【作者】 易涛；

【导师】 黄文杰；

【作者基本信息】 华北电力大学 ， 技术经济及管理， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 大型复杂的工程项目是一个复杂的巨型系统,其空间跨度大,项目参与方众多,项目性质复杂,涉及的专业广,且项目实施过程中面临的不确定性因素的数量和种类繁多,从而增大了项目建设和管理的风险。在工程项目建设过程中,费用控制的重要性毋庸置疑。几乎所有的业主都想“低价买入”,几乎所有的承包商都想“高价卖出”,因此,业主与承包商存在着博弈关系。业主与承包商往往是通过签订合同来进行工程费用的管理与控制。费用控制的水平随着现代工程技术经济分析与管理科学的发展而不断提高。本文针对大型复杂的工程项目,立足业主的角度,基于工程费用控制,在兼顾工程质量和工期目标的前提下,研究业主如何通过激励参与工程建设的设计承包商、施工承包商、监理单位,使他们在项目实施的过程中与业主共担项目风险,形成“利益相互依存”的共同体,从而有效控制工程费用。本文主要研究内容如下：(1)探讨了业主在工程费用控制中对工程建设过程的各承包商(包括设计承包商、施工承包商和监理单位)实施激励的意义,对国内外学者在激励理论与应用研究方面的成果进行了综述,并明确了论文的研究方法、研究内容、技术路线和创新点。(2)对工程费用控制相关的激励理论进行了研究,指出了工程费用的形成机理及过程控制目标；探讨了激励的概念,介绍了激励理论的历史发展,研究了内容型激励理论和过程型激励理论在费用控制中的应用；给出了工程费用控制中的激励理论,包括期望效用理论、委托代理理论和博弈论,为论文的研究奠定了理论基础；最后提出了工程费用控制中进行激励机制设计的理念和依据。(3)基于期望效用理论,研究了业主在工程费用控制中对设计承包商的激励机制设计与模型构建。论述了对设计承包商的激励管理应贯穿于工程建设的设计和施工阶段,给出了设计承包商激励指标选取与评定的依据,并选取了设计概算、设计进度、技术可靠和设计服务四个激励指标来评定设计承包商的工作；针对这四个激励指标,运用泰勒的科学管理方法确定设计承包商奖惩的金额；根据弗鲁姆的期望效用理论,以期望激励强度最大化为目标确定奖惩基本点,以此来构建成本加激励费的激励合同；最后,建立了奖惩激励模型,并给出了模型的求解步骤和分析方法。(4)分析了施工阶段信息不对称条件下业主费用控制的特点,研究了业主对施工承包商的激励机制设计与模型构建,给出了激励指标的选择与评定方法,并确定工程成本和工期为激励指标；基于委托代理理论,建立了以工程成本为唯一激励指标的单因子激励模型,并给出了模型的求解步骤和分析方法；在设定工程质量满足既定标准的前提下,以工程成本和工期同时作为激励指标,在用线性函数和非线性函数表示直接费与工期相互关系的基础上,分别建立了对施工承包商的线性与非线性双因子激励模型,并给出了基于遗传算法的模型求解步骤和分析方法,最后给出了模型参数的解释和模型的应用方法。(5)为保证业主在工程费用控制中对施工承包商激励的有效性,论文利用博弈论的相关知识和理论,研究了业主、施工承包商、监理单位三者之间的博弈关系,对不雇佣监理单位、雇佣监理单位且监理单位没有接受合谋的可能、施工承包商与监理单位存在合谋的三种情况,分别建立了无合谋博弈模型和防合谋动态博弈模型,给出了模型求解步骤和分析方法,提高了业主在费用控制中的激励有效性。(6)实证研究。结合某大型火力发电厂工程建设的实际数据,验证了业主对设计承包商、施工承包商和监理单位的激励机制设计和建模方法；根据已经确定的激励指标和建立的激励模型计算出相关的激励参数,完成了对合同激励条款的设计,验证了本文研究内容的科学性、有效性、合理性和实用性。更多还原

