【作者】 张留华；

【导师】 冯棉；

【作者基本信息】 华东师范大学 ， 外国哲学， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 本文摆脱现有中文文献仅从实用主义涉足皮尔士哲学的局限性,以“作为指号学,是哲学而非数学”的逻辑观念为基调,全面梳理皮尔士广义逻辑科学的内涵及外延,并试图通过逻辑这把钥匙层层解开皮尔士哲学在实用主义论争及当代各哲学分支根本问题上的独创性及相关性。与当代标准数理逻辑相比,皮尔士在逻辑代数、存在图等工作中独立发展了堪与弗雷格、罗素等人相媲美的一阶逻辑思想,但他在现代逻辑上的视野要宽阔得多。虽然皮尔士本人卷入到当时布尔代数的改进热潮当中,但他强调自己研究逻辑代数的动机不在于数学而在于逻辑学,即推理及思想分析上。在一种自然的科学分类法中,逻辑学服从于经验实在,属于广义实证科学中的通视科学。逻辑学关注应然而非实然问题,但这并不意味着逻辑学就与数学一样完全无关于经验事实；相反,逻辑推理从一开始就被迫诉诸一些共同的基本生活经验。皮尔士从深入细致的逻辑史研究出发,认为逻辑学在古希腊和中世纪那里一直承担而且现代也应继续承担“探究真理的工具”这一角色,从而他把广义上的逻辑科学等同于指号学。任何思想都是通过指号进行的,指号是推理得以开展的唯一载体,对于各类指号及其功能的分析凝结着我们对于推理本身或探究工作的思考。指号学作为哲学分部下现象学之后、形而上学之前的一种规范科学,大致可以分为理论语法(包括非心理主义意义上的认识论)、批判论(包括通常所谓的逻辑学)和方法论(包括能够加快真理探究进程的各种“修辞”策略)；而实用主义作为一种能够使我们的观念更加明晰的科学定义方法,则明显属于指号学方法论分部下的一种“逻辑命题”。皮尔士把实用主义看作是有关外展推理的逻辑学,并倡导一种同时包括外展、演绎、归纳等三种基本推理形式在内的、可广泛应用于任何科学探究的“实践逻辑”。正如存在一种哲学意义上的心理学、人类学等一样,皮尔士的新逻辑学就是一种哲学意义上的逻辑学：它不同于数学意义上的逻辑学即数理逻辑,也不同于作为某种专门技艺的逻辑。与其他逻辑学家相比,可能同样是考察推理问题,但皮尔士的关注总能表达出某种更为一般、更具总体性的东西。正如今天人们说“分析哲学”时越来越意识到它并非只是哲学上推陈出新的另一个分支或派别而可能是整个哲学研究的一种新方法、新路线、新追求,同样皮尔士所带给我们的“作为哲学的逻辑科学”并不是要取消或否定历史上已有的某种逻辑研究,它重点是为我们增添一种新的关注点,为我们展现原来很少出现或现已多被遗忘的整体视野。放在此种广义逻辑学语境下来看,皮尔士实用主义与其他版本实用主义的最大不同在于：它是一种基于连续统逻辑的联系主义哲学,其中包含了皮尔士逻辑在经院实在论、懊悔的可错论、客观唯心论以及自然主义等方面的深刻内蕴。整体来看,皮尔士在一百年前所规划的“哲学逻辑”是更多接近于当前英美及欧陆哲学前沿(而非十九世纪或二十世纪初期哲学主流)思想倾向的一幅图景：它具有非革命的进化特征,非二分法的连续性特征,反相对主义的多样性特征,反基础主义的客观性特征。更多还原

【Abstract】 This dissertation chooses to reconstruct Peirce’s system of philosophy from his distinctive conception of logic and clarify its much relevance to contemporary philosophical inquiry, rather than limiting Peirce’s complicated and ingenious philosophical thoughts to the fashionable pragmatism. In Peirce’s view, Logic conceived as Semiotics belongs to philosophy and not mathematics. Comparing with contemporary "mathematical logic", Peirce developed the first-order logic independent of Frege and Russell, and had a much deeper concern and broader vision of modern logic than them. The aim of Peirce’s much work in revising Boolean algebra and improving his algebra of relation was the analysis of reasoning and thought, which was the business of logic and not of mathematics. In Peirce’s natural classification of sciences, logic was a branch of Cenoscopy, a kind of positive science in non-Comtean sense. Logic studies the matter of ought-to, but it has to rest upon some common experience and general facts, not like mathematics irrelevant of any experiential reality. Basing on his comprehensive studies in history of logic, Peirce argued that logic in modern time should play the same role of the Method of methods as in ancient and medieval worlds, so that his grand logic science equaling in scope to his semiotics. Thought is in sign, and one reasons only by the vehicle of sign. So, semiotics, the inquiry into all forms of signs and their functions, is the analysis of the nature of reasoning. Peirce’s semiotics, as a division of philosophy, lies after phenomenology and before metaphysics. As one of the normative sciences, it in itself has three departments,1st, Speculative Grammar, including the epistemology getting rid of psychologism; 2nd, Critic, including the logic called as usual; 3rd, Methodeutic, including lots of rhetoric strategies of advancing the inquiry of truth. Peircean pragmatism is the scientific method to make our ideas more clear, and it is a logical maxim in the semiotics. Peirce thought of pragmatism as the logic of abduction, and set forth a logic of scientific inquiry including not only deductive reasoning but also abductive reasoning and inductive reasoning, which could be used to solve many practical problems in real human life.Just as there is a philosophical psychology and a philosophical anthropology, there is a philosophical logic. As seen by Peirce, logic is not "mathematical logic" taught in today’s textbooks, nor is any special arts. Different from other contemporary logicians, Peirce’s concerns with reasoning were much more general and inclusive. Just as analytic philosophy is not merely another sect in philosophy circle but stands as a new approach of philosophical inquiry, Peirce’s philosophical logic did not annul any successful logical studies but tried to renew a systematic vision which had been neglected since modern times. In the context of the expanded logic, the great difference between Peirce and other pragmatists consists in that Peircean pragmatism is essentially synechism relating to his logic of continuity, in which scholastic realism, contrite fallibilism, objective idealism, and mild naturalism were interlocked closely. In the whole, the logic prospect designed by Peirce one hundred years ago was more consistent with the philosophical attitudes in the late 20th century and the 21st century than those in the 19th century and the early 20th century. It is evolutionary but not revolutionary, continuous but not dichotomous; it commits to diversity but not relativism, objectivity but not foundationalism.更多还原