【作者】 韦倩；

【导师】 黄少安；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 政治经济学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 人类是自然界中唯一可以在大规模群体中与陌生人合作的物种。从进化的视角看,这种现象令人非常困惑,因为合作的个体需要自己承担成本但却给非亲缘的群体成员带来收益。这种现象引起了生物学、社会学、人类学、经济学等领域众多学者的关注。但是不可否认,现有的经济学体系都是以“竞争”作为主线的,“合作”在经济学中远没有获得与竞争同等的关注和研究,对“合作”的解释、描述显得非常不足,这显然是经济学的缺憾。其实,任何一个事物都包含着多种特征,而认识每一个特征都需要特定的视角。在很多情况下,合作和竞争已经成为人类同一种行为的两种不同属性,就像一枚硬币的两面,而忽视任何一方将会导致对人类行为的片面理解。因此,传统经济学理论体系以“竞争”作为主线的视角并非是唯一的和完整的,将人类本性中与竞争相对应的另一面——“合作”融入到经济学的基本理论中,将会使经济学的理论大厦建立在更坚实的客观基础之上。目前,国外基于合作视角对人类行为的研究虽然已不少,但是这些研究依然没有形成一套系统的经济学理论体系,而国内的研究主要停留在对国外研究进行介绍和模仿上,创新很少。鉴于此,本文拟对人类合作行为进行系统分析,试图能够在一些基础性的研究工作上取得突破,并初步构建合作经济学的理论分析框架。本文得出的某些结论具有一定的启发性,能够丰富我们对人类行为的理解。本文写作的基本思路是运用规范的经济学研究方法紧紧围绕人类合作行为来进行分析和研究。黄少安(2000)对合作经济学应有的主要理论构件进行了展望,但是本文不打算对所有的的理论构件都进行探讨,而是围绕着最重要和最迫切的几个问题进行研究,试图在较短的时间里能够在理论上取得一些突破。全文共分七章。第一章为引言部分,主要介绍本文的写作目的、意义、结构安排、创新之处等问题,另外,还从经济思想史的高度论述了一些经典作家的著作中对人类合作行为的关注,比如托马斯·霍布斯、约翰·洛克、让-雅克·卢梭、曼瑟尔·奥尔森等。第二章为相关基本范畴与影响群体合作的因素。本章主要对“合作”的一些基本范畴进行界定,还基于实验和田野调查的最新证据对影响群体合作的因素进行了分析和总结,发现群体成员的异质性一般会损害群体的合作;群体的规模和成员的经济不平等性与群体合作能力之间一般也认为是负相关的,虽然不如异质性特征那么明显;已有研究也证实,群体良好的制度安排,比如良好的沟通机制、惩罚机制、分配机制和管理机制,可以提高群体的合作能力。第三章为强互惠理论综述:强互惠行为与人类合作秩序。首先介绍了强互惠行为在维持人类合作秩序中的作用,接下来回顾了近年来强互惠理论的进展状况,主要包括强互惠理论为什么会产生、强互惠的证据、强互惠的生物基础、强互惠者惩罚的依据以及强互惠的演化等,并在文末对强互惠理论的现有文献进行了总体评述,并简单讨论了强互惠理论今后研究的发展方向。第四章为强互惠理论的拓展:提高惩罚能力的若干社会机制与群体合作秩序的维持。强互惠行为能够稳定演化的一个重要条件是要求强互惠者能够以低成本对背叛者进行严厉的惩罚,即惩罚行为本身对背叛者造成的伤害要大于惩罚者为此付出的成本,但是现实情况是惩罚者并非总是背叛者的对手,如果人们不能够以低成本的代价施加严厉的惩罚,依靠惩罚行为来维持群体内部合作的信念将很难再被坚持,因此,在更宽松的条件下讨论强互惠行为的演化具有非常重要的理论价值,本章进一步思考了人类社会中存在的可以有效增强惩罚能力的若干社会机制,即规范的内化、缔结同盟与第三方介入,并在Gintis(2000)模型结论的基础上构建一个简单数理模型来分析上述三种机制对人类利他性惩罚行为演化和群体合作秩序的影响。模型显示,在单个惩罚者不能满足惩罚行为稳定演化的条件下,上述三种社会机制却可以使强互惠行为能够在更广泛的条件下存活,从而进一步拓展了原有研究的作用范围。第五章为合作经济学理论体系框架,主要对合作经济学理论体系发展的一些基本问题进行了讨论,由于现实生活中表现出了以竞争作为主线的自利模型不能解释的大量事例,因此我们试图将公平纳入到“经济人”假设中来构建合作经济学,并为其提供了翔实的科学证据,本章还对合作经济学的基本理论内容以及基本方法论等问题进行了探讨。在接下来的两章,将分别对合作经济学的企业理论与增长理论进行研究。第六章为企业的性质:一个基于合作视角的分析框架。在对企业性质的考察上,过分依赖交易成本的解释并不能完全洞察企业的本质,企业的性质还应包含了更丰富的内容,詹姆斯·S·克罗曼(James S.Coleman,1990)认为,当群体成员有个人动机去采取减少群体总福利的行为时,关于行为的规范就会产生。从这个角度来讲,没有人们面临诸如囚徒困境博弈格局中的“背叛”的选择,人类社会中的国家、法律、礼俗、规范、组织和种种制度在很大程度上都是多余的了,因此,任何制度都有其“合作性”的一面,企业也不例外,因此,本章把企业抽象为对雇主和雇员之间的博弈进行治理的一组制度安排,在讨论企业的性质时,不再以交易成本为中心,而是以合作为中心探讨企业促进合作的机制,我们发现,企业通过长期博弈效应、声誉效应和激励与惩罚效应等一系列治理机制使得雇员在企业中实施更高的努力程度,带来了更高的产出,雇主也乐意支付雇员较高的工资水平,从而跳出了“囚徒困境”,实现了企业成员之间的合作。第七章为经济增长中的合作因素,现有的关于人类合作行为的研究都无例外的把重点放在微观层面,而我们所关心的问题之一就是:既然合作可以促进效率、提高经济主体的效用,那么社会上众多合作行为总的效果是什么呢?加总的合作行为对经济增长能够产生多大的贡献?经济学研究中这种加总的传统由来已久,代表性的人物就是凯恩斯。据我们所知,目前国内外还没有从宏观角度来考察人类合作行为对整个社会经济增长的贡献的研究,我们运用规范的经济学研究方法构建了一个包含合作因素的经济增长模型,试图填补这一理论空白。更多还原

【Abstract】 Unlike any other species, humans often cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers in large groups. This kind of behavior is puzzling from an evolutionary perspective because cooperating individuals incur individual costs to confer benefits on unrelated group members. This unique phenomenon has been wide concerned by many scholars in biology, sociology, anthropology, economics and other fields. However, it is undeniable that the existing systems of economics are based on competition and cooperation has not been received the same attention as competition. It is very inadequate to describe and explain about cooperation in economics. This is an obvious deficiency of economics. In fact, every thing contains a variety of characters, and to understand each character requires specific perspective. In many cases, cooperation and competition has become two different property of a behavior, just like the two sides of a coin, and the neglect of any side will result in incomplete understanding about human behavior. Therefore, it