【作者】 成九雁；

【导师】 朱武祥；

【作者基本信息】 清华大学 ， 应用经济学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 世界发达股票市场的历史和金融监管相关理论研究一致表明,最有(经济)效率的股票市场监管结构应该是在市场自律、法庭诉讼、行政监管和国有控制这四种主要的监管手段之间保持协调与制衡。但是,中国近代股市的监管结构非常明显地偏离这种最优模式,具体表现为:行政监管和国有控制占据主导,而市场自律和法庭诉讼处于边缘。即使放宽视野从1840年鸦片战争之后中国跨越一个半世纪的股市监管大历史来看,尽管政府权力在股市的渗透存在一种宽严交替的周期性调整,但是行政监管和国有控制总是在短暂的衰微之后又迅速复兴,最终长期主导着这段漫长历史的舞台。为什么中国这种偏离理论最优结构的监管体系得以长期延续?为了探究这种监管结构的历史根源及其动态演化机制,本文通过追溯1873-1949年近代上海华商股票市场监管结构的演变历史,提出了一个新的政治经济学解释。自由的股票市场作为一种强大而有效的资源配置机制,一方面会给许多企业家带来巨额财富,增加金融资本家的政治影响;另一方面也会削弱集权政府调动社会资金、实现政策目标、确保政治权威的能力。由于股票市场利益群体(上市公司、经纪公司、股票投资者)与集权政府在如何构建监管制度结构上存在着不同的利益诉求和价值主张,正是他们之间的利益冲突与力量对比推动了中国近代以来政府主导型股市监管结构的形成,并使其在此后的历史进程中逐步固化。本文致力于从以下三个方面对既有文献做出贡献:一是系统梳理从晚清时期到国民党政府时期的整个近代股市监管结构的演变轨迹,分析股市利益集团的兴衰与政府主导型监管结构的形成过程。二是谨慎提出监管制度结构研究的两维分析思路:发展起一个强大的股市既需要进行纸面上的监管制度文本建设,还要促进股市有关的各种利益主体的生成。创设或引进各种制度文本是比较容易的,但是执行这些制度文本所需的支持性利益主体的成长却存在政治障碍。三是尝试解释中国近代股市监管结构形成的政治逻辑,在比较评析一些传统观点(意识形态、重大事件冲击、国际学习)的基础之上,本文指出股市支持性利益集团与集权政府之间难以制衡共生的问题可能是影响监管制度结构动态演变以及监管效果提升的另外一个重要因素。更多还原

【Abstract】 The historical experiences of stock markets around the world and a considerable body of theoretical research have suggested that the optimal regulatory structure should be a check-and-balance mix among the four regulatory tools: market discipline, rule of law, administrative measures and state ownership in the industry. However, China’ s modern regulatory practices of stock markets have substantially deviated from this optimum model, that is, administrative measures and national ownership have been heavily emphasized relative to market discipline and the rule of law. Even if we take a long-term perspective into the stock market history from the 1840s, administrative powers almost always played the central stage role, alongside the occasional regulatory cycles.Why is this type of inefficient regulatory framework in China so persistent? This paper analyzes in detail the historical evolution of Chinese stock market in Shanghai during 1873 to 1949 and proposes a new political economy paradigm to explain it.Free stock markets, as a strong and effective mechanism of resource allocation, will bring huge wealth to the entrepreneurs and increase the political influence of financial capitalists, but at the same time weaken the ability of the centralized government to utilize financial capital and realize its own policy goals to strengthen its political authority. The conflicts between the well-developed interest groups (such as listed companies, brokerage firms, and investors) and the government on how to organize and regulate the stock markets will eventually emerge. It’s the conflict of interests and difference of powers between the interest groups of stock market and the administrative agencies that shape the unique regulatory structure of Chinese stock market since the 1840s.This paper makes three new contributions to the existing research. Firstly, the comprehensive evolutionary path of regulatory structure over the Chinese stock market since the mid 19th century is described in detail in this paper, especially on the fall of stock market interest groups and the rise of government-led regulatory structure.Secondly, the regulatory structure of stock markets should have two different aspects: one is about the rule on the paper, and the other is the supportive interest groups for the rules. Building a strong stock market requires both the establishment of a series of regulatory institutions and the supportive interest groups. The dilemma is between a co-operative stance when the well-developed interest groups can not only assist the government to regulate the stock market, but also carry out some constraints to the behaviors of the government itself.Thirdly, this paper provides a new political explanation on the unstable interactions between the supportive interest groups of stock markets and the centralized government that give rise to the government-led regulatory structure, compared with the traditional perspectives on this issue such as national ideological factors, crisis shocks, and learning from the international experiences and models.更多还原