【作者】 张宏敏；

【导师】 朱敏；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 企业管理， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 股票期权激励(Stock Option Incentive)是为了解决现代股份公司制度中最基本的股东与经营层之间的委托代理关系而产生的现代长期激励制度。随着中国市场经济的发展、技术创新的不断加快以及证券市场的不断壮大,这一国外流行的激励方式也逐渐被理论界重视和实践派实施。2005年开始,中国上市公司开始了如火如荼的股权分置改革,“股改”解决了困扰中国股市的制度性缺陷——股份全流通问题,使得在中国上市公司中实施真正意义上的股票期权激励成为可能。新的《公司法》、《证券法》等法律规定的突破,为股权激励制度的实施扫除了最为关键的法律障碍,证监会、国资委先后出台的《上市公司股权激励管理办法》、《国有控股上市公司(境内)股权激励试行办法》、《国有控股上市公司(境外)股权激励试行办法》、《2006新企业会计准则第11号——股利支付》、《关于个人股票期权所得征收个人所得税问题的通知》等一系列配套法规政策为实施股权激励提供了直接的操作依据。以往对我国上市公司高管股权激励与公司业绩、股东财富的研究都是基于制度不健全,法律未规范的各类试点进行的简单案例分析研究,所使用的数据均是来自“股改”以前的数据,然而2005年的股权分置改革已经使我国的上市公司进入了全新的历史时期,同样也为我国上市公司高管激励的研究提出新的研究需要。本文对现有已经提出股权激励计划的上市公司作为对象,研究这些公司实施股权激励的效果,分析影响中国上市公司实施股权激励效果的主要因素;现有实施股票期权激励的上市公司所处制度基础的实施细则问题,为建立和完善中国上市公司股权激励制度环境、运行规范提供有力的现实理论支撑、实证的研究经验和政策细则的研究建议。本文采用了理论分析与文献分析、现状分析相结合的研究方法,实证研究与政策建议相结合的研究方法,定量研究与定性研究相结合的研究方法;运用EVIEWS统计分析软件、EXCEL数据处理软件对搜集的数据进行整理、数学公式计算,描述性统计分析,进而研究变量、回归实证模型,分析主要成分、检验假设,并根据参数统计量做出实证分析结论;结合实证定量的研究结论,对股权分置改革后中国上市公司实施股票期权激励的制度基础进行理论、比较分析,从会计、税收、监管方面提出了相应的政策建议。论文主要分三个部分十个章节进行论述:第一部分主要是提出问题,包括第一、二、三、四章。第一章是绪论,主要阐述了论文的研究背景及意义、研究思路、研究方法、实现手段、主要创新点。第二章对股票期权激励的委托代理理论等制度经济学激励理论、人力资本激励理论和管理激励理论进行了系统梳理和整合互补分析,介绍了将在论文实证分析中运用的Black-Scholes的期权定价模型。第三章全面重点综述分析回顾了国内外股票期权激励、高管薪酬激励的研究文献和成果,从中理出对中国上市公司股票期权激励研究存在的盲点和主要问题。第四章简要阐述了中国上市公司股权激励实践的演变历程和发展现状,总结出实践过程中面临的制度、法律、环境方面遇到的问题。第二部分主要是分析研究问题,包括第五、六、七、八、九章。第五章在对股票期权理论、文献的回顾综述,中国股权激励演变历程和现状进行系统的梳理分析基础上;提出了中国上市公司股票期权激励有效性研究的整合分析框架:包括三个层层递进的实证分析子框架和政策细则研究分析框架。第六章是本文实证分析的第一层次子框架,即股票期权、市场风险和股权性质与中国上市公司高管现金薪酬实证分析,基于对股权分置改革以后,2006-2008年A股上市公司公开披露的数据对实证模型的假设进行检验,得出如下结论(1)中国上市公司高管人员的现金薪酬与公司的市场业绩、财务业绩之间存在显著的正相关关系;(2)中国上市公司的股票期权激励正在行使着约束激励和心里层面补偿公平的双层作用;(3)当前中国上市公司绩效风险对高管现金薪酬正在行使着扩大激励的强度和扩大薪酬的不确定性和高管努力误差,进而降低高管人员现金薪酬双层的作用;(4)带有国有股权性质的中国上市公司的高管现金薪酬显著的高于私营股权性质上市公司的高管现金薪酬;而且中央国有企业的高管现金薪酬显著的高于国资委控制的,而国资委控制的又显著的高于地方国有企业和地方国资委控制的。第七章在第六章证实了高管薪酬与公司绩效间显著正向相关关系后,展开了股票期权薪酬绩效敏感度和股票期权薪酬与现金薪酬比例的第二层次实证分析。首次对中国上市公司实施的股票期权计算了基于Black-Scholes的股票期权薪酬绩效敏感度、股票期权薪酬与现金薪酬比例,并对各种可能影响股票期权激励效果的因素进行相关分析,得出了如下结论:(1)成长性机会、支付现金股利、机构持股集中度对中国上市公司股票期权薪酬绩效敏感度的影响显著为正;成长性机会、支付现金股利、机构持股集中度与中国上市公司股票期权薪酬与现金薪酬比例之间呈现显著正向相关。(2)财务杠杆、股权集中度对中国上市公司股票期权薪酬绩效敏感度的影响显著为负;股权集中度和中国上市公司股票期权薪酬与现金薪酬比例之间呈现显著负向相关关系。(3)上市公司实际控制人的股权性质是影响我国股票期权激励效果的重要影响因素。私营性质上市公司股票期权激励效果显著的更加明显,而且与现金薪酬相比,更倾向于向高管层支付股票期权薪酬;在进一步对国有股权性质进行细分后,发现中央直属国有企业和国资委控制的上市公司的股票期权薪酬绩效敏感度和股票期权薪酬与现金薪酬比例比地方国有企业和地方国资委控制上市公司的更低。第八章基于前两个层次实证分析研究发现股权性质对股票期权激励的显著影响作用下,设计了第三层次股票期权薪酬授予比例和行权有效期与股权性质实证分析,检验得出了如下结论:(1)私营性质上市公司授予股票期权占公司股本总额的比例比国有性质上市公司的更高;而且对国有股权性质进一步细分后,发现国资委控制国有企业授予股票期权占公司股本总额的比例比地方国资委控制国有企业的更低。(2)私营性质上市公司授予股票期权的行权有效期比国有性质上市公司的更短;而且对国有股权性质进一步细分后,发现国资委控制国有企业授予股票期权的行权有效期比地方国资委控制国有企业的更长。第九章结合了第六、七、八章三个层层递进实证分析研究结果,针对中国上市公司对股票期权激励计划的实施与运行中遇到的当初设计各类规范时未预估到的各种政策细则问题,从会计、税收、监管三方面进行深入分析并提出了根植理论、关联性和可操作性强的建议。第三部分包括第十章,主要对本文的主要研究结论、研究创新、研究局限性和未来研究建议作了整理和简述。本文研究的创新主要体现在以下几方面:第一,针对中国上市公司实施股票期权激励计划的中国特色、演变历程和实施现状,提出对中国上市公司股票期权激励有效性的研究框架:股票期权激励的有效性研究包括通过经验数据检验的实证研究,即激励效果研究,和通过股票期权激励制度基础政策细则的分析建议,即制度基础研究;激励效果研究与制度基础研究相辅相成,形成对具有中国特色股票期权激励有效性研究的有机结合。第二,针对中国上市公司股票期权计划的实施,首次提出了薪酬绩效敏感度(PPS)和股票期权薪酬与现金薪酬比例(BSV-W)测量模型,并对其进行了实证相关分析,得出影响中国上市公司股票期权激励效果的主要因素。第三、首次提出股权性质在上市公司股票期权激励计划中的重要影响,对计划实施指标的显著作用;并对股权性质进行细分,进一步通过实证模型对该影响予以验证和衡量。第四、通过假设和检验发现中国上市公司的股票期权激励正在行使着双层的作用:一方面起着委托人对代理人的约束激励作用;另一方面,授予高管人员的股票期权同样也表现为一种给予高管人员的补偿,既包括对过去努力程度的一种加计奖励,也包含为使高管薪酬与国际相衔接的公平心里效应。第五、本文在实证研究的基础上,针对中国上市公司股票期权激励实践在会计、税收、监管政策实施细则方面遇到的问题,提出了根植理论分析且可操作性强的建议。包括如何避免企业对通过会计手段利用股票期权计划在年度间调节利润,如何避免对个人和企业的重复课税,降低股票期权激励效果;如何提高对企业实施股票期权计划的监管效率。更多还原