is not exclusive and complete to take the perspective of competition in traditional economics. To blend cooperation, the other corresponding side of competition in human nature, into the basic theory of economics, will build a solid basis for economics.At present, there are a lot of researches on human cooperative behaviors in foreign countries, but these studies still have not formed a system. The domestic researches often introduce and imitate about foreign studies and lack innovation. Therefore, I intend to conduct systematic analysis of human cooperation and try to make a breakthrough in some basic research and build initially an analysis framework about cooperative economics. Some conclusions in this paper is illuminating and be able to enrich our understanding of human behavior. The basic idea of this paper is to analyze focusing closely on human cooperation by standardized research methods of economics. Shaoan Huang(2000) brings forward the main theoretical components of cooperative economics, but I do not want to explore and discuss all of these. I will focus on the most important and pressing questions in order to achieve some theoretical breakthrough in a short period. This paper consists of seven chapters. Chapter one Introduction. This chapter mainly introduces the questions of purpose, significance, structure, innovations and other issues. In addition, I introduce a number of writings of classical writers on human cooperative behavior from the viewpoint of the history of economic, such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Mancur Olson, etc.Chapter two Related Categories and Factors Influencing Community’s Cooperation. This chapter mainly defines some related categories with cooperation and reviews the most concerned factors which influence the cooperation of communities based on the latest evidences of laboratory experiment and field study in literatures. Community heterogeneity is generally found to be detrimental to cooperation. Community size and wealth inequality is less clear-cut, although in general both of them seem to reduce cooperation. Good institutional arrangements in groups, such as the existence of a forum for discussions, the ability to punish deviators and to monitor agent of community, the well-defined distribute and management rules can improve the ability of groups to cooperate.Chapter three Review about the Theory of Strong Reciprocity. In this chapter, I first introduce the role of strong reciprocity in the maintenance of the order of human cooperation, then review recent progress in the theory of strong reciprocity, includes the question of why the theory of strong reciprocity come into being, the evidences of strong reciprocity, the biological basis of strong reciprocity, determination of punitive behavior of strong reciprocator, and the evolution of strong reciprocity. At the end, I review lectures about the theory of strong reciprocity.Chapter four Expansion of the Theory of Strong Reciprocity: Some Social Mechanisms of Improving the Ability of Punishment and Maintenance of Cooperation in Human Groups. One important condition for the stable evolution of strong reciprocity is that strong reciprocator can carry out severe punishment to betrayer at a low cost. But the reality is that the punisher is not always the opponent of the traitor. If human do not be able to inflict serious punishment at a low cost, it is very difficult to insist the faith of relying on punishment to maintain cooperation within the groups. Therefore, it is very important to discuss the evolution of strong reciprocity at