【作者】 刘铭；

【导师】 侯风云；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 国民经济学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 从十一届三中全会召开至今,中国的改革开放已经进行了近31年的时间。30多年来,我国的国民经济和社会发展在取得巨大成就的同时,也积累起诸多不容忽视的问题。对这些成就与问题,显然不应该仅仅局限在宏观经济运行的层面进行解释,而必须从制度安排的层面和制度变迁的角度去探索一个合理的答案。对后续改革的方向和趋势的把握,也需要从制度以及制度背后的利益集团入手,进行有深度的梳理。正是基于上述考虑,本文综合运用马克思主义制度分析方法和新制度经济学的制度变迁理论,构建了“三角螺旋”制度变迁模型,并以此为工具,对中国转轨的成就与问题进行了解释。“三角螺旋”制度变迁模型将制度、增长与分配三个要素整合到同一个分析框架中,并在厘清三者之间的作用机制的基础上,将制度变迁的过程拆分、细化,详细描述了制度变迁路径在动态中的决定机制。综合来看,制度变迁并不是始终遵从“帕累托改进”的原则,从某种意义上说,而是恰恰相反,制度变迁与利益调整及经济增长三者之间的互动关系,会使后续制度变迁步入“强者恒强、弱者恒弱”的恶性循环,在初次制度变迁中受益的集团将会推动制度向更有利自己的方向发展,而在初次制度变迁中受到损害和削弱的利益集团,在后续的改革中仍将处于被剥夺的地位。只有在政府的强力调控下,才可能走出这一困境。这一模型不仅解释了我国转型期的经济增长特征,而且指出了转型期利益分配失衡的制度根源,对我国的转轨实践有着很强的解释力。在模型构建后,本文还以此为工具对我国国有产权变革和房地产市场发展的制度逻辑和利益关系进行了分析,指出了后续改革的重点。同时,本文还特别强调了政府在转轨中的重要作用,政府既是参与制度变迁的利益集团,同时也是调控制度变迁的根本力量,只有科学把握政府定位、加快推进政府转型、不断提高政府能力,才能将改革进一步推向深化。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since the Third Plenum of the Eleventh CCP Congress, China’s reform and opening up has been carried out for nearly 31 years. Over the 30 plus years, China has not only made great achievements in economic and social development, but also piled up a lot of problems that cannot be ignored. Obviously, these achievements and problems should not be viewed simply from the perspective of macro economy. A reasonable answer must be sought from the perspectives of institutional arrangements and changes. For the direction and trend of the ensuing reform, institution and interest groups behind instruction should be focused to conduct thorough analysis and propose countermeasures. Based on the above considerations, the paper employs the Marxist institutionalism’s analytical method and institutional change theory of the new institutional economics to build the "Triple Helix" model of institutional change so as to explain the achievements and problems in China’s transition.In the "Triple Helix" model of institutional change, institution, growth and distribution are put in the same framework for analysis. Based on the understanding of the interactions of these three elements, the process of institutional change is further decomposed and divided to describe in details the determining mechanism of institutional change path in dynamic status. Comprehensively, institutional change doesn’t always follow the principle of "Pareto improvement". On the contrary, in some sense, the interactions of institutional change, interest adjustment and economic growth would bring the ensuing institutional change to a vicious circle that "the strong stay strong and the weak stay weak". Interest groups benefiting from the first round of institutional changes would promote the institution in the direction beneficial to their own development while those damaged and weakened in the first round of institutional changes would remain in the position of being exploited in the ensuing reform. Only with strong regulation of the government can this cycle be broken. This model not only explains the features of China’s economic growth during the transition period, but also points out institution as the root cause of improper distribution of interests in the transition period. It strongly explains the practices in China’s transition. With the model as a tool, the paper also analyzes the institutional logical and interest relationship of China’s state-owned assets reform and real estate market development and reveals the key point of the ensuing reform.Meanwhile, the paper also emphasizes the critical role of government in the transition. Government is not only an interest group of the institutional change but also the fundamental force to regulate it. Only by well positioning the government, accelerating government transition and continuously improving the government’s capability can the reform be further advanced.更多还原