠倒地球论证对此进行了质疑和反驳。表征主义的说明范围能够涵盖一阶意义上的感受质,但是对高阶意义上的感受质,表征主义则不具有说服力,根本原因在于,高阶意义上的感受质在本质上涉及到意识的主观性问题,它与主体的第一人称视角紧密相关。第五章从神经科学、量子力学以及现象学的维度对感受质研究的成果进行了介绍。埃德尔曼从神经科学的角度证实了感受质的存在地位,把它看作是意识的组成部分,为说明感受质而提出了相关的神经动力学模型。量子力学与意识在基本概念和描述层次上都具有相通性,为研究意识和物质的关系问题提供了一个新的说明,并为解答感受质难题提供了有益的启发。现象学主张从第一人称视角对主体的感觉经验进行描述,这对于说明感受质及其所代表的意识主观性不无裨益。第六章首先从意识困难问题入手,对前文提到的几种主要观点进行了再反思,然后以附生性理论作为基础,用第一人称视角和第三人称视角相结合的方法,来说明感受质的本体论地位及其与神经活动的关系等问题,并表明本文的物理主义立场。在本体论意义上,感受质等同于大脑神经活动；在认识论意义上,感受质是从第一人称视角对大脑神经活动所引起的主观体验的认识。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper investigates qualia and the subjectivity of consciousness, its purpose is providing an explanation of the ontological and epistemological status of qualia, so that it will conform to the principles of materialism, and save their own subjective qualitative characteristics. We will discuss the debates of qualia in philosophy of mind from both the first person perspective and the third person perspective. This paper argues that only through combining the first person perspective and the third person perspective, could we explain the ontological and epistemological status of qualia reasonably.This paper firstly introduces qualia and the first person perspective and the third person perspective, then physicalism, eliminativism, functionalism, representationalism and their opponents’views on qualia, and then discuss the new studies on qualia and consciousness, at last come to the conclusion of this paper.The first chapter examines the history and contemporary definition of qualia, as well as two perspectives of study of qualia. Discussion on qualia could dated back to the ancient Greek philosopher Democritus, and Locke and Leibniz also raised important idea which impact on future greatly. In contemporary philosophy of mind, qualia has a variety of forms of expression, such as original feeling, subjective characteristics, phenomenon of consciousness, etc., and the word qualia has also been given different meanings in different point. The first person perspective and the third person perspective are two dimensions of study of qualia, and we will discuss their meanings and roles in this chapter.The second chapter discusses the experience gap argumentation, explanatory gap argumentation, bat argumentation, etc., and eliminativism’s views on qualia, revealing the tension between qualia and physical description. On the level of experience intuition, we can not deny the existence of qualia, because it is directly related to the existence of subjectivity of consciousness; on the level of physical description, we can not go against the basic principles of physicalism. The debate between physicalism and anti-physicalism results in a confusion between cognition and ontological status of qualia. If we describe qualia from the first person perspective, we get the qualitative experience of qualia; if we discuss the ontological status from the third person perspective, we will find that it is a neural activity.The third chapter discusses the basic ideas of functionalism and its standards on the psychological state, and points out that the causal description of the object can not reveal the nature of objects. Functionalism describe the psychological state through the related terms of cause and result, it does not actually give a sufficient explanation to mind. On the problem of qualia, functionalism defines qualia as a functional status, and it believes that if two subjects have the same input and output of sensory, then they necessarily have the same state of mind and qualia. This view was opposed by absent qualia argument and inverted earth argument. Because of the confusion of the first person perspective and the third person perspective, functionalism theory has congenital defects on qualia and the subjectivity of consciousness.The fourth chapter discusses the relation between qualia and representationalism. Representationalism insists that qualia are determined by representational contents. If the representational contents are the same, then the qualia will be inevitably the same, if the representational contents are different, then qualia will be different too. Inverted spectrum argument and inverted earth argument oppose this idea. Representational description can cover the range of qualia of first-order sense, but it can not explain qualia of high-level sense. The fundamental reason is that qualia of high-level sense involves the subjectivity of consciousness, it is closely related to the first person perspective of the subject.The fifth chapter discusses the research of qualia from neuroscience, quantum mechanics and phenomenology. Edelman affirms the ontological status of qualia from the dimension of brain science, takes the relationship between whole and part as the reason of the existence of qualia. Quantum mechanics and consciousness have similarities on the level of the basic concepts and descriptions, it provides a new explanation for the relationship between consciousness and matter, and it is helpful to understand qualia. Phenomenology advocates the description of subjective experience from the first person perspective, which is not without benefits for understanding qualia and the subjectivity of consciousness.In the chapter six, we will begin with the hard problem of consciousness, taking the theory of supervenience as basis and combination of the first person perspective and the third person perspective methods as method to explain qualia, and show that our standpoint of physicalism. In the ontological sense, qualia is equivalent to neural processes of the brain; in the epistemological sense, qualia is cognition of subjective experience caused by neural processes of the brain from the first person perspective.更多还原