more relaxed conditions. In this chapter, I analyze more deeply a number of social mechanisms of enhancing the ability of punishment, which is internalization of norms, alliance and the intervention of third-party. Based on the model of Gintis (2000), I build a simple mathematical model to analyze the impact of the above-mentioned three mechanisms on the evolution of altruistic punishment and cooperation in groups. The model implies that these three mechanisms can make strong reciprocity survive at a wider range of conditions if a single punisher can not meet the condition of the stable evolution of punishment. Thus our work further expands the present study.Chapter five An Analytical Framework of Cooperative Economics. Some basic issues about the theory of cooperative economics are discussed in this paper. In reality, there are substantial examples which can not be explained by the self-interest model of economic theory dominated by competition. So we try to incorporate fairness into the assumption of "economic agent" to build cooperative economics, for which we provide some scientific evidences in detail. We also discuss the basic theories and the basic Methodologies of cooperative economics. In the next two chapters, I will introduce the firm theory and economic growth theory of cooperative economics.Chapter six The Nature of Firm: an Analytical Framework Based on the Perspective of Cooperation. As to the nature of firm, those explanations that excessively relying on transaction costs can not put insight into its nature. The nature of firm should have a richer content. James S. Coleman (1990) considers that when group members have personal motives to adopt behavior to reduce the total welfare of the group, the criterion about acts will be generated. From this perspective, without choices of betrayal in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, it will be superfluous of the state, law, customs, norms, organizations and various institutions in our society to a large extent. Therefore, any institution has its cooperative property, firm is in no exception of course. Firm can be abstracted to a group of institutional arrangements which can control the game between employers and employees. When discussing the nature of firm, we try to probe into cooperation mechanism of firm centered on cooperation instead of on transaction costs. We found that through a series of governance mechanisms such as effects of the long-term game, reputation effects and incentive and punitive effects, firms make employees implement a higher level of effort, furthermore, bring a higher output. Meanwhile, employers are willing to pay employees more. As a result, firms jump out of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and accomplish the cooperation between employers and employees.Chapter seven Cooperation in Economic Growth. All of literatures about human cooperation are concentrated in the micro-level. Since cooperation can promote efficiency and improve the utility of economic entities, what we concern is that what’s the accumulated effect of the entire community’s cooperation, and that to what extent the contributions are made by the overall cooperation actions to economic growth? As far as we know, there is no research which studies the effect of cooperation on the economic growth from the macro point of view. Therefore, this paper puts the factor of cooperation into the economic growth theory using the standard economic methods. Then I build an endogenous economic growth model containing the factors of cooperation, capital, labor and knowledge.更多还原