【作者】 汪忠；

【导师】 曾德明；

【作者基本信息】 湖南大学 ， 企业管理， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 机构投资者是法人形式投资组织。随着环境的变化,20世纪80年代以来,美国以共同基金等为代表的机构投资者,由消极主义向积极主义转变,作为股东利益强有力的代表开始参与公司治理。同样,中国机构投资者近些年来也出现类似趋势。而作为参与治理的前提,中国机构投资者需要借鉴国际经验,结合所处环境以及公司本身发展,引入机构投资者对目标公司治理评价。这有利于中国机构投资者形成新经营赢利模式；有利于降低代理问题和股东分散化问题,促使目标公司提高治理质量；有利于树立机构投资者信心,吸引稳定的长期资本流入,改进整体社会福利水平。本文选择中国基金等机构投资者对目标公司治理评价作为研究对象,以委托代理理论、战略管理理论、冲突管理理论以及绩效评价理论构成理论基础,综合国内外研究成果,着眼于从治理结构建立转向治理机制优化,有针对性的提供一套评价指标及其标准,以期客观判断和测评基于机构投资者视角的目标公司治理评价指标体系,结合国内外文献成果,理论推导与实证研究结合,为基金等机构投资者和目标公司治理长远发展奠定基础。首先,论文研究分析机构投资者对目标公司治理的发展趋势,引入机构投资者对目标公司治理评价。机构投资者选择目标公司的传统模式与方法发生变化,国外机构投资者对目标公司治理是发展趋势,分析了美国、日德公司治理模式及其比较,探讨了各国治理模式趋同。结合中国机构投资者的发展以及所处环境,其参与目标公司治理和引入目标公司治理评价是趋势。其次,论文从文献和数理模型角度,分析机构投资者对目标公司治理博弈以及利益整合的客观合理性。机构投资者对目标公司治理逻辑前提是委托代理关系、股东利益冲突与搭便车问题以及股东管理者利益不一致与内部人控制问题。本文分析机构投资者参与目标公司治理评价的动因、优势以及参与目标公司治理评价效应分析,研究机构投资者对目标公司治理评价博弈模型,进行了机构投资者与目标公司管理层的利益整合分析以及模型和证明。第三,论文研究机构投资者对目标公司治理评价的边界和结构以及框架。机构投资者对目标公司治理评价的边界和结构,从公司股权结构、公司高层权力制衡、公司高层管理团队治理、公司财务治理和公司环境治理方面,分析了必然性和内容。分析了对目标公司治理评价的程序和原则,重点讨论了对目标公司治理的评价指标体系,从公司股权结构、公司高层权力制衡、公司高层管理团队治理、公司财务治理和公司环境方面等方面进行阐述。分析了对目标公司治理的评价原则与方法以及评价指标体系中的权变因子。第四,机构投资者对目标公司治理评价实证研究。本章首先对基于机构投资者视角的目标公司治理评价体系设计的实证样本进行了描述性统计分析。然后,运用主成分分析法提取出关键因子,通过快速聚类对实证样本进行聚类分析。针对每一权变类型中的实证研究样本基金,归纳出各类权变环境中治理效应得分较高的目标公司治理评价因素,形成各种权变影响类型中目标公司治理评价因素组合体系。第五,政策建议。本章主要是在理论推演与实证研究的基础上,对基于机构投资者视角的目标公司治理评价体系,从宏观和微观两个层面提供一些相关的政策建议。首先,政府要积极发展合格的机构投资者,优化其内、外部环境,为其发展提供良好平台。其次,目标公司要从股权结构、高层权力结构、高层管理团队治理、财务治理以及环境治理方面积极完善其自身的治理,为机构投资者的投资选股和自身的发展壮大创造条件。当然,机构投资者也要不断完善自身的治理,通过政府、目标公司、机构投资者等多方配合,实现共生共赢。更多还原