【Abstract】 Stock Option Incentive is a modern long-term incentive system which is used to solve the basic principal-agent relationship, relationship of shareholders and managements, in modern corporate. Along with development of marketing economy, continually technology innovation and development of capital market, the incentive method is regarded by both theoretical and practical scholars in China.Since second half year of 2005, China has reformed non-tradable share problem in listed companies, and promulgated or revised a series of laws and regulations, which solved systematic and legal barriers for implementing real stock option incentives.Most research on top-management stock-based incentives and company performance as well as shareholders’wealth before is simple case qualitative analysis, or empirical analysis based on data of trial companies under non-comprehensive systematic systems. Reform on non-tradable share problem in China makes capital market entering a new historical time and creates a new research need on top-management stock-based incentives.Selecting listed companies implementing stock-based compensation as objects, this study aims to analyze the effectiveness of stock option incentives, elements influencing the efficiency, as well as gives some constructive suggestions to realistic environmental and systematic issues accruing during stock option incentive practice of listed companies on post non-tradable share times in China.The study applies comprehensive research approach combining empirical approach and realistic issues analysis, combining qualitative and quantitative approach, including theoretical, literature and realistic condition analysis. EVIEWS statistic analyzing software and EXCEL Office software are used to record, computer data from WIND Securities Information Database, and to regress the Model and test theoretic hypotheses. The dissertation is comprised of three section including ten chapters.The first section gives the study problem, including through chapter 1 to chapter 4.Chapter 1 is Introduction, which introduces research background, meaning, target, logical sequence, approach and instruments, as well as research innovation.Chapter 2 discusses and integratively analyzes theories interpreting stock option compensation incentives, including Principal-Agent Theory, Human Capital Theory, Management Motivation Theory, and Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model.Chapter 3 reviews literatures relating to research on stock option incentives and top-management incentive at home and abroad, in turn induces blind spot on stock option incentive research needs to study and resolve in current listed companies in China. Chapter 4 introduces and discusses evolvement of stock-based compensation incentive practice in China, in turn summarizes urgent systematic and environmental issues listed companies faced.The second section analyzes and researches the study problem, including through chapter 5 to chapter 9.Based on retrospection, summary and induction through chapter 2 to 4, Chapter 5 gives an integrated research framework on effectiveness of stock option incentive on listed companies in China, including three successive levels of empirical analysis sub-framework and policies research sub-framework.Chapter 6 is the first empirical research sub-framework level, which is analyzing relationship of stock option, market risk, nature of share and top-management compensation summation of salary and bonus on listed companies in China. Conclusions that market performance, accounting performance has significant positive relationship with