【作者】 岳蓉；

【导师】 张卫东；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 西方经济学， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 在现代经济中,风险投资展现出日益突出的作用。新的公司、新的技术和新的产品,甚至新的行业,很多时候都与风险投资的支持与推动分不开。中国自上世纪80年代中期就引入风险投资,近三十年来取得了长足的进展。但由于各种原因,中国风险投资行业的仍处于发展的初期阶段,相关政策法规有待完善,募资渠道和资金来源相对有限,退出通道也有待多元化,更重要的是,风险投资机构的运作机制存在进一步完善的空间,这些都是影响风险投资业进一步发展的因素。本文运用信息经济学、新制度经济学的合约理论与组织理论,对中国风险投资的运行机制进行了分析,得出了一些重要的结论。首先,关于风险投资的组织模式,目前国外主要有公司制、有限合伙制与信托制三种形式,其中有限合伙制占重要地位,而国内则以公司制为主。针对国内大多数人主张大力发展有限合伙制的观点,作者认为,公司制与合伙制各有短长,允许它们相互竞争,通过竞争完成进化,是政府应采取的基本态度。根据笔者的经验,升级型公司制可以较好地综合有限合伙制与公司制各自优势,同时可以在一定程度上避免二者的缺陷。但这种制度的有效运行依然需要相应的制度环境,依然需要在与其他组织的竞争中发展。其次,关于风险投资的融资机制,针对目前中国风险投资融资渠道单一且主要来自政府及政府控制的国有企业之现状,提出政府的资金在风险投资发展的初期可以起引导和辅助作用,发挥“诱导效应”,但风险投资的真正运行主体应该是市场主体,因为风险投资本质上是对市场机会的一种运用。而通过市场来筹集资金,需要根据市场主体的偏好,设计其最大化的合约安排,发掘潜在的交易机会,实现分工与专业化的利益。因此,加强对民间投资主体的培育,通过多样化的合约安排开辟多元化的筹资渠道是风险投资发展的应有之义。第三.关于风险投资的决策机制,作者在描述风险投资项目选择的程序的基础上,重点讨论了风险投资的评估体系,在改造AHP模型的基础上,构建了灰色多层次评估模型,提供了评估风险投资项目的风险与收益的依据。论文同时揭示了目前投资决策环节存在的决策成本过高、专业人才匮乏和尽职调查不够等缺陷。第四,关于风险投资的资金运用监管问题,本文在委托-代理理论的基础上,说明了风险投资基金加强投资后管理而不是干预决策的重要性,在此基础上把创业投资后管理活动分为监控活动和增值活动两部分,其中,创业投资家的监控活动包括监控财务状况、监控市场营销状况、监控股权变动、监控CEO的报酬、监控追加借款等；增值活动包括制定战略计划、充当管理团队的参谋、招募CEO或CFO等高层管理人员、招募新员工、联系潜在客户、组建有效运行的董事会、运作管理等。作者特别以早期项目为例,说明了从项目选择到退出的整个管理过程。第五,关于风险投资的退出机制,作者重点讨论了风险投资在退出环节遇到的三个重要问题：退出时间、退出价格和退出方式,作者分析了选择最佳退出时间,协商退出价格和决定退出方式时要考虑的重要因素,特别强调创业投资应该应用多种退出渠道相互配合、灵活运用。创业投资在整个运作过程中处处存在风险,而市场中投机机会的增多也使得创业投资不能及时退出的代价增大；由于创业投资退出是以回收资本、实现增值为最终目的,因此在实现退出时不能拘泥于某一种形式,应该针对不同的情况采取积极灵活的退出决策,减少退出风险。最后,作者根据前面关于风险投资组织形式、融资机制、决策机制、监管机制和退出机制的分析,得出了优化我国风险投资运行机制的政策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 Venture capital plays increasingly prominent role in modern economy. Startup companies, creative technologies, innovative products, and even brand-new industries, mostly are inseparable from the support and driven of the venture capital. Since its introduction to China in the mid-1980s, venture capital has made considerable progress during the past three decades. However, due to various factors, the development of venture capital industry in China is still in the early stage:the relevant policies and regulations need to be improved, the fund-raising channels and capital resources are relatively limited, the exit channels are not smooth enough, and so on. In addition to above mentioned problems existing in macroeconomic policies and industrial environment, the operational mechanism of venture firms is remain to be researched and improved, all these factors affect the further development of the venture capital. Utilizing contract theory and organization theory of information economics and new institutional economics, this disstertation analyzes the operational mechanism of venture capital industry in China, and draws some important conclusions.First of all, at present there are three forms of organizational structure for venture capital firms:corporation, limited partnership and trust. While the form of limited partnership dominates overseas, corporation takes main stream domestically. Different from the majority point of view in the domestic that advocating the development of limited partnership system, the author thinks that, either form of corporation or limited partnership has its own advantages. The government should allow healthy competition between them to achive their organic and orderly evolution. Based on the author’s experience, advanced corporation has both the advantages of traditional corporation and limited partnership, and at the same time, avoid their possible drawbacks. However, necessary regulations are needed to safeguard the smooth running of this advanced corporation form. And the same is ture about necessary competions against other forms.Secondly, about financing and funding options of venture capital firms, in view of the fact that current financing channel of venture capital in China is single and mainly through the government and state-owned enterprises controlled by government, the author suggests that the government play a guiding and supporting role in the early stage of the development of venture capital investment industry to trigger the "induced effects", while at the same time the actual operational platform for the venture capital should be the open market as venture capital investment is essentially an utilization of market opportunities. And to raise funds through the market, it is necessary to follow the preferences of market participants, design contract arrangement to maximize their payoffs, explore potential profitable business opportunities, and realize the benefits of specialization and professionalism. Therefore, the meaning of the development of venture capital investment industry should be strengthening the education for private investors and creating diversified financing channels for them through a variety of contractual arrangements.Thirdly, about decision-making mechanism of venture capital, the author focuses on investment related evaluation system after a description of project selection procedures, constructs a Gray Multilevel Evaluation model based on the transformation of the AHP model, and provides a basis to assess the risks and returns of targeted projects. The essay also reveals the strategic decision-making such as high decision-making costs, lack of professional personnel and insufficiency of due-diligence investigation.Fourthly, about supervision of invested venture capital, based on Principal-agent theory, the essay illustrates importance of post-investment financial management rather than the intervention of investment decision for invested projects. Furthermore, post-investment management can be categorized into supervising activities and value-adding activities. The supervising activities conducted by investors include the supervision of cash/account management, marketing, change of ownership, compensation for CEO and financing. The value-added activities include planning corporate strategies, consulting of management issues, recruiting senior management, contacting potential customers, establishing an effective board and others. The author takes early-stage investment as an example to illustrate the process form project selection to exit.Fifthly, about exit strategy, the author mainly discusses three important issues:exit timing, exit pricing and exit manners. Key factors of how to choose the best exit time, negotiate exit price, and choose exit manners are revealed and analyzed. The author also emphasizes that investors should select different exit manners and channels depending on specific situation. Risk is everywhere during the whole process of investment. With more and more speculative investment opportunities in the market, the risk will grow bigger without timely exit. The ultimate goal of venture capital investment is to recover the invested capital and gain of added value, therefore investors should consider various exit manners and policies to reduce risk.Finally, based on the analysis of venture capital firm’s organizational form, financing and funding options, decision-making mechanism, regulatory environment and exit strategies, the author offers the policy recommendations to optimize operational mechanism of venture capital investment in China.更多还原