【Abstract】 Institutional investors are the legal forms of investment organizations. As the environment changes since 1980s, mutual funds and other institutional investors in the United States shifted in paradigm from negativism to activism, as powerful representatives of the interests of shareholders began to participate in corporate governance. Similarly, Chinese institutional investors in recent years have experienced similar trends. As a prerequisite for participation in governance, China’s institutional investors need to learn from international experience, adapt to local environment and the company’s own development needs. This will naturally result in the need for institutional investors to rate the governance of the target corporate. Such developments will result in a number of benefits:they may help China’s institutional investors to form a new business profit model, to reduce agency problems and shareholder diversification issues, to prompt target company to improve the quality of governance, to build the confidence of institutional investors, to attract stable long-term capital flows, and to improve the overall well-being of the society. This dissertation explores China’s funds and other institutional investors’rating of governance of target corporate. Theories used for the study include principal-agent theory, strategic management theory, conflict management theory and performance evaluation theory. The dissertation integrates research results of domestic and international researches, focusing on the shift from established governance structure to the optimization of governance mechanism, targeted to provide a set of evaluation indicators and their criteria, with a view to an objective judgments and evaluation of institutional investors to target identification index system of corporate governance. The dissertation combines results from domestic and international research and uses both theoretical analysis and empirical study. The author seeks to use such research to contribution to the laying of the foundation for fund institutional investors and corporate governance objectives’long-term development.The first part of this dissertation researches and analyzes the trend of institutional investors in corporate governance, and then introduces rating methods by institutional investors of the governance of the target corporate. The dissertation analyzes changes in the traditional models and methods institutional investors use in choosing the target company, trends in international institutional investors in governing the target corporate, and models of the United States, Japanese, German corporate governance. The dissertation compares national governance models and offers an analysis of their convergence. The dissertation then explores China’s development of institutional investors in their specific environments, their participation in the target corporate governance and the trend of rating the corporate governance in target companies.Secondly, this dissertation uses literature review and mathematical analysis to analyze the objective rationality of institutional investors on the target corporate as well as the interests of the integration of corporate governance. The prerequisite of institutional investors in governing the target corporate include a principal-agent relationship, shareholder conflict of interest and the free-rider problem of interest, the competing interests of shareholders, managers and the internal control problem. This dissertation analyzes the motives and strengths of institutional investors in participating in the target corporation governance, as well as the effect analysis of institutional investors in participating in the target corporation governance, and research to institutional investors on the target game models of corporate governance to analyze, model and prove the integration of interests of institutional investors and managers.Thirdly, the dissertation offers a research on the boundaries, structure and framework of institutional investors in rating the corporate governance. It analyzes the necessity and content of the institutional investors participation in corporate governance from the perspectives of ownership structure, high-power structure, top management team governance, financial governance and environmental management. The dissertation analyzes the institutional investors’corporate governance procedures and principles, with a focus on the identification of target indicators of corporate governance, from the perspectives of ownership structure, high-power structure, top management team governance, financial governance and environmental management. The dissertation also analyzes the target of corporate governance recognition principles and methods and recognizes the contingency factor of indicator system.Fourth, the dissertation discusses the empirical study of institutional investors on the target of corporate governance. It begins by offering a description of the statistical analysis of the sample of corporate governance from the institutional investors’ perspective. Then, the dissertation uses principal component analysis method to extract the key factors through the rapid clustering of positive samples for cluster analysis. It then discusses contingency for each type of empirical research samples, sums up the factors of objective corporate governance which get the higher scores among various types of contingency environments, and proposes a composite system of target corporate governance among various types of contingency effects.Fifth, based on empirical study and theoretical deductions, the dissertation offers some macro and micro policy recommendations based on the perspective of institutional investors’identification system of corporate governance. First, the government should actively develop qualified institutional investors to optimize their internal and external environment, and provide a good platform for their development. Second, the target company should actively improve their governance including ownership structure, high-power structure, top management team governance, financial governance and environmental management, to create conditions for institutional investors’investment and their own expansion. Institutional investors should also constantly improve their own governance. Last but not least, the government, the target companies and institutional investors should seek to achieve win-win symbiosis.更多还原