top-management compensation summation of salary and bonus and etc are proved. Nature of share of listed companies in China has significant influence on top-management compensation summation of salary and bonus, in turn compensation of top-management of state-owned listed companies is significantly higher.Based on conclusions of chapter 6, chapter 7 make further empirical analysis on pay-performance sensitivity of stock option compensation and ratio of stock option compensation and cash compensation of top-management on listed companies in China. Growth opportunity, cash flow, institutional investors’ holding concentration, financial leverage, share concentration are proved elements having significant influencing effectiveness of stock option incentives on listed companies in China. Nature of share of listed companies has significant influence on PPS of stock option, and state-owned listed companies are inclined to pay top-management cash compensation comparing with private listed companies.Chapter 8 is the third level empirical research basing on conclusions of the above two chapters, which analyze specific influence of nature of share on stock option policy design of listed companies. It proved that nature of share has significant influence on award ratio of stock option as well as exercising validity period. state-owned listed companies has significantly lower award ratio and longer exercising validity period comparing with private listed companies.Chapter 9 gives realistic policies suggestions from accounting, tax and supervision aspects, aims at unpredicted problems and operational issues occurring during stock option practicing process of listed companies in post non-tradable share reform times in China.The third section including chapter 10 gives conclusions, innovations and contributions of the study, as well as discusses study limitation and suggestion for future study.Contributions of this dissertation are as followings:Firstly, research framework of effectiveness stock option incentive on listed companies in China is given, based on evolution process and present condition of stock option plan. The framework includes empirical analysis (incentive efficiency test) and realistic policies suggestions (systematic basis induction), which forms an organic research on effectiveness stock option incentive on listed companies in China.Secondly, measurement and test model whose dependent variables are respectively stock option pay-performance sensitivity and ratio of stock option incentives to cash compensation are given to analyse efficiency of stock option incentive on listed companies in China. Important factors influencing efficiency of stock option incentive on listed companies in China are put forward and tested statistically significant.Thirdly, nature of share of listed companies in China is proven to be an important factor influencing stock option incentive plan, which significantly affects relative indexes of stock option plan. Futher segmention to nature of share of listed companies in China is also proven to affects indexes of stock option plan tested by models.Fourthly, stock option plan on listed companies in China is found to have double effects on top-management, including both incentives effect and compensation effect.Last, suggestions on accounting, tax and supervision policies upon stock option plan in China are concluded, including how to avoid adjusting profit by using accouting measure, how to avoid repeat taxation, as well as how to improve supervision efficiency.更多还原