【作者】 吴昌林；

【导师】 罗云峰；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 系统工程， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 近年来，我国的权力腐败问题呈现出愈演愈烈的趋势。权力腐败使得社会矛盾越来越尖锐，政府的公信力受到考验，党的纯洁性受到腐蚀，国家的长治久安受到了影响。公权寻租所带来的利益，是权力腐败的原动力。要维持国家的长治久安，营造公平、公正、公开的社会环境，必须祛除权力腐败，为此需要制定祛除权力腐败的相关对策。因此，对公权寻租竞赛问题进行研究，能够为防公权寻租机制设计提供政策指导，具有重要的理论意义和实际价值。论文通过构建基于竞赛理论的公权寻租竞赛模型，研究了监督机制运行效率、监督成本收益比以及对出租人的惩罚力度对公权寻租竞赛均衡的影响，在此基础上，探讨了公权寻租竞赛的相关性质、不完全信息公权寻租竞赛、存在转包的不完全信息公权寻租竞赛以及可投资的公权寻租竞赛的均衡。首先，论文建立了公权寻租竞赛的一般模型，证明了公权寻租竞赛模型Nash均衡的存在性，给出了公权寻租竞赛的一般性结论。结论表明：寻租者的努力水平和监督者对奖励的分配行为是否进行检查有关，和出租人的行为无关；对出租人的惩罚力度并非越大越好，只需要保持在一个合理的范围内即可，当惩罚力度达到一定的程度时，继续加大对出租人的惩罚力度只会使监督者变得更加懒惰，而浪费的社会资源如何变化却是不确定的；加大对监督者进行奖励的力度、提高监督机制运行的效率和信息的透明度，增大寻租行为被发现的概率，减小监督成本可以降低出租人选择接受寻租者努力水平的概率，降低社会资源的浪费。其次，论文对公权寻租竞赛的相关性质进行了分析。结论表明：当公权寻租竞赛博弈是对称的、对出租人的惩罚与总寻租努力水平成正比且惩罚系数小于监督的收益成本比时，公权寻租竞赛博弈只存在唯一且对称的Nash均衡，且该公权寻租竞赛满足线性等价性；当公权寻租竞赛博弈是对称的，且在均衡处，寻租者关于另一个寻租者的反应函数取极大值时，该公权寻租竞赛满足动态一致性。论文接着对不完全信息公权寻租竞赛问题进行了研究，分析估价差异以及寻租者类型的相关性对公权寻租竞赛均衡的影响。所得结论表明：监督者对高类型寻租者的影响大于低类型寻租者的影响，能使低类型寻租者的处境变得相对好一些，高类型寻租者的处境变得相对差一些，即监督者可以在一定程度上抹平寻租者能力的差异；寻租者类型的正相关性越强，寻租竞赛的竞争越激烈，反之，寻租竞赛的竞争就越温和。论文还对存在转包的不完全信息公权寻租竞赛问题进行了研究。所得结论表明：高类型寻租者付出的寻租努力水平有可能比低类型寻租者付出的寻租努力水平要高，也有可能比低类型的寻租者付出的寻租努力水平要低；两种类型寻租者付出的寻租努力水平差异与寻租者类型的相关性成正比，即寻租者类型的正相关性越强，不同类型寻租者付出的寻租努力水平的差异越大。最后，论文对可投资的公权寻租竞赛问题进行了研究。所得结论表明：虽然寻租者仍然会进行投资以提高自身的寻租能力，但是寻租者进行提高寻租能力的投资不会提高寻租者的相对寻租能力，也不会降低寻租者的寻租努力水平。该结论表明在公权寻租中，增加一些反映寻租者能力的评价指标，设计更加复杂的程序可以提高寻租者的寻租能力，但却并不能降低寻租者的寻租努力。因此在防公权寻租竞赛机制设计中，通过增加评价指标的方法来降低寻租者的寻租努力水平的方法是不可取的。论文对全文进行了总结并提出了有待进一步研究的问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years, the problem of power corruption in China has become more and more serious. Power corruption has made social contradictions increasingly acute, put the Government’s credibility to the test and sully the purity of the Communist Party, which will affect the country’s long-term stability. The benefits of public rights rent-seeking are the driving forces of power corruption. To maintain the stability of the State and to create a fair, just and open social environment, we must take the corresponding countermeasures to eliminate power corruption. Therefore, the study on public rights rent-seeking contest can provide the policy guidance for designing the mechanism to prevent public rights rent-seeking, which is of great theoretical significance and practical value.Based on contest theory, the public rights rent-seeking contest model is constructed to study the running efficiency of oversight mechanism, the oversight cost-to-income ratio and the impact of the rent seeker punishment level on public rights rent-seeking contest balance. In addition, the related nature of public rights rent-seeking contest, the incomplete information public rights rent-seeking contest, the existent subcontract incomplete information public rights rent-seeking contest and the balance of the investment public rights rent-seeking contest are explored.First of all, a general model of public rights rent-seeking contest is established to prove the existence of Nash equilibrium of public rights rent-seeking contest model and draws a general conclusion of public rights rent-seeking contest. The conclusion shows that:The contestant’s effort level is related to the awards granted by the supervisor but has nothing to with the rent seeker’s behavior. The punishment for the rent seeker is not the more