【作者】 李胜；

【导师】 陈晓春；

【作者基本信息】 湖南大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 水资源短缺和流域水污染是我国面临的重要环境问题。跨行政区流域水污染是一种越界外部性,受流域自然整体性和流动性的影响,某一行政区的污染通常可以通过水体向另一个或多个行政区转移。流域水污染的跨区域性和可转移性使以水行政主管部门为主的、区域分割式的水资源管理体制无法满足流域水污染综合防治的要求。研究如何设计能够满足博弈参与人激励相容和参与约束的协同治理机制,使流域走上可持续发展之路,是建设资源节约型和环境友好型社会的重要内容,也是建设的生态文明的重要保障。本文首先介绍了我国流域水污染治理面临的困境：一方面是流域水污染防治的法律法规以及财政投入大量增长,国家和社会对水污染带来的巨大危害认识越来越充分；另一方面是流域水环境的持续恶化,条文规则表现出越来越大的无效性。本文通过对国内外文献、基础理论的梳理和流域水污染治理困境的现实考察,发现导致流域水污染持续恶化和治理失效的关键不仅有传统理论上所认为的产业结构不合理、企业的自私排污行为、环境监管体制等因素,更有在现有制度环境下的府际博弈的非理性均衡因素。其次,本文将制度理解为博弈规则,对府际博弈的机理进行了分析。根据《环境保护法》、《水法》和《水污染防治法》等相关法律规定,我国实行的是区域管理与流域管理相结合、以区域管理为主的流域管理体制。这种管理体制要求地方政府对本地水环境质量负责,而对流域污染的跨行政区性缺乏关注。流域管理制度、参与人的信息结构和利益冲突与流域性质的不适应性使体制上的缺陷进一步放大,并最终使嵌入到政治和经济双重竞争中的府际博弈成为跨行政区流域水污染的深层次原因。第三,从跨行政区流域水污染的府际博弈模型出发,对中央政府和地方政府,以及地方政府之间在流域水污染治理中的行动、支付、战略和均衡进行了分析。研究表明,流域上游的地方政府具有搭便车的机会主义倾向,流域公共产品自愿供给博弈的纳什均衡小于帕累托最优的供给量,而当下游政府采取“以牙还牙”的承诺行动时,博弈均衡受到一定影响。在中央政府和地方政府的政策博弈中,地方政府执行中央流域治理政策的概率与中央政府的监管成本成反比,而与中央政府的处罚成正比。中央政府和地方政府的信号博弈模型表明,不同类型的地方政府倾向于发出同样的信号,以期获得中央政府相同的奖励。府际联盟博弈的Shapley值表明,地方政府在联盟博弈中获得的收益要大于中央政府。第四,利用七大流域面板数据和湘江个案对跨行政区流域水污染的府际博弈进行了实证分析。结果表明地方政府对环境执法有重要影响。面对地方政府的保护主义,中央政府的流域限批政策使地方政府面临巨大的压力而不得不对本行政区的污染进行治理。但是,中央政府和地方政府在环境管理动力机制的差异,以及在流域水污染治理上财权和事权的不明晰使流域水污染治理投资不足。湘江流域的个案分析同样证明了在跨行政区流域水污染中府际博弈的存在,中央和湖南省政府的重视,使湘江流域沿岸地方政府签订了治理目标责任书和环境协议,治理进入到合作化的轨道。最后,本文提出了改变博弈规则有利于使流域水污染治理摆脱目前困境的结论。流域污染治理的责任制度、流域产权制度、流域生态补偿制度、政府绩效评估制度、环境公益诉讼制度,以及社会协同治理制度的建立对于约束和激励博弈参与人的行为具有重要意义。论文从这些方面进一步总结了全文的观点,建议从完善流域水污染治理的制度设计和执行上入手,促进流域水环境的改善。更多还原

【Abstract】 Water shortage and water pollution are important environmental issues which China facing. Trans-district water pollution is a cross-border externalities, affecting by the natural integrity and fluidity, the pollution can often be transfer to one or more administrative regions.The cross-regional and transferability of Water pollution’s characteristic, making the system which mainly management by water administration department and segementation-based water resources management,can not meet the requirements of comprehensive prevention and control water pollution. Study how to design the player’s incentive compatibility and participation constraint collaborative governance mechanism, making basin on the road to sustainable development, is not only an important part of building resource-saving and environment-friendly society, but also an important protection construction ecological civilization.This paper describes the regulation difficulties of water pollution in China:on the one hand, with the increasing laws and regulations on the water pollution control, the state and community are more and more aware of the tremendous harm caused by water pollution in recent years; on the other hand, the water environment is deteriorating, the rules are show growing void. Based on the sort of domestic and foreign literature and observation of basin water pollution control plight, this paper find that the keys which led to continued deterioration of water pollution and control invalidity are not only related to irrational industrial structure, enterprise’s selfish emission behavior, environmental supervision structure, but also related to the non-rational balanced of intergovernmental game which under the existing system.This paper analyzed institution as the rules of gam. According to "Environmental Protection Law","Water Law" and "Water Pollution Control Act" and other relevant laws, our country’s basin management system combined district management and watershed management,but mainly based on district management’s basin management system.This system requires local governments responsible for local water environment, but unconcerned about trans-district water pollution.The unadaptability between existing basin management laws and nature of basin is the main causes of intergovernmental game. In the game, local government win the promotion through economic performance.Thus, irrational industrial structure is only a surface reason of trans-district water pollution, and the deeper reason is the vicious competition among local governments.We build intergovernmental game model for trans-district water pollution.The action, payoff, strategy and equilibrium in the water pollution control were analyzed in the game. The results show that the upstream local governments have free-riding behavior in pollution regulation, Nash equilibrium supply of voluntary provision on river public goods is less than Pareto optimal.And when the downstream government take "tooth for tooth" commitment action, the game’s balance would be changed. In the policy game of central and local government, the implementation probability of local government is inversely to central government’s supervision costs, but is proportional to the punishment of central government.The signaling game model between central and local governments shows that in order to obtain rewards from central government, different types of local governments tend to send same signal.The empirical analysis of tans-district water polltion on the intergovernmental game shows that local government have a major impact on environmental law enforcement.In the face of protectionism by local government, central government’s river limits policy is successfully against local government.It made local governments have to pay more attention to pollution control. But the differences in dynamic mechanism of environmental management between central government and local governments,and the fuzzy of financial authority and powers on water pollution control which lead to insufficient investment of water pollution control.Xiangjiang River Basin also demonstrated the presence of intergovrnmental game on trans-district water pollution,the attention from central government and provincial government made local governments which along the Xiangjiang River signed the goal of governance responsibility book and environmental agreement,so the governance go into the track of co-operative.Changing the rules is benefit to water pollution control. River pollution contral liability system, watershed property rights system, ecological compensation system, performance evaluation system, environmental community litigation system and social coordination system, these institutions’s establishment are important to constraint and incentive the behavior of players. From these aspects, this paper further summarized the argument of the text, proposing through improve institution design to improve the quality of water environment.更多还原