【作者】 岳敏；

【导师】 赵德武；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 会计学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 2008年,美国次贷危机引爆了自上世纪30年代以来全世界最为严重的经济和金融危机,持续性长,波及面大,破坏性强。危机爆发后,各大企业,尤其是金融企业高管人员仍然领取天价的薪酬现象成为当时舆论关注的热门话题,并为上至总统下至普通老百姓所指责。为此,欧美西方发达国家陆续发布了加强企业高管人员薪酬监管的政策规定。同时,国内也掀起了对国有企业、股份制企业、金融、地产等行业高管人员薪酬水平的普遍质疑和批评,国家有关部门也出台了指导意见。在后金融危机时代,国有企业高管人员的薪酬问题,特别是中央国有企业高管人员的薪酬问题越来越受到社会的普遍关注。构成国有企业高管人员激励机制设计的核心是“如何设计最优的国有企业高管人员报酬”。如何设计和制定中国国有企业高管人员的报酬机制,使之不断改进和完善,成为当前我国国有企业改革的重大课题之一,本文研究的根本立足点也在于此。但是,纵观全球,国有企业经营效益较差是一个普遍性的现象,如何提升国有企业的业绩,使之发挥其应有的支柱作用,则成为世界各国普遍高度重视的重大问题。根据经济合作与发展组织(0ECD)成员国的经验表明,一个好的公司治理结构是国有企业经营效益提升的先决条件,而国有企业高管人员的激励机制,又是建立有效的国有企业公司治理机制的核心制度之一。在深入研究我国国有企业现有高管人员激励机制的基础上,如何建立适合我国国情的国有企业有效的公司治理机制,对于丰富国有企业高管人员激励机制的理论,和推动国有企业改革成功,都具有重要的理论和实践意义。确定这个命题后,该选择什么样的研究角度呢?为了保证对国有企业的高度控制权,确保国民经济的安全与平稳运行,我国政府一直对国有企业高管人员的人事任命、报酬等诸多方面实施高度的管制,从而导致了国有企业高管人员报酬激励机制呈现出一些与西方激励理论相背离的现象和结果。因此,结合我国国有企业高管人员面临的制度环境,本文着重从以下两个维度(显性激励机制和隐性激励机制)三个方面进行了研究：第一,高管人员短期货币报酬激励效应。对我国国有企业高管人员激励机制而言,货币薪酬是短期性激励的一种手段。从现有公司治理研究看,高管人员的短期性货币薪酬激励水平一般与企业的业绩具有高度的敏感性。这部分的研究重点是考察了两者之间的关联性。短期货币报酬激励是显性激励机制之一。第二,高管人员长期股权报酬激励效应。长期股权报酬激励机制,是当前国内外高管人员报酬机制的另外一种重要的形式,长期股权报酬激励机制同样存在于我国国有企业高管人员激励机制设计中。这部分的研究重点是考察了这一机制与业绩之间的敏感性。长期股权报酬激励效应是显性激励机制之二。第三,高管人员政治激励效应。与西方国家国有企业高管人员普遍来自于职业经理人市场的环境不同,我国国有企业高管人员更多来自于政府的行政性任命,高管人员的更替与政府目标的实现可能存在一定的关联性；而高管人员的政治仕途升迁,也成为高管人员显性报酬激励的一种可能的替代。所以,这些政治激励机制往往作为一种隐性激励机制,成为我国国有企业高管人员激励制度的一大特色。本文以数据实证和案例实证两种形式研究了这一特殊的激励形式。它属于隐性激励机制。本文上述三个方面的研究内容立足于超过一半的上市公司中存在国有控股股东这一国情背景,认为控股股东差异决定了上市公司高管人员激励方式的差异,进而决定公司绩效。通过比较不同控股公司,不同激励机制的公司激励—绩效敏感性,本文对当前我国国有企业高管人员的有效激励机制进行了深入研究,得出了以下结论：(1)短期货币性报酬激励依旧是我国国有企业高管人员重要的激励手段之一,但由于受到薪酬管制的外部政策性约束,其激励效力弱于非国有企业。(2)长期股权报酬激励机制是我国国有企业很少采用的激励机制,这一机制至今未发挥出显著性的效力。(3)政治激励是国有企业重要的激励机制之一,这种激励机制弥补了受到薪酬管制导致高管人员货币性薪酬激励效力的不足,在国有企业,特别是中央国有企业高管人员激励中发挥着更加显著的作用。本文的创新性与贡献主要体现在以下三个方面：(1)提出了我国国有企业高管人员多元激励机制的独特模式。当前,国内现有关于高管人员激励机制的研究,多以西方激励理论为基础,缺乏对高管人员需求的具体性和阶段性的准确把握。本研究则在现有显性激励机制的基础上,提出了我国制度背景下的政治激励机制的路径,即在我国薪酬管制和国有企业产权问题缺陷的模式下国有企业高管人员面临的实际显性激励机制效力不足的情况下,政治激励实际上是现有显性激励机制的一个有效补充,为以后的相关研究奠定了基础。(2)分析了我国国有企业高管人员的实际政治诉求现状。本研究在薪酬与业绩组合的一般激励模型的基础之上,引入了政治激励变量,并将高管人员的控制权进一步细分为显性控制权与隐性控制权。通过实证研究表明,国有企业高管人员由于拥有与政府行政权力之间的双向自然流动,因此,将政治公权力的追求作为其显性激励受到压制下的备选方式,这种政治诉求在中央大型国有企业中尤为明显,本文证实政治激励是国有企业高管人员显性激励机制的有效替代激励机制。(3)研究了多种激励机制之间的相互关系。基于国有企业特殊的产权背景和管理模式,国外以物质激励为重要研究方向的传统研究范式在我国受到限制。本文依据国有企业高管人员多种个人需求研究了除显性激励外的一种重要隐性激励的效果,验证了政治激励机制是隐藏在传统显性激励机制下的重要补充激励机制。本文研究表明,要加强国有企业高管人员的激励效力,应从改善内部治理结构和改善外界制度环境两方面同步入手,双管齐下。合理的内部治理机制是公司治理的基础,建立包含激励、监督和选聘三方面机制的公司内部制衡制度是我国国有企业公司治理的核心问题之一。只有存在有效的激励、监督和选聘机制,高管人员才能积极履行职责,才能自觉地努力实现股东价值最大化力。同时,内部治理机制唯有在外部制度的作用下才能真正发挥效力。外部市场的制度性约束是推动公司改进和完善治理结构的强大动力。因此,加强公司外部治理市场的培育,包括公司控制权市场和职业经理人才市场,降低政府管控水平和弱化高管人员的行政任命程度,是实现国有企业高管人员激励机制的重要手段。更多还原

【Abstract】 In2008, subprime crisis broke out in USA, that triggered the world’s most serious economic and financial crisis since the1930s, which is characterized with a long duration, wide spread and huge damage. After the outbreak of financial crisis, the phenomenon regarding astronomical salaries that given to organizational executives especially those from financial sector has become a hot debate among the public at various level from the president of the country to the wage earners. As a result, western developed countries have drafted or released a series of policies and regulations to strengthen the supervision of corporate executive compensation. Similar tothe western countries, questions and criticisms about the high executive pay levels among Chinese state-owned enterprises(SOEs), joint-equity enterprises, financial and real estate industry etc are raised. Chinese government then promulgated a series of guiding opinions to regulate the market. In the post-financial crisis, the executive pay of the SOEs, especially the Chinese central governmental controlled enterprises, receives a widespread concerns from the society."How to design the most effective compensation system for SOE executives" has constituted the core of the incentive mechanism SOE executives. At present, one of the major projects of reforms of SOEs is about how to develop and design the reward system of China’s SOE executives, which has which has become the fundamental issue that this study explores. However, from a global perspective, it can be seen that, the performance of SOEs generally appears weak.. The issue of how to improve the performance of SOEs and to help them play a more important role has become the major concerns among various countries in the world. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD)experience, a good structure of corporate governance has become prerequisite for the development of SOEs. Among them, the incentive mechanism of SOE executives is identified as one of the core systems that help establishing an effective corporate governance mechanism. Based on the in depth study of SOE executives’ incentive mechanism, the solutions regarding how to set up an effective corporate governance mechanisms of SOEs that suited to Chinese national conditions, not only could enrich the theory related to incentive mechanism in SOEs, but also push the SOEs to reform successfully. All these have the major theoretical and practical implications.After identifying the topic, it has to clarify which angle should we choose this research. For the purpose of guaranteeing its high degree control of the SOE by Chinese government, ensuring the security and smooth running of national economy, Chinese government has controlled a series of activities such as staffing and compensation of SOE executives, which lead the incentive mechanism of China’s SOE executives to differentiate from those occur in western countries. Accordingly, combining with the institutional environment that our SOE executives face, this study focuses on two dimensions (namely explicit and implicit incentives) by discussing issues from the following three aspects:First, the incentive effects of short-term monetary rewards for executives. For the incentive mechanism of SOE executives in China, monetary reward is a means of the short-term incentives. Based on the existing research on corporate governance, the pay level of executives’ short-term monetary incentive has generally been found to have a sensitive/significant association with firm performance. This part of the thesis is to examine the correlation between the two variables. The short-term monetary incentive acts as one of the explicit and dominant incentives.Second, the incentive effects of long-term equity (stock ownership) for executives. Long-term equity is another important form of executive compensation mechanism across countries includes such as China. This part is to focus the sensitivity of the relationship between this mechanism and firm performance. The long-term equity also acts as one of the explicit incentives.Third, the executive’s political incentive effects. Different from western countries, where SOE executives are generally professional managers, a large number of Chinese executives are appointed by Chinese government, and the replacement of executives may be correlated with the implementation of governmental goals; then the executive’s political career promotion, has become an implicit incentive, which becomes a significant feature of incentive mechanism system in SOEs. The study explores this special incentive by using two types of research (namely empirical study and case study).Since the (partial) share of over half of listed companies are owned by the State-controlling shareholders, this study assumes that the differences among shareholders determines the difference of incentive mode of executives of listed companies, which in turn influences the firm performance. By comparing the sensitivity between company incentive and firm performance among selected companies, this study has conducted an in-depth research on the incentive mechanisms of SOE executives, and draw the following conclusions:(1) Short-term monetary reward incentives are still remained as one of the important incentives for SOE executives, but due to the external policy constraints of pay control, its incentive effect was weaker than those in non-state enterprises.