severe the better but should be maintained within a reasonable range. When the punishment reaches a certain degree, the more severe punishment for the rent seeker will make the supervisor lazier, whereas the change of the wasted social resources is indeterminate. By increasing the awards for the supervisor and improving the running efficiency of the mechanism and the information transparency, the disclosure probability of rent-seeking behavior will be increased. Reducing the oversight costs can reduce the rent seeker’s the probability of selecting and accepting the contestants’effort level and then reduce the waste of social resources.Secondly, the related nature of public rights rent-seeking contest is analyzed and proves that:If public rights rent-seeking contest game is symmetric, and the punishment for the rent seeker is proportional to the total rent-seeking effort level and the punishment coefficient is less than oversight revenue costs, the public rights rent-seeking contest game will merely exist the only and symmetric Nash equilibrium, and the public rights rent-seeking contest will meet the linear equivalence theorem. If public rights rent-seeking contest game is symmetric and in balance, and the contestant attains the maximum value of another contestant’s reaction function, the public rights rent-seeking contest will meet the dynamic consistency.Then the incomplete information public rights rent-seeking contest is explored, analyzing the impact of valuation differences as well as the rent-seeking type on public rights rent-seeking contest balance. The conclusion indicates that:The impact of the supervisor on the high type contestant is greater than the low type contestant, making the situation of low type contestant better, and high type contestant somewhat worse, that is, the supervisor can eliminate the capacity differences of different contestants to some degree. The stronger the positive correlation of the contestant is, the fiercer the rent-seeking competition becomes, and vice versa.Furthermore, the existent subcontract incomplete information public rights rent-seeking contest is analyzed. The conclusion shows that:the high type contestant may pay much more or less efforts than the low type contestant; the effort level differences of the two types of contestants are proportional to their type correlation, that is, the stronger the positive correlation of contestant type is, the larger the efforts level differences paid by different type contestants will become.Finally, the investment public rights rent-seeking contest is investigated. The conclusion shows that:Although the contestants still make investments to improve their rent-seeking ability, the investments will not increase or reduce the contestants’ rent-seeking effort level. That is to say, in terms of public rights rent-seeking, adding some evaluation indicators which can reflect the contestants’capacity and designing more complex programs can increase the contestants’rent-seeking ability, but can not reduce their rent-seeking efforts. Therefore, in designing the mechanism to prevent public rights rent-seeking, it is not desirable to reduce the contestants’rent-seeking effort level by adding the evaluation indicators.The last part of the dissertation makes a summary and raises some issues for further research.更多还原