【Abstract】 Large and complex engineering projects is a complex giant system with large span, numerous project participants, complex nature, wide range of professional and huge quantity and variety of uncertainties in the implementation stage, which greatly increased the risk of project construction and manangement. In the process of construction, the importance of cost control is without doubt. Almost all owners want to "purchase at a low price", however, at the same time, almost all contractors want to "sell at high price". Therefore, the game relationship exists between the owners and contractors. The owner and the contractor often manage and control the project cost by signing the contract. The level of cost control continuously improves with the advancement of modern economic analysis and management science. The incentive mechanism is researched in this paper, based on large and complex projects and on the prospect of the owners, to motivate the design contractors, construction contractors and consulting contractors, with whom "benefit community" is formed in order to control project costs on the premise of the guarantee of project quality and duration target. The main contents are as follows.(1)This paper discusses the owners’cost control incentive significance for the contractors (including design contractors, construction contractors and consulting contractors) of the project in the construction process. Then it summarizes the incentive theory and the applied research achievement of domestic and foreign scholars and clears the research methods and the content of the paper. After that the paper expounds the corresponding research schemes and innovation.(2)Based on the expounding of the incentive basic theories and knowledge related to engineering cost control, this paper points out the formation mechanism and process control objectives of such cost; The paper also explores the concept of incentives, introduces historical development of incentive theory, discusses the content type and procedural type of incentive theory; In order to establish the theoretical foundation for the research, the paper gives three incentive theories in engineering cost control, including the expected utility theory, agency theory and game theory; Finally it concludes incentives mechanism design concept and basis in engineering cost control.(3)Based on the expected utility theory, the paper studies the design and modeling of incentive mechanism for design contractor during engineering cost control process of the owners. After expounding the cost control during the design phase of the construction, the paper gives the basis of incentive index selection and evaluation for the design contractors, and selects the design budget, design schedule, reliable technology and design services to assess the contractors’ design work; According to these four incentive indicators, the paper uses the Taylor’s scientific management methods to determine the reward or punishment amount of design contractors; In the light of Vroom’s expectancy theory, this paper chooses the maximum point of the expected incentive strength as the reward basic point. Using such methods, this paper creates a cost plus incentive fee contract; then it builds a reward incentive model and gives the solving steps and analytic methods of the model.(4)After the analysis of the characteristics of cost control under the condition of asymmetric information and the studying of the modeling and design of incentive mechanism for the construction contractors, the selection and evaluation method of incentive index is demonstrated in the paper, which sets the project cost and the duration of the project as incentive indicators. A single factor incentive model is established with the project cost as the only incentive factor, based on principal-agent theory, and the solving steps and methods of analysis models of which are written in the paper.After using the linear and nonlinear function to describe the relationship between direct cost and time limit, the model of linear and nonlinear double factor for the construction contractors incentive model are established respectively on the premises of the guarantee of project equality and setting project cost and duration both as incentive indexes. Steps and methods of analysis are demonstrated in the paper based on the model of genetic algorithms. The explanation of model parameters and application methods are also written in the paper.(5)In order to ensure the effectiveness of incentive toconstruction contractors, the game relationship among the owners, construction contractors, consulting contractors with the knowledge of the game theory. No conspiracy game model and dynamic game model of anti-collusion is established,according to the cases of not hiring consultants, the rejection of collusion by contractors and collusion between construction contractors and consultants respectively. Procedures and analytical methods for solving model are demonstrated in the research. The effectiveness of cost containment of owners is improved accordingly.(6)Case study. The owner incentive mechanism for the design contractor, construction contractors and consulting contractors designing and modeling method is verified combined with the actual data of a large thermal power plant construction project. The related contract terms of incentive is designed based on the identified incentive indicators and the calculated parameters according to established incentive model.更多还原