(2) The incentive mechanism of long-term equity is rarely adopted by the China’s SOEs. This mechanism has not yet played a significant role in present mechanism of executive incentives.(3) Political incentive is one of important incentive mechanisms implemented by SOEs. Due to the high pay control, this kind of incentive mechanism has compensated for the inadequacy of monetary incentive compensation, and this incentive exerts a more significant effect in the SOEs, especially in the central state controlled enterprises.The origins and contributions of this study are reflected into three aspects:(1) Proposed a unique pattern of multivariate incentive mechanisms for China’s SOE executives. Currently, the domestic existing research on executive incentive mechanisms are more based on the Western motivation theory, and therefore lack of accurate grasp of the specificity and various stages of executives needs. This study, however, based on the existing explicit incentive mechanism, proposed a path of political motivation system in the context of China Specifically, the deficiency of insufficient explicit incentive mechanism for our pay control and the defects of ownership of SOEs, lead political motivation to become an effective supplement to the existing dominant (explicit) incentive mechanism, and this exploration provides an important research direction for the future research.(2) Fully analyzed the current status of political demands from China’s SOE executives. Based on the combined motivation model of pay-performance, this study involved the political motivation variables, and further divided the control power of executives into explicit and implicit control power. Through conducting empirical studies, it has been found that the executives of SOEs have two-way natural flows from enterprises to government administrative power. Accordingly, the pursuit of political authority could be an alternative incentive mechanism to the dominant motivation mechanism. this is particular the case in the central (governmental) control of large SOEs. This study confirms that political motivation in China is an effective alternative to the explicit incentive mechanism of SOE executives.(3) Studied the relationships between various incentive mechanisms. Owing to the special ownership background and management model of SOEs, the foreign traditional paradigms that based on the research direction of material incentives, does not work properly in China. This study argues that, apart from explicit motivation mechanism, political motivation mechanism (implicit incentive) is also identified as one of the major mechanisms within the Chinese SOEs, which emphasizes a variety of individual needs of executives. Overall, political incentives is identified as an important incentive mechanism that supplement to the traditional dominant incentive mechanism.This study concluded that, to strengthen the incentive effect of SOEexecutives, we should improve both of internal control and external institutional environments. Appropriate internal governance is the basis for corporate governance, establishing tripartite mechanisms include incentive, supervision and selection which are identified as one of the core issues of our corporate governance reform. Only the incentive mechanisms, supervisions and selections are effectively implemented, company directors and or executives can actively commit to their job, and to consciously maximize the shareholder value. At the same time, internal governance mechanism will also not play its role unless it is positively affected by the external institution. Institutional constraints from external market help facilitate the improvement of organization as well as its governance structure. Accordingly, strengthening the cultivation of external governance market, including market for corporate control and professional manager market, reducing the level of government control and weakening the level of executive administrative appointments, are all recognized as important means of realizing effective incentive mechanism for SOE executives.更多还原